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INTRODUCTION

The practice ofjudicial scrutiny of legislation and executive action challenged
on constitutional or other legal grounds has long been understood to be a necessary
corollary of the principle of judicial review.' But judicial scrutiny stands in a
curious position in contemporary constitutional scholarship. On the one hand,
anyone who teaches or writes about constitutional law recognizes that, at least since
the 1930s, the decision by a majority of Supreme Court justices to apply a particular
level of scrutiny to constitutionally challenged actions of the other branches is an
essential first step in the Court's analysis of the constitutionality of that action, and
often the crucial factor driving the analysis. Moreover, constitutional law specialists
recognize that the scrutiny level decision, once made, brings a set of doctrinal
baggage with it. Levels of scrutiny come with their own doctrinal tests for
evaluating legislation; those tests come with their own refinements. The scrutiny
level decision, in sum, spawns a complex web of formulas and judicial guidelines
for the levels' application that takes up a lot of the doctrinal space in modem
constitutional law. It seems not much of an overstatement to say that the Supreme
Court's constitutional jurisprudence for the last sixty-odd years has been
consistently preoccupied with what level of judicial scrutiny to afford
constitutionally challenged actions by other branches of government.2
Nonetheless, there has been very little discussion among commentators-and
most of that attenuated-about how or why the Court's scrutiny levels jurisprudence
emerged. There has been ample discussion of the particular scrutiny level choices
Court majorities have made and some effort to instruct the Court about the

1. At least after Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), Martin v. Hunter'sLessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), and Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). For more
detail, see DAVIDP. CURRIE, THECONSTITUTION INTHESUPREME COURT: THEFIRSTHUNDREDYEARS
1789-1888, at 67-74, 91-102 (1985); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL
CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 495-524 (abr. ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1988).
2. This preoccupation may be underrecognized because Court opinions often do not openly
acknowledge the scrutiny levels decision but instead merely employ a particular doctrinal framework
associated with the level. But opinions in which the scrutiny levels decision is contested (which have
consistently surfaced) reveal that the scrutiny level decision drives the Court's doctrinal framework.
See, for example, the debate among the justices in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), and
Craigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), as to the appropriate level of scrutiny to be afforded in gender
discrimination cases.
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appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to a given line of cases There has been
widespread recognition that the Court's scrutiny levels have changed over time,
both in their formulation and in their application.4 There has been abundant
criticism of the coherence of the levels, especially as the Court has applied them to
cases. Recently, several commentators suggested that the Court's established
scrutiny levels typology, which features at least three and possibly as many as six
levels of scrutiny, is on the verge of degeneration! But there have been few efforts
to analyze the scrutiny levels practice as a historical phenomenon.6 This seems all
the more striking because for a time span of 150 years, in which the Court rendered
numerous decisions reviewing the acts of legislatures on constitutional grounds, it
made a quite different set of scrutiny level choices from the sets it has employed
since the 1930s.
During the period from Marbury v. Madison7 to United States v. Carolene
Products, Co.,' the Court essentially subjected all challenged decisions of other
branches to the same standard of review, but at the same time it often lingered over
the question ofwhether it could constitutionally review a decision by the Executive
or Legislature at all. Although the Court's posture of review during that time period

can fairly be described as heightened, that description would be misleading because

no other levels of scrutiny existed.9 Further, the Court did not employ any of the

3. Gerald Gunther's article, The Supreme Court,1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a ChangingCourt: A Modelfor a Newer EqualProtection,86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972),
is an influential example of scholarship that seeks to instruct the Court about relevant factors in a
scrutiny levels decision.
4. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: ILLUSION AND REALITY
74-102 (2001) [hereinafter SHAMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION] (discussing the Court's
development and use ofthe multiple scrutiny levels); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The
Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO STATE L.J. 161, 162-63 (1984) [hereinafter
Shaman, Cracks in the Structure] (discussing the changes in scrutiny levels jurisprudence from the
Warren Court to the Burger Court and the creation of intermediate scrutiny).
5. See Shaman, Cracks in the Structure, supra note 4, at 172-77, 182-83; R. Randall Kelso,
FillingGaps in the Supreme Court's Approach to ConstitutionalReview of Legislation: Standards,
Ends, and Burdens Reconsidered, 33 S. TEX. L. REV. 493, 514-16, 540-47 (1992); Calvin Massey,
The New Formalism: Requiem For Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 990-97 (2004).
6. Other than the quite brief historical discussions in Shaman, Cracksin the Structure,supra note
4; SHAMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 4; and Massey, supra note 5, at 947-57,
there are two other sources that describe the historical context of the Court's scrutiny levels practice:
LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978) and HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA

A.PERRY, FREEDOM AND THE COURT (8th ed. 2003). Both sources are primarily concerned with fitting

the Court's scrutiny levels jurisprudence into the major themes oftheir works. Tribe relates the practice
to the various "models of constitutional law" he outlines in his book. See TRIBE, supra, at 564-75.
Abraham and Perry attempt to canvass some political and philosophical justifications for a "double
standard" ofjudicial review in economic cases and civil liberties cases. See ABRAHAM &PERRY, supra,
at 25-32.
7. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
8. 304 U.S. 144 (1937).
9. SHAMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 4, at 74, 112, identifies a handful of
nineteenth-century cases in which the Court alluded to a presumption of constitutionality for legislation.
See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213,
270 (1827); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 531 (1871); Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S.
700, 718 (1878); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96 (1879). But those allusions seem to have been
rhetorical devices rather than evidence of an actual practice of deferential review, or indeed, of any
consciousness of levels of judicial scrutiny toward constitutionally challenged actions by other
branches. SHAMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supranote 4, at 74; Willard Hurst, Review and
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analytical criteria it subsequently came to associate with the scrutiny level decision,
such as whether a particular legislative or executive decision allegedly affected
"fundamental" constitutional rights, or whether that decision rested on a
constitutionally "suspect" classification of individuals or groups or an "invidious"
discrimination between them.'o Instead, the Court's decision to review an action of
another branch turned on a criterion that modems have come to associate not with
judicial scrutiny but with justiciability: whether a decision of another "department"
of government lies within the "discretion" of that department.
This Article represents an effort to historicize the Court's scrutiny levels
jurisprudence." The Article first sketches a historical account of the Court's
response to the constitutionally challenged actions of other branches from Marbury
to Carolene Products. The Article then explores the emergence of the Court's
modem approach to judicial scrutiny. In the process, this Article addresses two
related sets of questions.
The first set of questions focuses on the antecedents of the Court's modem
scrutiny levels jurisprudence. I attempt to recover the Court's approach toward
challenged decisions of other branches from the early-nineteenth century, when its
power to review both federal and state statutes that allegedly violated the
Constitution was definitely established, to the 1930s, when it initiated what I will
be calling bifurcated review, as outlined in Carolene Products,and thus began to
develop a constitutional jurisprudence of scrutiny levels. I ask how the Court's pre-

the DistributionofNationalPowers, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 140, 156 (Edmond Cahn
ed., 1954).

By the 1880s, the Court had identified a category of businesses "affected with a public interest"
that were subject to police power regulations if the regulation was not unreasonable. See Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876); see infra notes 203-15 and accompanying text. In at least one earlytwentieth-century opinion, O'Gorman & Young v. HartfordFirelns. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931), Justice

Brandeis, for the Court, stated that since "[t]he statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly
within the scope of the police power.... [Tihe presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." 1d. at 257-58. That

"presumption of constitutionality," however, was limited to cases involving businesses-in O 'Gorman,
the fire insurance business--"affected with a public interest." Id. at 257.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. The term "historicize" seeks to capture the double role I assign to history in this Article and
in other recent works on American constitutional jurisprudence. Historicizing a doctrine or practice in

contemporary constitutional law, or a concept in contemporary constitutional commentary, refers to the
process of simultaneously locating and explaining the historical origins of the doctrine, practice, or
concept and demonstrating its contingency as an analytical phenomenon. Historicizing legal constructs
undermines their universality by associating them with the particularistic concerns of a prior moment
in time. For additional examples of the technique, see G. Edward White, The ConstitutionalJourney
ofMarbury v. Madison, 89 VA. L. REv. 1463 (2003) [hereinafter White, ConstitutionalJourney] and
G. Edward White, Unpacking the JudicialCenter, 85 N.C. L. REv. 1089 (2005) [hereinafter White,
Unpacking the JudicialCenter].
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CaroleneProductsapproach to other branch decisions should be understood 2 and
why that approach came under strain in the early-twentieth century.
The next set of questions is connected to the collapse of the Court's initial
approach to the challenged decisions of other branches and its replacement with an
approach, explicitly set forth in Justice Stone's "footnote four" in Carolene
Products3 and implicitly adopted in some earlier cases in the 1930s, which sought
to establish two categories of constitutionally challenged legislation that would
invoke two different levels of judicial scrutiny. I ask how and why that approach
emerged. In the process of exploring those questions, I address the connection
between the Court's bifurcated approach to constitutional review and two other
interpretive techniques it employed in early twentieth-century constitutional cases:
glosses on open-ended constitutional provisions such as "due process of law" and
judicial incorporation of provisions of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In outline form, this Article's narrative begins by describing the connections
between republican constitutional theory, the conception of constitutionalism that
informed the founders' generation, and the twin principles of judicial review and
departmental discretion that lay at the heart of republican constitutionalism. This
Article then proceeds to show how a robust conception of departmental
discretion-which allowed the Court to avoid reviewing other branch decisions that
involved questions that were "submitted to the executive" or were "political" in
their nature--enabled the Court to treat all other judicial questions as within its
departmental province and thus requiring no deference to other branch actors.
Although the lines between "judicial" and "executive" or "political" questions were
clearly not as bright as the Court's approach suggested, the departmental discretion
principle presupposed that those lines were often self-evident and should be
maintained in close cases.
The departmental discretion principle resulted in the Court's invalidation of
comparatively little federal legislative or executive action through the Civil War,
and in the antebellum years, the Court managed to reach doctrinal accommodations
that permitted states to engage in a fair amount of regulatory and promotional
legislation based on their police powers. But with the Reconstruction Amendments
came a potentially expanded role for the courts as guardians of individual liberties
and property rights, which were newly protected against state interference by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After an early effort to
circumscribe its new role by defining "due process" as whatever was within the
scope of state police powers and then invoking the departmental discretion principle
to avoid reviewing any police power legislation, the Court found itself drawn into
12. I will not be using the phrase "uniformly heightened scrutiny" to describe the Court's
approach to reviewing challenged decisions of other branches in the years from Marbury to Carolene
Products. The phrase invites anachronism because it presupposes that from the time its judicial review
powers were established, the Court self-consciously adopted a posture of scrutiny toward challenged
acts of other branches. Such was not the case. Although the Court placed challenged acts in different
categories and declined to review some of those acts, it used the language ofjusticiablility, not the
language of scrutiny levels, to justify its categorizations.
The phrase "uniformly heightened scrutiny" does capture, however, the fact that prior to Carolene
Products the Court did not invoke any "presumption of constitutionality" for a legislative or executive
decision that it chose to review.
13. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
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the task of "tracing the boundary" between legitimate exercises of the police power
and illegitimate, unconstitutional invasions of private rights. Eventually the Court
openly identified its role as that of boundary tracing. The Court defended that role
on the grounds that its proper function in a republican constitutional order was to
protect the fundamental rights of citizens against state usurpation, and that by doing
so, the Court was merely declaring principles of law, not making law itself or
entering into the domain of policy.
Thus, by the early-twentieth century, as the Court settled comfortably into its
role as boundary tracer, the departmental discretion principle shrunk in significance.
Even in those instances when the Court concluded that the states' police powers or
the federal government's commerce powers prevailed over private rights, the Court
itself was marking the sphere of legislative discretion. Increasingly, the Court was
resorting to the doctrinal formulas it used to place legislation on the permissible or
impermissible sides of the public-private boundary as surrogates for the
departmental discretion principle. As assumptions about the role of humans as
causal agents in the universe-and the role of judges as potential
lawmakers-began to change in the early-twentieth century, the doctrinal formulas
courts had developed to aid them in boundary tracing came to be criticized as
designed to serve the ideological ends of willful humans holding power.
By the second decade of the twentieth century, the idea of lawmaking by
unelected federal judges was deemed inconsistent with democratic theory, which
now seemed a superior alternative to republicanism in a modem industrial society
with broad political participation and a more fluid class structure. Some
commentators openly suggested that the Constitution's meaning should change to
reflect altered social and economic conditions. Others felt that judicial boundary
tracing was too likely to reflect ideological biases to be continued. At the same time,
in Commerce Clause cases and in police power-due process cases involving the
regulation of economic activity or the redistribution of economic benefits, the Court
began to abandon its boundary tracing formulas for a general attitude of deference
to legislators.
In this atmosphere, the Court could have adopted an abdicationist posture
toward judicial review of the other branches' challenged activity, but it did not.
Instead, the Court began to experiment with a posture triggered by scrutiny level
choices: the posture outlined in Carolene Products. Although footnote four in
Carolene Products has come to be seen as a charter for the Court's twentieth
century scrutiny levels jurisprudence, a series of cases the Court decided in the late
1930s and early 1940s involving incorporated rights and foreign affairs issues, as
well as police power-due process issues, present a more complete picture of the
Court's new approach. In those cases, the Court's decision about the level of
scrutiny to be afforded a particular action by another branch of government became
a surrogate for the departmental discretion principle. Because the Court's approach
was not fully abdicationist, but selectively deferential and aggressive, its scrutiny
levels decisions over time became a version of the doctrinal formulas it once
employed in boundary tracing.
With the last development, this Article reaches the current state of judicial
scrutiny in constitutional jurisprudence. Some commentators have suggested that
the approach the Court has employed since CaroleneProducts, now reflected in
multi-tiered scrutiny levels with attendant doctrinal baggage, is in a state of
collapse. The history of judicial scrutiny suggests that the disintegration of the
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol57/iss1/3
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Court's scrutiny levels jurisprudence maybe inevitable as the weight of its doctrinal
baggage increases and contemporary actors become further removed from the
intellectual and social conditions that made a scrutiny-triggered approach to judicial
review appear attractive. To understand the future of judicial scrutiny of
constitutionally challenged legislation, the Article concludes, one needs to
understand that history.
II.

REPUBLICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL

THEORY

AND

JUDICIAL

REVIEW:

THE

TRADITIONAL REGIME

This Section describes the Supreme Court's dominant approach to reviewing
constitutionally challenged actions of other branches from the early-nineteenth
century to the 1930s. Before that approach can be mapped through an analysis of
individual cases, it is necessary to understand the approach's connection to the
constitutional theory that animated it: American constitutional republicanism of the
founding generation. The Court's dominant approach to judicial review throughout
the nineteenth century represented a fusion of two of the framers' foundational
principles: the principle of republican-style judicial supremacy and the principle of
departmental discretion. 4 Both principles undergirded an idealized role for the
judicial department, as personified by the Supreme Court, in the new American
constitutional republic.
A. Republican Constitutional Thought and the Principle of Departmental
Discretion
The 1819 Term of the Supreme Court was one of the most momentous in its
history, including the arguments and decision in McCulloch v. Maryland'5 and the
Court's disposition of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,'6 which had been set for
reargument but was suddenly decided, with full opinion, on the first day the Court's
Term opened.' 7 By the close of the 1819 Term, a number of the Court's germinal
constitutional decisions had been decided: Marbury,'s Fletcher v. Peck,'9 New

14. See White, ConstitutionalJourney, supra note 11 (arguing that the framers' version of
judicial supremacy presupposed a defined set of constitutional issues that judges were capable of
deciding in a disinterested fashion, and that the principle of departmental discretion served as a
counterweight to judicial supremacy). The departmental discretion principle was grounded on a
foundational belief of republicans of the framing generation: that preservation of the separate,
autonomous powers of governmental "departments" was vital to the survival of republics.
15. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
16. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
17. For details see WHITE, supra note 1, at 176-80. The Court's Term in Washington, for most

ofJohn Marshall's tenure as Chief Justice (1801-1835), extended only from the first week in February
or the second week in January until the end of March. The rest ofthe year the Justices remained in their
home communities or tended to their duties as Circuit Court judges, traveling from courthouse to
courthouse within the geographic circuits to which they were assigned. "Circuit riding," as it was
called, occupied the Justices in the spring and fall. See id. at 159-64.
18. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
19. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (holding that states cannot constitutionally rescind land grants
to individuals who purchased the land in good faith).
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Jersey v. Wilson,2" Terrett v. Taylor,2' Martin v. Hunter'sLessee,22 and Sturges v.
Crowninshield," as well as Dartmouth College24 and McCulloch. Commentators
had become aware of the Court's unquestioned importance as an actor in the
American constitutional and political system.
The Dartmouth College case demonstrated the Court's preparation to "pack"
the Contracts Clause of the Constitution with the republican credo of protection for
the "vested rights" of individuals in order to prevent state legislatures from
modifying the terms of their existing relationships with eleemosynary institutions,
including institutions of higher education. 26 The ramifications of the case initially
seemed immense," and two Boston commentators took the occasion to reflect more
generally on the Court. Some passages from their essays, written in 1819 and 1820,
encapsulate the role of a Supreme Court Justice as it was then understood by
educated elites.28
1.

The Role ofJudges in American ConstitutionalRepublicanism

In one essay, a correspondent of Boston's Columbian Centinel,identified only
as "A," stated that the Dartmouth College decision handed down the "great and
important constitutional principle" that the legislative "powers are limited, not only
by the rules of natural justice . . . but by the very letter and spirit of the
constitution." 9 The chief source of "this restraint" on legislatures was "in our
Courts of Justice."3" The courts, "A" declared, "may be considered the bulwark of

20. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812) (holding that the Contracts Clause overrides a state statute
repealing an exemption from taxation that was repugnant to an existing contract).
21. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815) (holding that a state cannot constitutionally revoke land grants
it previously made).
22. 14 U.S. 304 (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (holding that the Supreme Court has the power to review
final decisions of state courts).
23. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819) (holding that a state statute allowing debtors to discharge debts
incurred before the statute's enactment violates the Contracts Clause).
24. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
25. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
26. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 641. In his 1833 treatise, Commentaries on the
Constitutionof the United States, Justice Joseph Story stated that "[t]he fundamental maxims of a free

government" prevented states from "tak[ing] the property of A. and transfer[ring] it to B. by a mere
legislative act." 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 1393, at 268 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833). For a discussion of how Marshall's opinion in
Dartmouth College "packed" that principle into the Contracts Clause, see WHITE, supra note 1,at
624-28.
27. Marshall gave no indication in his DartmouthCollege opinion that legislatures could modify
the terms of relationships with corporations they chartered, but a concurring opinion by Justice Story
indicated that iflegislatures wanted to avoid violating the Contracts Clause they could reserve the right
to modify terms in their original charters. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 708, 712 (Story, J., concurring); see
WHITE, supra note 1, at 627.
28. Commentary on the Supreme Court by nonlawyers was relatively common in the earlynineteenth century. Particularly in the major cities, men of high social standing "read law" as part of
their general education. The legal and literary communities significantly overlapped in cities such as
Boston, and journals such as the North American Review devoted space to legal as well as to literary
issues. See Alfred S. Konefsky, Law and Culture in Antebellum Boston, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1119,
1125-37 (1988).
29. COLUMBIAN CENTINEL (Boston), Feb. 10, 1819, quoted in WHITE, supra note 1, at 751.
30. Id.
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the Constitution to guard it against legislative encroachments. They are an
intermediate body between the people and the legislature."'"
"A" then went on to say:
It is peculiarly gratifying to discover in [the courts] an inflexible
and uniform adherence to the rights of individuals and those of the
Constitution. It is [a] matter of rejoicing to discover purity and
independence in this branch of our government. These are
qualities essential to the perpetuity of the Constitution. Whenever
the Judiciary department becomes more corrupt than the
Legislative, we must share the common fate of all Republics.32
A year later, Warren Dutton echoed these observations in an article on the
Supreme Court in the North American Review.33 After reviewing Dartmouth
College and several other of the Court's decisions, Dutton emphasized that when
the Constitution was adopted, "[m]uch reliance was placed on the security, which
the due exercise of the judicial power would afford, to the rights of states, as well
as of individuals, when infringed or invaded by the encroaching spirit of legislative
bodies, either in the states or in Congress."34 The "judicial power," Dutton claimed,
"was regarded by the friends of a new and better order of things, as a being,
separated from the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of men, watching and
regulating the movements of a complex system. 3.. "Within the last twenty years,"
he believed, "we have seen the judicial department protecting the rights of the
citizens of a state against the injustice of their own legislatures, and keeping within
their constitutional bounds the legislative and executive powers ofthe union."36 And
"through the disastrous changes that await all free governments," Dutton concluded,
"[the judiciary] may be found to be the strongest barrier against
the tide of popular
3 7
commotions, or the usurping spirit of popular assemblies. 1
In these excerpts, we can see connections between basic premises ofrepublican
political theory and an idealized role for judges as constitutional interpreters. Both
"A" and Dutton assumed that although a republic was the best of all political
worlds, it would inevitably decay;38 the "common fate of all [r]epublics"39 was that
freedom would spark licentiousness, demogaguery, and ultimately corruption and
tyranny.4 ° Nonetheless it was uplifting, for dedicated republicans, to contemplate

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. [Warren Dutton], Book Review, 10 N. AM. REV.83 (1820) (reviewing TIMOTHY FARRAR,
REPORT OF THE CASE OF THE TRUSTEES OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE AGAINST WILLIAM H. WOODwARD
(1819), and 4 HENRY WHEATON, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES (1819)). The book review was untitled. The identification of Dutton as the

book review's author was made by Charles Warren in 2 THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 2 (1922).
34. Id. at 105.

35. Id.
36. Id. at 113.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 114-15; COLUMBIAN

CENTINEI, supra note 29.
39. COLUMBIAN CENTINEL, supra note 29.
40. For a discussion of the pervasiveness of these assumptions in eighteenth and early-nineteenthcentury republican thought, see DREw R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC 32-40 (1980).
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the Constitution as enduring over time, and its strictures against legislative
usurpation of the rights of state governments or individuals as remaining in place
for at least a while. Even more uplifting was the thought of a class of pure and
independent judges guarding the rights protected by the Constitution. As "A" put
it, judges were "an intermediate body between the people" and usurpatious
legislatures." Judges discerned and applied constitutional safeguards that protected
citizens of the republic. Dutton hoped that, in this capacity, judges could separate
themselves from "the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of men" and thus
serve as impartial regulators and watchers of a complex constitutional system. 2 "A"
felt that if the judicial guardians of republican constitutionalism themselves became
corrupt,
"the common fate of all republics," disintegration to tyranny, would
43
ensue.
The judiciary's function in a constitutional republic had its most vital
embodiment in the work of Justices on the United States Supreme Court. Only they
had the power to employ the Constitution to prevent Congress from encroaching on
the powers of states and usurping the rights of individuals. Likewise, only the
Supreme Court could prevent state legislatures from making the same
encroachments and usurpations. The Justices' very lack of accountability to the
other branches of government made them more likely to be independent and free
from corruption. Moreover, as Dutton noted, Americans gave "a new dignity and
higher duty to LAW" by creating a "mode of government" symbolized by a
Constitution that is interpretedbyjudges and designed to subject "legislative bodies
to rule, and hold[ ] them under the restraints of... fundamental principles and
enactments."" By following the dictates of law rather than the passions or the
interests of humans, judges reaffirmed the central role of the Constitution: the
preservation of the American republic from the inevitable pressures of corruption
and tyranny. Both commentators hoped that republican citizens could trust judges
to protect their constitutional rights by following law and thereby transcending

partisanship.
That hope was the flip side of the deep fatalism of republican theorists of the
founding generation. Republican theory assumed that partisanship was endemic in
humans.45 Even judges were not free from its corrupting influences. Yet law in
America could not be partisan if it were to be a force forestalling tyranny and
corruption. "A" spoke of "purity and independence" in judges as essential to
preserving the Constitution." Dutton conceded that "no species of oppression is so
hopeless or so terrible, as that which may be practised under the forms ofjustice,"47
and noted that "every good man would wish that the law should be supreme over
all" only when "justice is allowed to do her work, uncorrupted and unobstructed."48
Judicial maintenance of a distinction between law and partisanship, between
judicial impartiality and judicial willfulness, was thus crucial to the integrity of

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

COLUMBIAN CENTINEL, supra note 29.
Dutton, supra note 33, at 105.
COLUMBIAN CENTINEL, supra note 29.
Dutton, supra note 33, at 113-14.
For the republican assumption that humans are endemically partisan, see ALBERT 0.

HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS 30 (1977).

46. COLUMBIA CENTINEL, supra note 29.
47. Dutton, supra note 33, at 107.
48. Id. at 113.
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judges in American constitutional republicanism. The preoccupation of early
Supreme Court Justices with that distinction is visible in two comments made by the
two dominant judges on the Marshall Court, Chief Justice John Marshall and Justice
Joseph Story.49 In the 1824 case of Osborn v. Bank ofthe United States,50 Marshall,
for the Court, held that Congress's charter of a national bank meant that suits
against the bank must be brought in federal courts,5' and that states could not tax the
bank's operations. 52 Late in his opinion, Chief Justice Marshall responded to the
intimation that he and his fellow judges were using a congressional statute to
increase not only the power of Congress against the states but the power of the
federal courts themselves. Marshall declared:
Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing.
When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal
discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course
prescribed by law ....Judicial power is never exercised for the
purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge... [but only] for
the purpose of giving effect to the will of the legislature; or, in
other words, to the will of the law.53
As for Justice Story, he felt an obligation as ajudge and as a legal commentator
to maintain a bright line between principles of law and partisan political views.
When Justice Story's Commentaries on the Constitution appeared in 1833, it was
treated by his close friends and jurisprudential allies, such as Marshall and the New
York judge and commentator James Kent, as a "bold and free defen[s]e of sound
doctrine, against the insidious, mischievous, and malignant attacks of Jefferson,"
who had been an outspoken opponent of the Marshall Court's alleged
consolidationist tendencies since leaving the Presidency in 1809. 54 Justice Story,
however, stated that his work did not set forth "any novel views[] and novel
constructions of the Constitution," and that he had no "ambition to be the author of
any new plan of interpreting the theory of the Constitution, or of enlarging or
narrowing its powers by ingenious subtleties and learned doubts."" His role as

49. For more on the roles of Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story on the Supreme Court
between 180 1, when Marshall was appointed Chief Justice of the United States, to 1845, when Justice
Story suddenly died at the age of 66, see R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE

OF THE SUPREME COURT (2001), R. KENTNEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY (1985),
and WHITE, supra note 1.
50. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).

51. Id. at 818.
52. Id. at 777, 791.
53. Id. at 865.

54. Letter from James Kent to Joseph Story (June 19, 1833), in 2 WILLIAM W. STORY, LIFE AND
LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 134-35 (1851). Marshall wrote Justice Story, after hearing that his
Commentarieshad been published, that the Commentaries"would give our orthodox nullifyer a fever,"
and that it would provoke "young men" who "grow up in the firm belief that ....[n]othing... is to
be feared but that bugbear, consolidation; and every exercise of legitimate power is construed into a
breach of the constitution." Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Apr. 24, 1833), in THE
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DOCTRINES OF JOHN MARSHALL 149-50 (John Edward Oster ed., photo
reprint 1967) (1914); Letter from John Marshall to Justice Story (June 3, 1833), in THE POUTICALAND
ECONOMIC DOCTRINES OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra, at 151.
55. STORY, supra note 26, at vi.
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commentator was only to "bring[] before the reader the true view of [the
' He wanted readers
Constitution's] powers."56
to think of his treatise as "less... my
own opinions[] than as those ofthe great minds[] which framed the Constitution."57
That Justice Story made these remarks as a commentator rather than as ajudge-in
his last fifteen years on the Court he produced treatises on a variety of legal
subjects---only serves to underscore how invested he was in the idea of true legal
interpretations that would transcend partisanship.
The reaction of contemporaries to Justice Story's treatise, when juxtaposed
against his self-description as a commentator, reveals a paradox that lies at the core
of the idealized role of judges in early American constitutional republicanism.
When Marshall spoke ofjudges exercising "discretion," he identified that paradox.
Judicial "discretion" and judicial "will" conjured up the image of judges as
partisans. And republicans understood that judges were partisans because all
humans were inherently "passionate" and "interested" and thus inevitably in pursuit
of their partisan concerns. The whole structure of republican government was
designed to check the partisanship that led to demagoguery, tyranny, licentiousness,
or corruption; the point of a written Constitution was to codify protections for
citizens against rampant partisanship. Republican government envisaged judges as
participants in the process of checking power usurpations and protecting citizen
rights in a republic, but they were no less human than those they sought to check
through law. Thus, judges had a vital role not only to moderate their own passions
and move beyond their partisan interests but also subordinate their destructive
human tendencies in fidelity to a corpus of law that was more than the aggregate of
edicts by partisan humans holding power. That challenge seemed, in some respects,
inimical to human nature but necessary to keep a constitutional republic from
degenerating.
The paradox described above was embodied in the two opposing but
complimentary principles undergirding the idealized judicial role in the founding
generation's concept of American constitutional republicanism. The principle of
judicial supremacy testified to the ideal that judges should be disinterested
savants-legally trained elites, who had the knowledge to discern and apply legal
authorities, and, having neither purse nor sword, did not have their interests directly
enhanced by their office. As disinterested savants, judges were better suited than
other officeholders to apply the foundational republican beliefs embodied in
authoritative sources of law--of which the Constitution was paramount-to legal
controversies. However, judges' application of authoritative law was limited only
to legal controversies, and both terms had precise constitutional meanings.
Therefore, the judicial "department" created by the Constitution was the chief office
designed to ensure that law protected republican citizens against themselves, but the
judiciary was only designed to operate in the realm of "law," an embodiment of the
sovereign people in a republic that imposed checks even on the sovereign.
Thus, the strength of the judicial supremacy principle in republican
constitutional theory depended on the judiciary exercising that supremacy only
within the confines of its own department-only within those realms where legal

56. Id.

57. Id.

58. See WHITE, supra note 1, at 95.
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training and an appreciation of the primacy of a government of laws gave officials
a selective advantage. Judges certainly had power: the power to authoritatively
resolve disputes and the power to apply law to controversies. Yet republican
theorists sought to equate judicial power with a correct understanding of law.
Judges were not, as Marshall said, exercising the will of the members of the
legislative and executive departments, who had the power to draft, enact, and
enforce laws. They were exercising the will of judges.
The departmental discretion principle followed directly from this confined
description of the judicial department in American republican constitutionalism.
Marshall's disposition of Marbury demonstrated the close affinity between the
principles of judicial supremacy and departmental discretion. Although Marshall
ultimately concluded that the Supreme Court did not have constitutional authority
to issue a writ of mandamus in Marbury's case, he did not reach that issue until
raising and deciding another, which was arguably mooted by his conclusion.
William Marbury sued to recover a judicial commission in the District of Columbia
that had been granted him by outgoing President John Adams, pursuant to
legislation enacted by Congress on February 27, 1801, in the last days of the Adams
administration. Adams signed Marbury's commission and deposited it in the office
of the Secretary of State-who happened, at the time, to be John Marshall. Marshall
failed to deliver Marbury's commission before the newly elected President, Thomas
Jefferson, formally assumed office. Upon assuming office, Jefferson ordered the
new Secretary of State, James Madison, not to deliver the commission.59
In his opinion, Marshall considered whether the courts could review Jefferson's
executive order affecting Marbury's commision. That issue turned, he suggested,
on whether the Executive "possess[ed] a constitutional or legal discretion. ' In
some instances the Constitution had granted the Executive discretionary powers,
such as the power to grant pardons or veto legislation. But the Constitution did not
grant the power to revoke an appointment by Congress-which had Article I power
to pass legislation affecting the District of Columbia-for a specified term of office.
Nor did Jefferson have a "legal" discretion to revoke Marbury's commission,
because it was signed by Adams, Congress's agent, and had arguably "vested" with
Adams's signature." Marbury, Marshall concluded, was seeking a remedy for the
violation of his allegedly vested right to a commission, and hence was entitled to
'
have the question "whether a right has vested ... tried by the judicial authority."62
Although he concluded that the departmental discretion of the Executive did not
preclude judicial review of the legal status of Marbury's commission, Marshall did
so against the backdrop of a broad formulation of the departmental discretion
principle. After concluding that the courts could try the issue of whether Marbury's
commission vested upon Adams's signature, Marshall stated:
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive

59.
Mystery:
(2001).
60.
61.
62.

For an overview of the facts leading to Marbury, see Susan Low Bloch, The Marbury
Why Did William Marbury Sue in the Supreme Court?, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 607,607-09
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
Id. at 162.
Id. at 166-67.
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officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.
Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be
made in this court.63
At first blush, this language would seem to declare a number of arguably "legal"
questions nonjusticiable. Marshall's statement did not simply refer to questions
"submitted to the executive" by the Constitution or other laws, but to questions that
were "in their nature political," a potentially vast category that might include a great
deal of legislation as well as executive actions. Further, Marshall suggested that
courts only passed "on the rights of individuals" when they could fairly allege that
they had "vested" rights for which there were legal remedies.64 A good deal of
legislative or executive activity that arguably had adverse effects on individuals did
not infringe on vested rights. For example, if Adams had promised Marbury that,
pursuant to the 1801 c6ngressional statute providing for the appointment ofjustices
of the peace in the District of Columbia, he would appoint him to a judgeship but
then neglected to sign Marbury's commission or affix it with his Presidential seal,
Marbury would not have been able to successfully complain in a court. Adams's
power to appoint judges in the District of Columbia was a discretionary power of
the executive department. He could choose not to exercise it, and adversely affected
parties could not seek judicial redress.
The broad formulation of the departmental discretion principle made by
Marshall in Marburyhas regularly been minimized by commentators because of a
far more celebrated passage in his opinion. Marshall began that passage by noting
"It]he judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the
constitution." 6pHe then continued:

63. Id. at 170. When he wrote this passage, Marshall seems to have had a clear understanding of
what he meant by questions "submitted to the executive." In a speech before the House of
Representatives on March 7,1800, Marshall discussed whether John Adams, as President of the United
States, had been justified in delivering Thomas Nash (also known as Jonathan Robbins), a seaman
accused of committing a murder on a British frigate, to British authorities. John Marshall Speech on
the Case of Thomas Nash (Mar. 7, 1800), in THE POUTICAL AND ECONOMIC DOCTRINES OF JOHN
MARSHALL, supra note 54, at 225,226-27. Nash sought asylum in the United States, claiming that he
was an American citizen and that he had only resisted an effort to impress him. Id. at 226-27, 251-53.
In the course of defending Adams's decision, Marshall made an extended argument that the Nash
incident turned on executive discretion because it represented "a national demand made upon the
nation," and Adams's decision involved "questions ofpolitical law," such as whether the frigate, which
was captured by an American vessel off the Atlantic Coast, was "legally captured or not, and whether
the American government was bound to restore" the vessel and its prisoners. Id. at 247. In the process
of that argument, Marshall said that "[tihe President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations" and asked:
[i]f at any time policy may temper the strict execution of [a] contract [made
between the United States and another nation], where may that political discretion
be placed so safely as in the department whose duty it is to understand precisely
the state ofthe political intercourse and connection between the United States and
foreign nations?
Id. at 247, 249. Thus "the question whether the nation has or has not bound itself to deliver up any
individual, charged with having committed murder... within the jurisdiction of Britain, is a question,
the power to decide which rests alone with the executive department." Id. at 249.
64. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 167, 170.
65. Id. at 178.
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Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, to say
that, in using it, the constitution should not be looked into?...
This is too extravagant to be maintained.
In some cases then, the constitution must be looked into by
the judges. And if they can open it all, what part of it are they
forbidden to read, or obey?66
This passage has frequently been cited as an argument for the necessity of judicial
interpretation of the Constitution in those cases that "arise under" it-judicial
review of the actions of other branches challenged on constitutional grounds. As
such, the passage does not easily reconcile itself with the earlier Marbury passage
about departmental discretion. The earlier passage suggested that a court cannot
entertain some questions involving the Constitution because they have been
"submitted" to other branches of government or do not involve "legal" subject
matter. 7 What if prospective Article III cases or controversies require a resolution
of such questions?
The typical way modem commentators have made sense of the two passages
in Marbury is to suggest that Marshall's broad formulation of the departmental
discretion principle was artful. In the end courts, as part of their powers of judicial
review, would decide which cases turned on questions that were "political" or
"submitted to the executive" and thus not justiciable. Because judges would
formulate the scope of the departmental discretion principle in cases, departmental
discretion was properly seen as subordinate, rather than complementary, to judicial
supremacy. As Edward Corwin put it in a 1914 article, "[Marshall in Marbury] took
the engaging position of declining to exercise power which the Constitution
withheld from [the Court], by making the occasion an opportunity to assert a far
more transcendant power." 6 At the same time, while "in the very process of
vindicating judicial review, [Marshall] admitted to a degree the principle that had
thus far been contended for only by opponents ofjudicial review[:] .... the doctrine
of departmentaldiscretion.' '69

Corwin's view--commonly reflected in the shibboleth that although courts do
not decide "political questions," what constitutes a "political question" is decided
by courts-represents a caricature of the departmental discretion principle as it was
understood in early nineteenth-century republican constitutional jurisprudence. As
a brief sample of cases illustrates, the departmental discretion principle's scope was
quite impressive, and, more significantly, it was not a principle designed to give
courts ample freedom to expand or contract their jurisdiction as they saw fit. The
most striking feature of the Supreme Court's early-nineteenth-century departmental
discretion cases is the categorical language judges employed in placing a question
in the realm of another department, therefore making it notjusticiable. The language
suggests that beyond the comparatively few cases in which the Court considered
questions that appeared to be at the margins ofjusticiablility and nonjusticiablity,

66. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803).
67. Id. at 170.
68. Edwin S. Corwin, Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine ofJudicial Review, 12 MICH. L.
REV. 538, 543 (1914).
69. Id. at 571.
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many more contested issues may have existed whose resolutions were taken for
granted as being in the province of other departments.
2.

DepartmentalDiscretion Cases, 1819-1855
a. McCulloch v. Maryland

Most of the significant Marshall Court decisions between Marbury and
McCulloch v. Maryland did not provide opportunities for exposition of the
departmental discretion principle. With the exception of Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee,70 the cases did not involve questions about the scope of the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction, and Martin raised that question only with respect to state courts. 7 1 In

McCulloch, however, the Court's power to scrutinize the actions of another
department of the federal government was implicated in its decision about
Congress's constitutional authority to charter a national bank.72 But the Court's
power to submit acts of Congress to constitutional scrutiny was not seriously
contested in McCulloch; the arguments of both sides assumed that the Court

possessed that power. 73 Nonetheless, Marshall did allude to the departmental
discretion principle in his McCulloch opinion and offered a deeper grounding for
his position in subsequent commentary on the case.
Marshall's latitudinarian interpretation of congressional implied powers in
McCulloch arguably raised the question of whether there were any constitutional
limits on the departmental discretion of Congress when it sought to exercise powers
that the Constitution expressly or impliedly granted.74 With that question in mind,
Marshall remarked:
Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures
which are prohibited by the constitution; or should Congress,
under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the
accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it

70. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
71. Id. at 313. The issue of whether the Supreme Court could review final decisions of state
courts on issues involving federal law was contested in some circles. For example, Martin and its
sequel, Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), were criticized in a series of anonymous
articles in the Richmond Enquirer between October 1820 and July 1821, and similar commentary
appeared in the Washington Gazette in the fall of 1821. Yet the Court's power to prevent states from
"nullifying" the federal law's impact on them seemed incumbent in the very concept of a federal Union.
For more detail, see WHITE, supranote 1,at 495-524. In contrast, the issue ofwhether the Court could
review the decisions offederal branches on federal law issues arguably did not threaten the existence
of the new federal government.
72. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
73. See WHITE, supra note 1, at 543-45 (discussing the parties' arguments in McCulloch).
74. "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. For an
earlier case in which Marshall announced that Congress "must be empowered to use any means which
are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the constitution," see United States v.
Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1805).
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would become the painful duty of this
tribunal.., to say that such
75
land.
the
of
law
the
not
was
an act
However, he added:
[W]here the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect
any of the objects entrusted to the government, to undertake ... to

inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line
which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on
legislative ground. This court disclaims all pretensions to such a
power.76
The McCulloch opinion was attacked in anonymous essays in the Richmond
Enquirer, which so provoked Marshall that he responded anonymously in the
PhiladelphiaUnion and the Alexandria Gazette.7 7 Two arguments he advanced in
his anonymous defense of McCulloch explicitly tied the departmental discretion
principle to an idealized view of the judiciary in the American constitutional
republic. The first argument maintained that:
According to [the Constitution] the judicial, is a coordinate
department, created at the same time, and proceeding from the
same source, with the legislative and executive departments.
... [No department] is the deputy of the whole, or of the other

two.... Each is confined to the sphere of action prescribed to it
by the people of the United States, and within that sphere,
performs its functions alone.... On a judicial question then, the
judicial department is the government, and can alone exercise the
judicial power of the United States."8
Although Marshall's argument usually has been seen simply as an effort to invoke
the republican axiom of separated and divided powers to reinforce judicial review,
his argument is more concrete. Marshall suggested that judicial review follows
logically from the departmental discretion principle. The judicial department's
power to scrutinize acts of other departments is both derived from and confined by
the finding that those acts raise "judicial questions." Moreover, the argument
assumes that the nature ofjudicial questions will be self-evident.
Marshall then advanced his second argument:

75. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.
76. Id.
77. See JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V.MARYLAND (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969)
(reprinting the essays attacking McCulloch and Marhall's response). Marshall's essays originally
appeared in the PhiladelphiaUnion in April 1819, under the pseudonym "A Friend ofthe Union," and
were subsequently published, in altered form, in the Alexandria Gazette in May 1819. Gunther's edition
of Marshall's response to attacks on McCulloch is a far superior source to the original versions of those
essays. The printer of the Union essays garbled them, and the Gazette versions, although in the correct
order, are not easily accessible. See Gerald Gunther, UnearthingJohnMarshall'sMajor Out-of-Court
ConstitutionalCommentary, 21 STAN. L. REv. 449,450-52 (1969).
78. John Marshall, A Friendof the Constitution(July 15, 1819), in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE
OF MCCULLOCH V.MARYLAND, supra note 77, at 156, 210,
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[T]he whole political system is founded on the idea, that the
departments of government are the agents of the nation, and will
perform, within their respective spheres, the duties assigned to
them ....
To whom more safely than to the judges are judicial questions
to be referred? ... To secure impartiality, they are made perfectly
independent. They have no personal interest in aggrandizing the
legislative power. Their paramount interest is the public
prosperity, in which is involved their own and that of their
families .... The people are the authors of all; the departments are
their agents; and if the judge be personally disinterested, he is as
exempt from any political interest that might influence his
opinion, as imperfect human institutions can make him."
This argument begins by tying the "departmental" structure of the federal union-as
outlined by the Constitution-more explicitly to the republican axiom that
sovereignty rested in the people of the United States. Marshall's main purpose,
however, was not simply to link departmental discretion to republican theory, but
to supply reasons why judges should decide judicial questions. Judicial questions
in a republic, Marshall intimated, were questions that concerned "public
prosperity," conflicts among citizens, or conflicts between citizens and their
government. Those questions are peculiarly suited to be decided by federal judges
for two reasons. First, federal judges are "perfectly independent," having life tenure
and hence no "personal interest" in "aggrandizing" the power of legislatures who
otherwise might be able to determine the duration of their offices. Although
Marshall, as an orthodox early-nineteenth-century republican, acknowledged the
partisan nature of humans and hence the "imperfect" quality of "human
institutions," he concluded that "personally disinterested" judges would recognize
that "public prosperity" would in turn advance judges' well-being and "that of their
families." Judicial discretion to decide questions of law thus followed from the
impartiality and disinterestedness of judges. Therefore, the impartiality and
distinterestedness ofjudges signified the investment of republican theory in law as
a constraint on human passion and self-interest.
Thus,. by 1819 Marshall had fashioned links between the departmental
discretion principle, judicial review, and two foundational axioms of republican
theory: separation of governmental powers and sovereignty in the people. The main
import of those links, for our purposes, is that they were intended to justify the
power of judges to determine what classes of questions that arose out of social and
political controversies in the republic were judicial and what questions should be
confined to other departments. A translation of Marshall's arguments from the
language of departmental discretion to the languages ofjudicial review and judicial
scrutiny indicates that he was advancing two propositions. First, in terms ofjudicial
review, when judicial questions were raised, the federal courts had full power to
review the acts of other federal departments on constitutional or legal grounds and
to determine the constitutional or legal legitimacy of those acts. Second, in terms
ofjudicial scrutiny, when a judicial question was properly raised with respect to the

79. Id. at 211-12.
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acts of other federal departments, there was no presumption that those acts were
constitutional or otherwise legal. In mid-twentieth-century terms, the level of
judicial scrutiny was always "strict."
Both propositions, however, had important corollaries. When the acts of a
department other than the judiciary raised questions within its own
discretion--questions that were not judicial in their nature-the federal judiciary
possessed no power to resolve those questions. Thus, judicial review in those
instances only extended to the preliminary determination that the acts of another
department raised or did not raise judicial questions. If the other department's acts
did not raise judicial questions, then the departmental discretion principle precluded
further judicial inquiries. In terms ofjudicial scrutiny, if,because the acts involved
the other department's discretion, the other department's acts did not raise judicial
questions, then they were not scrutinized at all.
Therefore, it is hypothetically possible to think of Marshall's departmental
discretion arguments as erecting a structure of scrutiny levels: strict scrutiny for all
acts of other federal departments that raised judicial questions and no scrutiny for
acts that did not raise judicial questions because they involved core departmental
functions. But that hypothectical speculation would be anachronistic. The pivot
point in Marshall's structure was not the level of judicial scrutiny but the nature of
the questions implicated by the acts of another federal department. Marshall and his
contemporaries did not think about levels of judicial scrutiny at all. They thought
about how to establish, in the context of actions by other branches that arguably
raised constitutional or legal issues, the lines between judicial and nonjudicial
questions.
Between Marshall's remarks in 1819 about departmental discretion and 1855,
the Court decided several cases in which it invoked the departmental discretion
principle to conclude that the cases were not justiciable. One striking feature of
those cases is that at least through 1849-when the Court concluded in Luther v.
Borden"0 that the legitimacy of two opposing governments in Rhode Island could
not be settled in a judicial proceeding -the conceptualization of judicial and
nonjudicial questions advanced by Marshall in Marbury remained in place. To
illustrate, in a separate opinion in Luther,8 2 Justice Levi Woodbury, after asking
"[i]n what place runs the true boundary line" between "judicial" and "political"
questions, stated that when

80. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
81. Id. at 41,47.
82. Id. at 48-88 (Woodbury, J., dissenting). The reporter described Woodbury's opinion as a
dissent. Justice Woodbury noted, however, that "I concur with the rest of the court in the opinion[]
that... the validity of the old charter... is not within our constitutional jurisdiction." Id. at 51. One
of the two principal issues in the case was whether the Court could decide which of two competing
governments in 1842, one of which operated under a charter originally granted to proprietors by Charles
II of England in the seventeenth century, was the legitimate government of Rhode Island. Id. at 48. It
was that issue which prompted Woodbury's delineation of the distinction between "judicial" and
"political" (nonjusticiable) questions. Id. at 51. The other issue was whether the charter government
had legitimately declared martial law to protect itself against its competitor. Id.Woodbury, the Supreme
Court Justice whose circuit included Rhode Island, concluded, unlike the rest of the Court, that it had
not. See id. at 51, 59-88 (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
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a constitution or law, however originating, be clearly
acknowledged by the existing political tribunals .... [and] when
the claims of individuals come in conflict under [that constitution
or law], it [was] the true province of the judiciary to decide what
[those claims] rightfully are under such constitutions and laws,
rather than to decide whether those constitutions and laws
themselves have been rightfully or wisely made.83
Woodbury was echoing Marshall's language in Marbury.
Having internalized the republican axioms that "the [federal] judiciary, by its
mode of appointment, long duration in office, and slight accountability, [was] fitted
to check legislative power" when challenged and that Congress and the President
were "by their pursuits and interests, better suited to make rules," 4 Justices in the
first half of the nineteenth century seemed, on the surface, to have difficulty
recognizing cases in which the distinction between judicial and political questions
was implicated. Justice Woodbury listed twelve instances in which the Supreme
Court of the United States had applied the distinction,85 which can be grouped in
two categories, examples ofnonjusticiable "executive" discretion and nonjusticiable
"legislative" discretion.
Closer analysis of three of the Court's departmental discretion cases, however,
reveals a more complex picture. Although in each of the cases the Court concluded
that the issues raised were outside the province of the judiciary, their disposition
obviously affected the legal rights of individuals and required the Court, in the
course of reaching its conclusions about justiciability, to implicitly decide some
legal questions.
Therefore, the cases posed a difficulty for the Court's departmental discretion
jurisprudence, which grew in complexity over time. The difficulty centered on the
importance to be attached, in cases where justiciability was the central issue, to what
might be thought of as the "judicial baggage" of an exercise of discretionary power
by another branch. Thatjudicial baggage was a product of the assumption that once
the executive or legislative branch exercised its discretion in the form of a policy
directive, courts, in a republic, must provide a forum where the effects of that
directive on the constitutional or legal rights of individuals could be adjudicated.
The attachment of judicial baggage to discretionary policymaking by the other
branches meant that any exercise of executive or legislative discretion might
potentially be challenged in a court. It also meant that in deciding that the
departmental discretion principle made a particular challenge not justiciable, a court
would effectively be adjudicating that challenge.
This difficulty had been inherent in the Court's departmental discretion
jurisprudence from the start: it followed from the tacit judgment that the judiciary
would constitute the final authority for determining whether it could exercise
jurisdiction over a particular departmental discretion case. But Marshall's language
in Marbury and McCulloch seemed to assume that the line between political and

83. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1,54 (1849) (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 53.

85. Id. at 56-58. Justice Woodbury also listed three English decisions grounded on the
distinction. For a list of the U.S. cases Woodbury cited, see infra note 119.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol57/iss1/3
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judicial questions would be easy to draw. That line may well have been apparent in
many cases that did not find their way to the Court, but those that did in the fiftyodd years after Marburywere brought and appealed in part because the line was not
apparent. In particular, cases surfaced from situations in which measures enacted
by the executive or legislative branches, although they arguably governed subjects
typically regarded as the core of executive or legislative discretion, patently affected
the constitutional or legal rights of individual citizens. When that situation occurred,
did it mean that the courts, as part of their obligation to provide a forum to resolve
constitutional and legal questions raised by other branches' decisions, were required
to scrutinize the meaures in question?
b. Foster v. Neilson
A comparatively early example of departmental discretion raising this
complexity was the Court's 1829 decision in Fosterv. Neilson. 6 The case was a
title dispute over land in the state of Louisiana, about thirty miles east of the
Mississippi River. The plaintiff in the dispute claimed title to the land on the basis
of an 1804 grant from an officer of the Spanish government, which once owned that
portion of Louisiana and claimed not to have relinquished it. The plaintiff brought
suit to eject the defendant, an American settler in possession of the land." Several
treaties between Spain, France, and the United States affected ownership of the
land, and counsel for the plaintiff asserted that "the true interpretation and effect of
these treaties.., now comes before [the Supreme Court of the United States] to be
finally settled judicially."88 But Marshall, for the Court, held that the effect of the
treaties had in fact been "settled" by laws and practices of the United States
government over a span of years between 1803 and the 1820s. Given those
practices, he concluded that the courts could not decide the treaties' impact on the
title dispute.89
At the opening of the nineteenth century, both France and Spain held dominion
over significant tracts of land in the New World, but the Napoleonic Wars and their
side effects eventually resulted in both nations relinquishing those tracts to the
United States. Fosterturned on a disputed sequence of events in the relinquishment
process. The validity of the plaintiff s title to the land in what was once known as
the Feliciana district-a region that by 1829 was within the state of
Louisiana-rested on the assumption that because Spain possessed the Feliciana
district at the close of the eighteenth century and did not cede the district to France
in a secret treaty signed by the two nations in 1800, it was not within the territory,
designated "Louisiana," that France ceded to the United States in the Louisiana
Purchase Treaty of 1803. The plaintiff in Fosterargued that the Feliciana district
was understood to remain in West Florida, territory the Spanish government
acquired from England in 1783. ° The line between the Louisiana and West Florida
territories, the plaintiff claimed, was the Mississippi River, Louisiana being west of
the river and West Florida east of it. Since the Feliciana district was east of the
86. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
87. Id. at 256.

88. Id. at 257.
89. Id. at 308-09.

90. Id. at 254-55, 299-03.
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Mississippi, he maintained that it was still a territory of the Spanish Crown in 1804
when the Spanish government sold some lands in the district, a portion of which the
plaintiff eventually bought in 1811.91
The defendant's claim to the disputed land in Fosterwas based on possession
rather than title. But the defendant was also able to point to a series of acts by the
United States Congress that seemed inconsistent with the recognition of any titles
to the land derived from the Spanish Crown.92 One was an 1804 act of Congress
that divided the "Louisiana" territory into two territories--one of which was
composed of an area called "Orleans territory" that included lands east of the
Mississippi River and north of the port of New Orleans-that Spain had claimed as
part of West Florida territory.93 That act included a provision declaring that "all
grants for lands within the ["Louisiana" territory] ceded by the French Republic to
the United States [and earlier ceded to France by Spain were] ...null, void, and of
no effect in law or equity." 94 That act, Marshall eventually concluded for the Court
in Foster,
was obviously intended to act on all grants made by
Spain after her retrocession of Louisiana to France, and
without deciding on the extent of that retrocession, to put
the titles which might be thus acquired through the whole
[Louisiana] territory, whatever might be its extent,
completely under the control of the American
government. 95
A second act of Congress, passed in 1812, enlarged the boundaries of the state
of Louisiana to include the Feliciana district and other land east of the Mississippi
River, and two other acts of 1817 created the states of Alabama and Mississippi out
of territory extending from east of the Mississippi River to west of the Perdido
River in what is now Florida.96 Taken together, the United States Government's

actions suggested that it believed that the "Louisiana" territory it received from
France in 1803 extended eastward to the Perdido rather than stopping at the
easternmost borders of the Mississippi. In that same time period, however, the
Spanish government had resisted all efforts to suggest that in ceding the "Louisiana"
territory to France in 1800, it gave up any land from east of the Mississippi River
to the Atlantic Coast, which by the 1820s had become the American states of
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida.97

The diplomatic dispute thus turned on what France, Spain, and the United
States meant by the "Louisiana" territory when the territory passed from Spain to
France to the United States between 1800 and 1803. The dispute was affected by
the extravagant land claims originally made by European nations in the New World
and the relationship between those claims and the practicalities of New World

91. Id. at 254-55.
92. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 282-83 (1829).

93. Id. at 304.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 304-05.

96. Id. at 308.
97. Id. at 305-06.
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settlement by inhabitants of claiming nations.98 Lands west of the Florida coast and
east of New Orleans were treated as "waste lands" by the Spanish Crown,99 and
were inhabited primarily by aboriginal tribes throughout the eighteenth century.
"Louisiana" territory initially may have been regarded as bounded on the east by the
Mississippi River only because that boundary was convenient and land to the east
was largely uninhabited. The territories of "East and West Florida" that Spain
acquired from England in 1783 were unsettled in their interior, and between 1800
and 1819 the Spanish government, facing pressure from Napoleon and England and
rebellions in its Latin American colonies, was increasingly inclined to ignore its
North American possessions.
In short, no one, including signatories to treaties, really knew the precise
boundaries of the Louisiana and Florida territories, and the European nations
involved seemed more interested in preserving their dignity through carefully
worded ambiguities in treaties than in actually laying claim to New World land.
Against this backdrop, the United States, with its strong post-Louisiana Purchase
interest in eliminating Spanish as well as French influence from the New World,
aggressively encouraged settlement of the southern regions of both the Louisiana
and Florida territories. By 1829, in the wake of Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, and
Louisiana joining the Union and rapidly becoming settled, counsel for the plaintiff
in Fosterwas able to assert that the "great and interesting question" of the borders
of Louisiana and West Florida territories no longer needed to be "discussed
diplomatically between the representatives of [Spain and the United
States] ...upon grounds of policy and national interest," but could be "presented
for decision as a merely legal question" because "[i]t has ceased to be a national
controversy, and has assumed a shape peculiarly fitted for this tribunal."" This last
argument indicated that Foster was a case that illustrated the complexities of
judicial application of the departmental discretion principle. Many decisions by the
executive and legislative branches had the potential to affect the rights of individual
citizens. Treaties with foreign governments affecting the status of land on the North
American continent were just one set of examples.
What distinguished Foster from Martin v. Hunter'sLessee,'0 ' where the Court
considered, in the context of a land title dispute, the effect of a treaty between
England and the United States on land in Virginia? In both cases governments had
passed laws stating differing positions about the ownership of the land in question.
In both cases the property rights of American citizens turned on which government
positions American courts would treat as authoritative. Therefore, why did the
Court conclude that the conflict in Martin, between the Treaty of Paris and a 1779
Virginia escheat act, raised "judicial" questions, °2 but decide that the differing
98. English claimants landing in Virginia asserted that the dominion of the English crown
extended from the Atlantic Shore to the Pacific Ocean, and the French claimed to the "Louisiana"
territory extended from New Orleans to the northernmost reaches of the Mississippi River.
99. Foster v Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 278 (1829).
100. Id. at 279.
101. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816).
102. Id. at 358-59. For a discussion of Martin v. Hunter'sLessee, see WHITE, supra note 1, at
495-504. There was at least one important difference between Martin and Foster. In Martin, the
conflict was between a federal treaty, the 1783 Treaty of Paris, and a state statute, the Virginia Escheat
Act of May 3, 1779. When the Virginia Court of Appeals held in 1810 that the Virginia Escheat Act

prevailed over the Treaty, that action drew into question the validity of a treaty of the United States
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positions in Fosterwere "political" and that the case was therefore not justiciable?
In both cases the interpretation of treaties was at issue, and Marshall's opinion for
the Court in Fosterset forth alternative legal interpretations of the relevant treaties
and even revealed that the Justices were divided on which interpretation they found
controlling.' 3
Marshall ultimately concluded in his opinion in Fosterthat the Court could not
substitute its view for Congress's on a matter as political as whether the United
States or some other sovereign owned disputed land, ° nor could it take jurisdiction
of the case because Congress had established a process for the adjudication of all
the titles to land affected by the relevant treaties."' 5 Marshall concluded that
Congress had not put such a process in place for the particular land in dispute."6 To

government and thus gave the Supreme Court of the United States jurisdiction, under Section 25 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, to review the court of appeals' decision. Id. at 304-13. In Foster,by contrast,
the differing interpretations of Spain and the United States about who owned East and West Florida in
the years between 1803 and 1819 were based on alternative understandings due to scattered language
in treaties between Spain, France, and the United States about the boundaries of the "Louisiana"
territory when the United States acquired it from France in the Louisiana Purchase and the relationship
between those boundaries and Spanish claims to East and West Florida.
Although the Marshall Court ultimately treated the difference between Martin and Foster as
decisive on the issue ofjusticiability, one could argue that the distinction between laws that enacted the
policies of the legislative and executive departments and laws that directly affected the constitutional
or legal rights of individuals was not a difference that spoke to a foundational distinction on which the
Court's departmental discretion decisions rested. Since the treaties pertaining to lands in the Feliciana
district each purported to define the years in which one sovereign nation or another (Spain, France, or
the United States) was the owner of territory in that district, they necessarily affected the legal rights
of any party whose claim to ownership of land in the district rested on titles derived from one of those
sovereign nations. Accordingly, counsel for the plaintiff in Fosterargued that the legal rights of those
parties needed to be determined in a court by a judicial interpretation of the treaties. Foster,27 U.S.
(2 Pet.) at 279.
103. At one place in his opinion in Foster, Marshall pointed out an ambiguity in the 1819 treaty
in which Spain relinquished its claims in the regions previously known as East and West Florida, whose
boundary either stretched westward to the Mississippi River as the Spanish government maintained, or
only to the Perdido River (now the boundary between the westernmost portions ofthe Florida panhandle
and the easternmost portions ofsoutheastern Alabama) as the United States maintained. Foster,27 U.S.
(2 Pet.) at 310-13. Marshall considered whether the Spanish government, in relinquishing "the
Floridas" in 1819, had assumed that grants of land it made in "the Floridas" before the signing of the
treaty remained valid, so that the treaty did not affect the grant at issue in Foster.Id. at 311. After
interpreting ambiguous language in the 1819 treaty, he concluded that "[o]ne other judge and myself'
were of the view that "fair grants" made by Spain before the treaty were "as obligatory on the United
States, as on his Catholic majesty." Id. at 313. But "[t]he majority of the Court," he added, "think
differently," believing that all titles in land traced to Spanish grants between 1803 in Mississippi and
Alabama "might be objected to on the ground of fraud," given Spain's 1800 cession of the "Louisiana"
territory to France and France's 1803 sale of that territory to the United States. Id. The division among
the Justices was ultimately rendered moot by Marshall's disposition of Foster,but the exercise indicates
that the Court was well aware of the difficulty in separating legal from political questions in the case.
104. Marshall stated:
In a controversy between two nations concerning national boundary, it is
scarcely possible that the Courts of either should refuse to abide by the measures
adopted by its own government.... The judiciary is not that department of the
government, to which the assertion of its interests against foreign powers is
confided; and its duty commonly is to decide upon individual rights, according to
(the] principles which the political departments of the nation have established.
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 307 (1829).
105. Id. at 314-16.
106. Id. at 316-17.
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arrive at this conclusion, he revisited the 1819 treaty between Spain and the United
States, emphasizing the provision that: "[A]ll the grants of land made before the
24th of January, 1818, by his Catholic majesty... shall be ratified and confirmed
to the persons in possession of the lands, to the same extent that the same grants
would be 0valid
if the territories had remained under the dominion of his Catholic
7
majesty.'
This provision, being in a federal treaty, became "the law of the land" in the
United States. 0 8 But the language stating that the grants shall be "ratified and
confirmed" in the provision was the "language of contract," in which "either of the
parties engages to perform a particular act." The United States was pledging to
"execute the contract" through some sort of legislative process. " 0 The decision to
establish the process was entrusted to Congress; hence, "the treaty addresses itself
to the political, not the judicial department; and [Congress] must execute the
contract before it can become a rule for the Court." '' Thus, even if one could read
the treaty of 1819 as a concession by the United States that it would recognize some
Spanish dominion over portions of the "Louisiana" or "West Florida" territories
between 1803 and 1819, and perhaps eventually confirm the validity of some land
titles in those areas that derived from grants by the Spanish Crown, Congress had
not yet ratified and confirmed the plaintiff s title in Foster.Therefore, in the end,
the departmental discretion principle resulted in the premature submittal of the case
to the Court.
Twenty years after Foster,the Court described the case as standing for the
proposition that
where the title to the property depended on the question, whether
the land was within a cession by treaty to the United
States ... after our government, legislative and executive, had
claimed jurisdiction over it, the courts must consider that the
question was a political one, the decision of which, having been
made in this manner, they must conform to." 2
That reading of Fosterwas made by Justice Woodbury in his separate opinion in
Luther, where he listed the case among "[s]everal precedents" illustrating the
principle that "as judges, our duty is to take for a guide the decision made on
[political questions] by the proper political powers, and ... enforce it until duly
altered."" 3 As we have seen, Fosterwas not so simple a case. Although the United
States acted as if it owned the Louisiana Territory after 1803, it did not act as if it

107. Id. at 310 (quoting Treaty Between the United States of America and the King of Spain,
U.S.-Spain, Feb. 22, 1819).
108. Id. at 314.
109. Id.
110. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
111. Id.
112. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 56 (1849).
113. Id.
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owned East or West Florida until 1819, and Spain never acknowledged that lands
east of the Mississippi River were in the Territory of Louisiana." 4
Finally, Fosternot only turned on the Court'sjudgment that differences among
governments about dominion over property were political questions. The case also
turned on the Court's reading of the eighth article of the 1819 treaty between Spain
and the United States in which Spain ceded East and West Florida to the American
government." 5 Although that article clearly seemed designed to preserve the legal
status of Spanish land grants made in those territories before January 24, 1818,116
it included the phrase "shall be ratified and confirmed," which Marshall interpreted
as a promise by the United States to establish processes to perfect titles to land in
East and West Florida which derived from those land grants.' 17 The meaning of
article eight of the treaty was a legal question. Marshall decided that question for
the Court, and that decision was as important to the outcome in Foster as his
judgment that disputes among sovereign nations over the ownership of land were
not justiciable." 8 Fosterdid not establish that the line between those cases that the
judiciary could entertain and those that were confined to the discretion of other
departments was self-evident.
Nonetheless, Fosterwas the sort of case in which the departmental discretion
principle tended to surface in the early-nineteenth century. Foster involved a
controversy implicating the foreign relations powers of the Executive and the
Senate, which were responsible for the making and ratification of treaties between
the United States and other nations. Of the twelve Supreme Court decisions Justice
Woodbury cited in Luther v. Borden as examples of judicial deference to the
departmental discretion of other branches, ten of them involved the exercise of
foreign relations powers." 9 Additionally, Marshall in Marbury,120 and in his

114. In Foster,Marshall noted that despite protracted efforts by the governments of the United
States and Spain to settle the question of the Louisiana Territory's boundaries at the time Spain ceded
that territory to France in 1800, "[e]ach persevered in maintaining the construction with which he had
commenced." Foster,27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 306.
115. Id. at 310.

116. The treaty was signed on February 22, 1819, but article eight was directed at "all the grants
of land made before the 24th of January, 1818, by his Catholic majesty." Id.
117. Id. at 310, 313.
118. Marshall, in a subsequent decision, concluded that the meaning of the 1819 treaty between
the United States and Spain was different from what he ruled it to be in Foster.See United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88-89 (1832), in which Marshall, for the Court, had access to the
treaty translated from its Spanish version, as well as the American version in its original English.
119. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 56-57 (1849). The cases, in the order Justice

Woodbury cited them, were Decatur v. Paulding,39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840); Fosterv. Neilson, 27

U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 309 (1829); Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 511,520 (1838); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia,30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20 (1831); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet) 657,736,738
(1838); Williams v. SuffolkIns. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 419 (1839); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 241, 268 (1808); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634 (1818); Gelston v.
Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246 (1818); The Divina Pastora,17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 52, 64 (1819); The

Santissima Trinidad,20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 336-37 (1822); and Scott v. Jones, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
343,374 (1847). All but Cherokee Nation, Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, and Scott v. Jones involved

foreign relations treaties or the diplomatic recognition of foreign governments, and Cherokee Nation
involved a treaty between the United States and the Cherokee tribe, which argued that it should be given
the legal status of a "foreign" sovereign power with respect to any rights conferred to it by a treaty. For
more detail on the Cherokee cases, see WHITE, supra note 1,at 716-30.
120. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 135, 170 (1803).
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remarks to the House of Representatives in 18 0 0 ,l 'a identified foreign relations
issues as paradigmatic examples of questions that were not justiciable because they
had been "submitted to the executive" under the Constitution.
c. Luther v. Borden
In contrast, Marshall's category of cases that were governed by the
departmental discretion principle because they raised "[q]uestions, in their nature
political" '22 was far less well developed when the Taney Court considered Luther
v. Borden in 1849. Justice Woodbury only cited two examples of cases that did not
involve foreign affairs powers, and in one of them, a boundary dispute between
states, he noted that the Constitution provided that states could agree to have the
dispute settled by the Supreme Court. 23 The Court exercised its original jurisdiction
to decide several boundary disputes between states in the nineteenth century. 24
Luther gave the Court an opportunity to apply the departmental discretion
principle to a wider set of cases raising "questions in their nature political."
Entertaining the case might have plunged the Court into the extremely sensitive task
of making substantive interpretations of the meaning of "a republican form of
government" and of "domestic violence" under the Guarantee Clause of the
Constitution. 2 ' The Guarantee Clause states that "[t]he United States shall
guarantee to every State in [the] Union a Republican Form of Government, and
shall protect each of them... [from] domestic [v]iolence. ' ' 2 6 No specific branches
of the United States government are mentioned in the Clause; the wake of a political
crisis in Rhode Island provided the Court with a test case in which it had an
opportunity to invoke it.
The colonial charter of the government of Rhode Island, which was never
modified after Rhode Island joined the Union, severely limited eligibility for voting.
By 1840, after the population of the state had been swelled by mill and factory
workers who did not own property, close to 90% of the adult males in Providence,
the state capital, could not vote. Frustrated at their lack of success in convincing the
legislature to broaden the franchise, a group of reformers drafted a new state
constitution between 1841 and 1842-known as the People's
constitution-submitted it to a referendum of all adult white male citizens of the
state-who voted to adopt it-and organized elections for a new state government.
In response, the existing government submitted a revision of the current state
constitution to those voters eligible to vote under the original charter, who rejected
the revised constitution. When the newly elected People's government began to
form itself, the existing government-known as the Freeholders'

121. John Marshall, Speech on the Case of Thomas Nash (Mar. 7, 1800), in THE POuTICAL AND
ECONOMIC DOCTRINES OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 54, at 247.
122. Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 170.
123. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1,56 (1849) (citing Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,37
U.S. (12 Pet.) at 736, 738).
124. For examples, see Note, The OriginalJurisdictionof the United States Supreme Court, 11
STAN. L. REv. 665, 708-18 (1959).
125. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 26.
126. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2005

27

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57: 1

government-declared martial law and arrested the newly
elected People's
127
governor, Thomas Wilson Dorr, charging him with treason.
The "Dorr Rebellion" ended quickly in 1842, when the Freeholders'
government used the state's militia to suppress the Dorrites. 2 aAt the same time, the
Freeholders submitted another revised constitution, considerably broadening the
franchise, which voters approved.' 29 Luther was an effort on the part of reformers
to restore the legitimacy of the People's government, and to nullify Dorr's 1844
treason conviction. The reformers sought a judicial determination that the
Freeholders' legislature was not a republican government and thus could be
30
replaced by the people at large, even without formal legislative proceedings.
Consequently, they also sought a determination that the Freeholders' government
had no authority to enact martial law.' 3 ' Rhode Island courts concluded that 32
the
Freeholders' government had authority and upheld Dorr's treason conviction.
A Dorr supporter, Martin Luther, filed an action for trespass against Luther
Borden and others in federal district court in Rhode Island, alleging that Borden, a
member of the Rhode Island militia, broke into Luther's house during the time
martial law was declared and, in the process of searching for Luther, damaged some
property. Luther's lawsuit claimed that since a majority of white males in the state
ratified the People's constitution and elected the People's government, the
Freeholders' government was displaced and thus had no authority to declare martial
law. Further, the United States had an obligation under the Guarantee Clause to
ensure the citizens of Rhode Island a republican form of government, and the
Freeholders' government did not take that form. Thus any courts established by the
Freeholders' government after the People's government came into existence were
illegitimate and could not try anyone for treason, and as a result, the United States
government was bound to nullify any acts of the Freeholders' government after the
People's constitution was ratified. 33 The federal district judge dismissed Luther's
suit, and the case was then certified to the Supreme Court ofthe United States under
a pro forma division of the judges on that Court, which consisted of the federal
district judge and the Supreme Court Justice assigned to the New England circuit. '3'

127. On the Dorr Rebellion and the events leading to Luther, see GEORGE M. DENNISON, THE
DORR WAR: REPUBLICANISM ON TRIAL, 1831-1861(1976).
128. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 37.
129. Id.

130. Id. at 19-26.
131. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 19-26, 38 (1849).

132. Id. at 38.
133. For a summary of those arguments, see id. at 19-26.
134. Id. at 18-19, 47. Justice Joseph Story, who died in 1845, was the Supreme Court Justice
assigned to the New England circuit at the time ofpro forma certification. Twenty-nine questions were
certified to the Supreme Court of the United States. The technique of pro forma certification of

questions through a feigned division of the federal districtjudge and the Supreme Court Justice assigned
to a federal circuit-at the time the U.S. Circuit Courts ofAppeal were composed exclusively of these
two judges-was a convenient way for Supreme Court Justices to get questions of law entertained by
the full Court. Justice Story was particularly inclined to adopt the technique of pro forma certificates
of division. For more detail, see WHITE, supra note 1, at 173-80. In his opinion in a companion case
to Luther, a separate trespass action arising out of the same facts, by Rachel Luther, Martin Luther's
wife, Chief Justice Taney noted that:
It appears, on the face of the record, that the division [between Justice Story and
the district judge] was merely formal, and that the whole case has been
transferred to this court, and a multitude of points (twenty-nine in number)
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The arguments made on behalf of Luther were fraught with difficulties for the
Taney Court. President John Tyler had encouraged the Freeholders' government to
declare martial law and call up the state militia to suppress the Dorrites. After
coming into existence in May 1842, the Dorr government adjourned, after only two
days, until July 1842. It was never acknowledged by the Freeholders' government,
which continued to operate. The Dof" government did not meet in July 1842, or
ever again. Dorr was arrested and charged with treason in August and eventually
had his conviction for treason upheld by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in 1844.
In November 1842, the Freeholders' government submitted a revised constitution
to voters, who adopted it. In May 1843, that constitution went into effect. 35 If the
Court were to accept the Guarantee Clause and martial law arguments of the
Dorrites, the last seven years of government in Rhode Island, including a decision
by that state's supreme court on the legitimacy of the Freeholders' constitution,
would have been declared null and void.
Although it was highly unlikely that the Taney Court would countenance an
effort to use the federal courts to negate a decision by a state supreme court on the
question of whether the government established in that state was legitimate, the
Court declined to make use of its option to dismiss Luther as improperly certified.
Instead, the Court used the occasion to make several pronouncements about the
reach of the departmental discretion principle. Although each of those
pronouncements appeared to make sense in the context of the case, they were not
indubitably obvious as propositions of constitutional law.
The first pronouncement related to separation of powers. Chief Justice Taney's
opinion maintained that since "[i]t is the province of a court to expound the law, not
to make it,"'

36

it followed that if a court "decides at all as a court, it necessarily

affirms the existence and authority of the government under which it is exercising
judicial power. 1 37 But that argument obviously proved too much: judicial review
assumed that courts could decide some governmental acts had no legal authority,
being constitutionally invalid, without having to deny the authority of the
government itself. The next pronouncement, related to federalism, was similarly
overbroad. Chief Justice Taney invoked the "well settled rule... that the courts of
the United States adopt and follow the decisions of the State courts in questions

presented for its decision. We have repeatedly decided that this mode of
proceeding is not warranted by the act of Congress [The Judiciary Act of 1802,
2 Stat. 156, 159-61], authorizing the justices of a Circuit Court to certify to the

Supreme Court a question of law which arose at the trial, and upon which they
differed in opinion.
Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 47. By that comment, Chief Justice Taney meant that the practice of

wholesale pro forma certification of questions up to the Court was not contemplated by Congress. He

indicated that "many cases, in which, like the present one, the whole case was certified, have been
dismissed for want ofjurisdiction." Id. at 47. He consequently dismissed the suit by Rachel Luther,
noting at the same time that "the parties will understand the judgment of this court upon all the material

points certified" and decided in Martin Luther's case. Id. at 47-48.
Chief Justice Taney's language suggests that the Court could have dismissed Luther as
improvidently certified to it, which would have had resulted in the same outcome, but it wanted the
opportunity to extend the category of legislative departmental discretion cases.
135. See DENNISON, supra note 127, at 84-109.
136. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 41.

137. Id. at 40.
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which concern merely the constitution and laws of the State." ' He suggested that
a state supreme court's determination of which, among opposing governments, was
the legitimate government of the state was such a decision. Yet if that were so, the
Guarantee Clause of the Constitution would seem to have no effect. How could a
federal court determine whether a "Republican Form of Government" existed for
the purpose of assessing the United States' obligation to guarantee that form "to
every State," if it were bound by state court decisions about whether the government
in that state was legitimate and hence "republican"?
Chief Justice Taney had an answer to that question: the Guarantee Clause
entrusted the determination of whether a state was republican to Congress. He gave
no support for his claim that the Constitution had "treated the subject as political in
nature," and thus entrusted it to Congress rather than the courts.'39 He apparently
assumed that once Congress admitted "the senators and representatives of a
State ...into the councils of the Union, the authority of the government under

which they are appointed, as well as its republican character, is recognized by the
proper constitutional authority."' 4 But in concluding that Congress's decision as
to whether a republican form of government exists in a state was "binding on every
other department of government, and could not be questioned in a judicial
tribunal,"' 4' Chief Justice Taney seemed to ignore the possibility that a decision
might affect the constitutional rights of citizens of the United States. Suppose
Congress decided in 1860 that the state of Mississippi did not have a republican
form of government because a majority of the state's voting population owned
slaves. In the 1857 Dred Scott case, Chief Justice Taney suggested that the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provided protection for the property rights
of slaveholders 42 Did his comments in Luther suggest that congressional
legislation abolishing or modifying slavery in Mississippi could not be reviewed by
the courts?
Finally, Chief Justice Taney stated that because Congress had implemented the
"domestic violence" language of Article IV, section 4 of the Constitution with a
1795 statute entrusting the President with the power, on application of a state
legislature or its executive, to call up state militias to suppress violence in the state,
courts could not question executive decisions about "which is the [legitimate state]
government, and which party is unlawfully arrayed against it," that were necessary
preliminaries to calling up the militias.143 "If the judicial power extends so far" as
to allow courts to review those executive decisions and potentially "discharge those
who were arrested or detained by the troops in the service of the United States,"
Chief Justice Taney argued, "the [Guarantee Clause] is a guarantee of anarchy, and
not of order."'" And if "this right does not reside in the courts when the conflict is
raging, if the judicial power is at that time bound to follow the decision of the
political, it must be equally bound when the contest is over."' 45

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
See id. at 42.
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1,42 (1849).
Id.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,450 (1857).
Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 43.
Id.
Id.
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Once again, Chief Justice Taney's pronouncement, as a proposition of
constitutional law, was far too broad. The designation of the Executive as the
implementator of constitutional guaranties does not shield that branch from
subsequent judicial inquiry into whether, in the process of attempting to implement
those guaranties, other constitutional rights were violated. To suggest that on-thespot review in a domestic emergency might be awkward-President Tyler was
hardly neutral in the controversy--did not mean that subsequent review should be
precluded.
Thus none of the legislative or executive decisions that Chief Justice Taney's
Luther opinion confined to the realm of departmental discretion were "in their
nature political" and therefore not justiciable across the board. They were simply
decisions the Taney Court found awkward to review at the time. Once again the
scope of departmental discretion was less than it seemed, and bright lines between
judicial and nonjudicial questions were harder to fashion than a nineteenth-century
opinion of the Court had suggested.
d.

Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.

The Court heard a third departmental discretion case of genuine complexity in
1855, Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. 46 That case
originated from a title dispute in which the claims of both parties to land in New
Jersey derived from Samuel Swartwout, the land's initial owner, who was collector
of the United States customs for the Port of New York from 1830 to 1838. 47 In
March 1838, Swartwout left his position, and an audit of his account in November
1838 revealed that he had not remitted $1,374,119.65 to the United States Treasury.
After the audit, the solicitor of the Treasury Department issued a "distress warrant"
pursuant to an 1820 act of Congress. 48 The act provided that a lien for the amount
due the United States should exist on the lands of the debtor once a levy recording
the amount of the debt was recorded in the office of the federal district court in
whose district the lands were situated. 49 Sometime before April 10, 1839, the
United States recorded that levy, making the distress warrant enforceable against
any lands owned by Swartwout "o
On that date, the lessor of the plaintiffs in Murray'sLessee bought Swartwout's
estate at an execution sale. Shortly thereafter, on June 1, 1839, the United States
Marshal for the District of New Jersey held a sale under the distress warrant, and
the Hoboken Land and Improvement Company bought Swartwout's lands. 5 The
United States had concededly perfected its lien on those lands prior to the date the
plaintiffs bought them if the distress warrant procedure was valid. Therefore the
plaintiffs sought to attack the validity of that lien." 2 They challenged the 1820 act
of Congress authorizing the distress warrant procedure as unconstitutional on two
related grounds: first, the procedure amounted to a summary deprivation of the

146.
147.
148.
149.

59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
Id. at 274-75.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 274.

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,275 (1856).
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debtor Swartwout's property by the Secretary of the Treasury, who was an
executive official and not a court; and second, by depriving Swartwout of property
without a hearing and without a trial by jury in violation of the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. 5 3 As Justice Benjamin Curtis put it for the Court:
Taking these two objections together, they raise the questions,
whether, under the constitution of the United States, a collector of
the customs, from whom a balance of account has been found to
be due by accounting officers of the treasury. . . can be deprived
of his liberty, or property, in order to enforce payment of that
balance, without the exercise of the judicial power of the United
States, and yet by due process of law, within the meaning of those
terms in the constitution; and if so, .. . whether the warrant in
question was such due process of law?" 4
Justice Curtis's opinion inMurray'sLessee answered these questions in reverse
order. By surveying the summary procedure for collecting debts owed to the
sovereign in England and in American states, he concluded that procedures
resembling distress warrants had been so regularly adopted and so "repeatedly acted
on by the judiciary and the executive" that they "cannot be denied to be due process
of law, when applied to the ascertainment and recovery of balances due to the
government from a collector of customs.""'s This conclusion, however, did not end
the inquiry, because it was clear that the distress warrant procedure "issues against
the body, lands, and goods of certain public debtors" without "regular allegations,
opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some settled course of judicial
proceedings."' 56 Furthermore, the procedure was one of "those administrative duties
the performance of which involves an inquiry into the existence of facts and the
application to them of rules of law."' 7 Did this mean that auditing and recording
a levy on a collector's assets, even if it satisfied the requirements of due process,
was a "judicial" proceeding and thus, when performed only by executive officials,
was incompatible with Article III?
This was the issue that had dogged the Court's departmental discretion cases
from Marbury on. When certain kinds of governmental acts arguably affected the
legal and constitutional rights of individuals and involved "an inquiry into the
existence of facts and the application to them of rules of law,"'5 8 when should the
Court nonetheless deem those acts to be within the discretion of the Executive or
Congress and thus not susceptible to judicial scrutiny? As Foster and Luther
demonstrated, aphorisms such as "the legislature and executive make laws and the
judiciary applies them" did not easily resolve that issue, nor was the content of
judicial questions, as opposed to questions "submitted to the executive" or "in their
nature political," readily discernible. As Justice Curtis stated:

153. Id. at 273-74.
154. Id. at 275-76.
155. Id. at 280.

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,280 (1856).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol57/iss1/3

32

White: Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny

20051

HISTORICIZING JUDICIAL SCRUTINY

[I]n an enlarged sense... judicial act[s] [include] ....
[a]ll those
administrative duties the performance of which involves an
inquiry into the existence of facts and the application to them of
rules of law. In this sense the act of the President in calling out the
militia ...or of a commissioner who makes a certificate for the
extradition of a criminal, under a treaty, is judicial. 59
"It [was] necessary to go further," Justice Curtis suggested, and show that questions
arising from "the exercise of judgment upon law and fact" by branches of the
government must, "from their nature," give rise to "controversies to which the
United States is a party, within the meaning of the second section of the third article
of the constitution." 6 ' Congress or the Executive could "provide by law" that a
particular set of questions "shall form the subject-matter of a suit in which the
judicial power can be exerted."'' But when Congress or the Executive has made
no such provision, "the question is, whether its subject matter is necessarily... a
judicial controversy."' 62
Justice Curtis's formulation did not supply courts with a magic formula for
deciding when to apply the departmental discretion principle. However, the
formulation did represent an opportunity for the Court to clarify its departmental
discretion jurisprudence by recognizing two recurrent features of cases on the
margins ofjusticiability. One feature was that the great bulk of such cases were, like
Foster,Luther, and Murray's Lessee, cases in which political issues merged with
legal and constitutional issues, making categorization difficult. All departmental
discretion cases necessarily involved legal or constitutional interpretations of acts
of the Executive or Congress. Anytime the Court decided that a case ultimately
raised questions other than judicial questions, it had consequently interpreted the
meaning of a treaty or the Guarantee Clause or the Due Process Clause or the "case
and controversy" requirement of Article III. Therefore, it was useless to pretend that
mere recitals of the distinction between judicial and executive or legislative
questions could do any work.
The second feature of the departmental discretion cases that Justice Curtis
recognized in Murray's Lessee was the capacity of all acts of the Executive or
Legislature to have effects that appeared to make them suitable forjudicial scrutiny.
All executive or legislative acts involved, at some level, the application of rules of
law to facts, and they all arguably affected the legal or constitutional rights of
individuals. Indeed, the more another branch provided for minimal judicial review3
of one of its acts, as Congress did in the 1820 statute at issue in Murray'sLessee,1
the more the act appeared to give rise to judicial questions. Thus, as the federal
government increased its foreign relations activities and enacted more domestic
legislation in the latter half of the nineteenth century, courts would have to wrestle
increasingly with the issue of how to confine the category of justiciable
controversies.

159. Id.
160. Id. at 280-81.
161. Id. at 281.
162. Id. at 280-81.
163. The statute provided that collectors of treasury revenues could "bring before a district court
the question, whether [they were] indebted as recited in the warrant." Id. at 284.
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Looking back at Foster,Luther, and Murray's Lessee as a unit, one feature of
these cases stands out. They each involved legal issues connected to the exercise of
an arguably core function of another department of the government-determining
whether the United States or a foreign government had dominion over territory in
the New World, supplying federal aid to a state in an emergency, or establishing a
process where the United States could swiftly recover debts owed to it by its
revenue agents-and where the other department had actually exercised that
function. The departmental discretion issues in these cases were not hypothetical;
courts would be second guessing the acts of another branch in determining whether
these cases were justiciable. That actually exercised core function feature may have
been dispositive in cases where the legal dimensions otherwise seemed plain. Foster
was a land title dispute, Luther an action in trespass, and Murray'sLessee another
title dispute turning on the priority to be given to a government lien. Courts
traditionally entertained all of those actions.
In the period between the Civil War and the First World War, two new features
of the American constitutional landscape emerged that placed greater pressure on
the lines between legal and political questions.' 4 One new feature was the passage
of the Reconstruction Amendments, especially the Fourteenth Amendment, which
contained provisions that allegedly enhanced the Court's role as a censor of state
police power legislation. The second new feature was the increased growth of
legislative activity itself, initially at the state level but also, in the twentieth century,
by Congress. The question raised by those developments was whether the enhanced
effect of congressional and state legislation on the private lives of American citizens
would be accompanied by an enhanced role for the judiciary as overseer of that
legislation. As the courts struggled with that question, pressure began to be placed
on the unarticulated scrutiny levels decisions that were inherent in antebellum
departmental discretion jurisprudence.

164. During the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, the Court invoked the departmental
discretion principle in three controversial cases. In Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475
(1867), and Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1868), the Court used the departmental discretion
principle to stop an injunction that would have prevented President Andrew Johnson and his Secretary
of War, Edwin Stanton, from enforcing the Military Reconstruction Act of 1867, which abolished state
governments in the Confederate States and replaced them with military districts under the control of
the Union. The ground for the injunctions was the alleged unconstitutionality of the Act. The Chase
Court unanimously held, in both cases, that the power ofthe President or an executive officer to enforce
the laws made by Congress was a prerogative of executive discretion and that the courts could not
review the power until the discretion was actually exercised. Johnson, 71 U.S (4 Wall.) at 500; Stanton,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 77.
In Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), the same Court unanimously deferred to
Congress when it curtailed the Court's appellate jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions from
prisoners who claimed to have been convicted under unconstitutional Reconstruction statutes. The
McCardle Court argued that since the Constitution gave Congress the power to make "exceptions" to
the Court's appellate jurisdiction, a congressional statute restricting the Court's jurisdiction over a
particular class of cases was an exercise of legislative discretion and hence not subject to judicial
review. Id. at 514.
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B. The Departmental Discretion Principle and Judicial Review of Police
Powers Legislation
This Section argues that the analytical work performed by the categories of
antebellum departmental discretion jurisprudence, through which the Court had
labeled certain issues as "legislative" or "executive" in character and hence not
justiciable, became less effective after the Civil War as more state police power
legislation appeared, and with it more constitutional challenges to that legislation.
As lawyers and judges began to recognize that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment might embody vested rights and anti-class principles,
tracing the boundaries between public power and private rights appeared to be a
regular responsibility of the courts. Initially, the Supreme Court resisted the task of
boundary tracing, instead drawing on departmental discretion jurisprudence for the
proposition that the scope of legislative power to promote public health, safety, or
morals was a legislative question and thus not justiciable. But as due process
challenges to police power legislation became more frequent, the assumption that
private rights yielded to public power any time a legislature characterized its actions
as promoting health, safety, or morals became more difficult to sustain. Eventually
the Court came to recognize that if the Due Process Clause imposed any restraints
on legislatures at all, the judiciary needed to decide, in cases raising judicial
questions, what those restraints were.
The result was that the categories of departmental discretion jurisprudence no
longer served to define the scope of police power legislation. Judicial boundary
tracing required something else: the categorization of statutes that fell on one side
of the boundary line as legitimate exercises of the police power or on the other as
impermissible intrusions on private rights. As courts settled into their role as
boundary tracers, they began to employ constitutional doctrine in the fashion they
had once employed propositions associated with the departmental discretion
principle. Instead of equating due process with the permissible scope of legislative
power as determined by the legislative department, courts came to equate due
process with a line of decisions categorizing some statutes as valid exercises of the
police power and others as invalid usurpations ofprivate rights. Judicially fashioned
due process doctrine became, like the categories of departmental discretion
jurisprudence before, a surrogate for judicial scrutiny of types of legislation. This
Section traces those developments.
1. The Impact of the Reconstruction Amendments
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments altered the structure of
American constitutional government.6 5 By the 1880s it was apparent that even if
the revolutionary potential of those Amendments to alter antebellum configurations
of the relationship between the federal government and the states would not be
165. See generally HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
CONSTITUTIONALDEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875 (1982) (discussing the events leading up to and following
the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments); ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE NATIONALIZATION
OF CIVILRIGHTS: CONSTITUTIONALTHEORY AND PRACTICE INARACIST SOCIETY, 1866-1883 (Harold

Hyman & Stuart Bruchey eds., 1987) (discussing postbellum congressional intent to nationalize
fundamental rights with the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments).
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immediately realized,"' the Amendments would eventually modify two core
principles of early-nineteenth-century constitutional republicanism.
The first principle-which was emphasized in "A"'s 167 and Dutton's16 1
adumbrations of the Supreme Court's role-was constitutional protection for the
vested rights of individuals. The idea that a government could not take property
from A and give it to B remained associated with the foundations of republican
government in late-nineteenth-century constitutional jurisprudence. 69 But the idea
was refurbished to take into account the much broader distribution of the fianchise
in the mid-nineteenth century and the growing tendency of state governments to
involve themselves in public-regarding activities, such as the regulation of
transportation franchises and the development of public educational institutions.
Moreover, with the reduction of restrictions on voting, the growth of national and
local political parties, and the recruitment of newly arrived immigrants into party
organizations, the specters of demagoguery and corruption in state legislatures took
on a new shape. Republican theorists worried less about unscrupulous individuals
undermining the vested rights of individuals through impassioned appeals to mobs
than about legislation becoming an exercise in rewarding some social and economic
classes of voters at the expense of other classes. The vested rights principle had
evolved into the anti-class principle. 7
The second principle to be modified was the role ofthe judiciary in a republican
constitutional order. As early as 1868, constitutional commentator and judge
Thomas Cooley recognized that although state legislatures could reserve for
themselves the right to change the terms of contracts they made with private parties
notwithstanding the vested rights principle and the Contracts Clause, "' if those

166. In the Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), a majority of the Court gave
a limited reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause and declined to use

the Amendment's Due Process Clause to invalidate state legislation that was advanced as a health
measure but whose effect was to favor some slaughter house operations at the expense of others. In the
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), a majority struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875, an effort,
grounded on the Enforcement Clauses of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, to prevent private
citizens from denying blacks equal access to public accommodations. The majority opinions in both
cases maintained that the balance between federal and state power in the Union would be severely
disrupted if the courts read the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments as a charter to the federal
judiciary to protect individual citizens from virtually any form of discrimination by states or
individuals. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 77-78; The CivilRightsCases, 109
U.S. at 13.
167. COLUMBIA CENTINEL, supranote 29.
168. Dutton, supra note 33.
169. See STORY, supra note 26.

170. For a discussion of the emergence of the anti-class principle in postbellum constitutional
jurisprudence and its eventual undergirding as one of the major constitutional doctrines of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Charles W. McCurdy, The "Libertyof Contract" Regime
in American Law, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 161 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1998). For

an example ofjudicial application of early-nineteenth-century conceptions ofthe vested rights principle
to police power legislation after the Civil War, see White, ConstitutionalJourney, supra note 11, at
1516-22 for an analysis of the Slaughter-House Cases.

171. This was the joint message of Justice Story's concurring opinion in Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518,708 (1819), and the Court's decision in Proprietorsofthe Charles
River Bridge v. Proprietorsof the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837), where a majority
eventually concluded that Massachusetts, having previously granted one corporation franchise rights
for a bridge across a river, could subsequently grant another corporation rights for a competing bridge.
For discussion of the implications of those cases for the vested rights principle, see WHITE, supra note
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legislatures passed laws that had the effect of taking property from A and giving it
to B, they were at risk of violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.172 The idea that state statutes might be subjected to judicial
invalidation under the Due Process Clause if they infringed on vested rights, taken
together with the anti-class principle, appeared to open a far more active agenda for
judges exercising their constitutional review function. As state legislation grounded
on the states' police powers to protect the health, safety, and morals of their citizens
increased, judicial review of that legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment-at
least to some judges who considered the implications of that Amendment's
passage--seemed destined to increase as well. Justice Noah Swayne, in his
dissenting opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases,1 3 said that the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments "may be said to rise to the dinity of a new
Magna Charta" and "trench directly upon the power of the States."' 74 "Nowhere,
than in this court," Justice Swayne felt, "ought the will of the nation, as [expressed
in those Amendments],
to be more liberally construed or more cordially
'7
executed."'

The potential impact of the role Justice Swayne envisaged for the judiciary can
be seen if one engages in a comparison of the sort of legislation typically enacted
by state legislatures and Congress before and after the Civil War and the
implications, for those who continued to believe in both the sanctity of vested rights
and the departmental discretion principle, of enhanced judicial review of that
legislation. Between the time of Marbury and Dred Scott, Congress passed a
strikingly small amount of legislation on any subject, but the states passed a fair
amount of legislation affecting private contractual rights and regulating
commerce. 7 6 The Court did not invalidate a single congressional statute between
Marburyand DredScott, that is, between 1803 and 1857. In that same time period
the Court entertained a number of cases posing Contracts Clause and Commerce
Clause challenges to state economic regulations. The Court's doctrinal posture in
Contracts Clause cases, although rhetorically hostile to state interference with
vested rights, tended to be solicitous of legislation that infringed on property rights
in the promotion of economic competition or "progress."' 77 In Commerce Clause
cases, although the Court consistently affirmed the federal government's authority
to control the terns under which commercial traffic flowed across state lines, it

1, at 622-28, 668-73.
172. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONALLiMITATIONS 351-59 (photo.
reprint 1972) (1868).
173. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
174. Id. at 125 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 129.
176. See WHITE, supra note 1, at 581-93,655-73; CARLB. SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD, 183664, in 5 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 128-54, 396-422 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1974).
177. For a discussion of the Marshall Court's Contracts Clause cases between 1827 and 1835,
see WHITE, supra note 1, at 648-63. The Court's approach culminated in the Taney Court's decision
in CharlesRiver Bridge v. Woodward, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). After Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S.
(1 How.) 311 (1843), the Court concluded that Contracts Clause cases involved a judicial inquiry into
whether the contractual obligation being impaired was "substantial" and the legislative modifications
of it were "reasonable."
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allowed the states 17room to supervise forms of that traffic that Congress had not
chosen to regulate.

In short, before the Civil War, the Court did not have many opportunities to
scrutinize acts of Congress and invalidated only a precious few. Additionally, as the
scope of state police power legislation began to broaden in the three decades
preceding the Civil War, the Court seemed to tolerate a fair amount of state
involvement with contractual obligations and interstate commerce. In contrast,
between 1857 and 1883 the Court invalidated three congressional statutes 1 79 and
signaled that even though a majority of its Justices might not regard the
Reconstruction Amendments as "a new Magna Charta"'"8 that "ought . . . to
be... liberally construed,"'' the Amendments provided the Court with enhanced
opportunities to scrutinize state legislation on constitutional grounds.'
The altered economic climate during the three decades after the Civil War was
the backdrop against which a potentially new role for the judiciary might emerge.
That climate featured a significant growth in the number and size of corporations
and an increased involvement by corporate enterprises in interstate activity. The
massive development of the railroad industry, dominated by comparatively few
corporate entities whose lines spread across the entire continent, and the emergence

178. The leading case was Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852), where
the Taney Court sustained a Pennsylvania "pilotage law" that required ships of a certain size stationed
in the Port of Philadelphia to employ local pilots for the navigation of local waters in the area of the
port. The Cooley opinion maintained that interstate commerce took diverse forms, and Congress's
power to regulate commerce was only exclusive when the form required a uniform rule for the whole
nation ("selectively exclusive"). Pilotage, which often involved the knowledge of local waterways, was
not such a form. Id. at 319.
179. In addition to invalidating the Missouri Compromise in DredScott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1857) and the Civil Rights Act of 1875 in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), a
majority of the Court invalidated an 1862 congressional statute making greenbacks the equivalent of
legal tender in Hepburn v. Griswold,75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870). The Hepburn decision was reversed
a year later in the companion cases Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
The sequence has come to be known as the Legal Tender Cases.
180. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 125 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 129.
182. The Louisiana statute at issue in the Slaughter-HouseCases gave a particular corporation,
the Crescent City Stock Landing and Slaughterhouse Company, a monopoly over the slaughtering
business in New Orleans. The statue was justified as a health measure, whose purpose was to ensure
that all the butchers in New Orleans used the Crescent City facilities, which were located outside the
center of the city. Id. at 38. Assuming that the public health rationale for the legislation was not
pretextual, the statute did not violate the Contracts Clause as it was then understood, and thus no
constitutional attack on the statute was possible without recourse to the Fourteenth Amendment's
Privileges and Immunities or Due Process Clauses. Id. at 66. The Court's opinion in the cases assumed
that those clauses presented a cognizable constitutional challenge, giving the Court power to review the
legislation in question. That assumption suggested that the Court might take on that role in future cases
challenging state legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Davidson v. New Orleans,a landowner challenged a municipal assessment of his property for
the purpose of raising funds for swamp drainage. 96 U.S. 97, 97-99 (1878). Justice Samuel Miller,
in the course of dismissing the claim, referred to a "strange misconception" of the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, namely that it could be employed to "bring[] ... to the
test of the decision of this court" arguments directed at "the merits of [any state] legislation" affecting
private property. Id. at 104. Earlier in his opinion, however, Justice Miller conceded that "a statute
which declares in terms... that the full and exclusive title of a described piece of land, which is now
in A., shall be and is hereby vested in B., would... deprive A. of his property without due process of
law, within the meaning of the constitutional provision." Id. at 102.
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of "trusts," holding companies that controlled the incorporation decisions and shares
of stock of large industrial corporations, dominated the late-nineteenth-century
American economy. Large-scale corporate enterprise was suddenly perceived as a
potentially malign force, capable of corrupting legislatures, retarding competition,
and oppressing industrial laborers. In the face of these developments, a recasting of
the largely promotional attitude of183state legislatures toward corporations that
marked the 1840s and 1850s began.
2. MunicipalBond Cases
Two examples of that changed attitude became the subject of prominent
lawsuits in the 1860s and 1870s. The first example was the repudiation by
municipalities or states of bonds they had previously issued in order to finance
subsidies to corporations-mainly railroads-whose business they sought to attract.
Municipal bond suits began to find their way to the Supreme Court as early as 1864,
and the Court was still deciding them as late as 1888.84 Although the Court's
results in that time period alternated between upholding the claims of bondholders
and permitting repudiation, its approach to the cases remained consistent. The
central issue in the cases, the Court assumed, was whether a subsequent
modification of the terms of bond obligations previously undertaken by a state or
municipality amounted to an impairment of contract obligations within the meaning
of the Contracts Clause, a judicially cognizable issue.' 85 On the surface, the latenineteenth-century municipal bonds cases looked very much like antebellum
Contracts Clause cases. But in one case, ultimately affirmed without opinion by an
equally divided Court, Chief Justice Morrison Waite revealed that the departmental
discretion principle had found its way into the Court's analysis. In considering
whether a state-induced change in the remedies accorded to bondholders amounted
to a repudiation of the state's obligations, and thus a violation of the Contracts
Clause, Chief Justice Waite wrote that:
[T]he question becomes one of reasonableness, and of that the
legislature is primarily the judge .... We ought never to overrule
the decision of that department of government, unless a palpable
error has been committed .... If a state of facts could exist which
would justify the change in the remedy that was made we must

183. The best overview of the contrasts between the legal basis ofgovernment-business relations
in the antebellum years and the last three decades of the nineteenth century remains Charles W.
McCurdy, JusticeFieldand the Jurisprudenceof Government-BusinessRelations: Some Parameters
of Laissez-FaireConstitutionalism,1863-1897, 61 J.AM. HIST. 970 (1975).
184. Charles Warren found that the Court decided nearly 200 cases testing the legality of
repudiations of bond obligations by municipalities or states between 1874 and 1888. 2 CHARLES
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 678 (rev. ed., Fred B. Rothman & Co.,
1987) (1926).
185. Over time, a Court majority fashioned a distinction between municipal or state acts that
directly repudiated a previous commitment to honor bonds and acts that changed the remedies creditors
could use to enforce the bonds' validity. The latter legislation did not violate the Contracts Clause. See,
e.g., Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769, 774 (1883) (stating that "changes in the forms of action and
modes of proceeding do not amount to an impairment of obligations of a contract, if an adequate and
efficacious remedy is left").

Published by Scholar Commons, 2005

39

South Carolina
Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57: 1

presume it did exist, and that the law was passed on that
account.'86
This language suggested that the justices were beginning to think of Contracts
Clause cases less as exercises in determining whether contractual obligations had
literally been impaired and more as judgments about the probity of a legislature's
modification of its prior contractual commitments. Once that reconceptualization
occurred, the issue of whether the judiciary should "overrule" the decision of
another department was sharply posed. Chief Justice Waite indicated that such
overruling was generally inappropriate, and that the Court should search for "a state
of facts . . .which would justify the change,"'187 even if it had to employ some

inventiveness in the search. That judicial technique was a product of fidelity to the
departmental discretion principle.
3.

Rate Regulation Cases

Departmental discretion issues also surfaced in the second major illustration of
an altered attitude on the part of states and localities toward corporate enterprise
after the Civil War: state legislation regulating the rates charged by companies
involved with commercial transportation, particularly grain warehouses (known as
"elevators") and railroads. That legislation was challenged in the courts on a variety
of constitutional grounds, including the Contracts Clause, the Commerce Clause
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Here the challenges
were more novel, resembling the arguments advanced but not resolved in the
Slaughter-HouseCases, where Justice Miller's opinion for the Court rested on a
narrow reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.' 88 In an 1874 case,
Bartemeyer v. Iowa,'89 the Court, holding an Iowa statute prohibiting the sale of
liquor was a constitutional exercise of the state's police powers, intimated that the
Due Process Clause would have been implicated had the statute been applied to
liquor owned before it went into effect. 90
The cases in which states sought to regulate the rates of railroads and storage
facilities were clearly in a different constitutional category from the municipal
bonds cases because they did not involve legislative modifications of existing
contractual obligations. They arose from direct legislative efforts to control the
prices charged for goods and services by corporations in the business of commercial
transportation. Although most of the challenges were made to legislation affecting
railroad rates, the Court's eventual lead opinion in a series of consolidated cases,
Munn v. Illinois,'9 ' addressed the constitutionality of an Illinois statute regulating
grain elevators.' 92 The Court's decision to focus on that statute rather than
186. Undelivered Opinion of Chief Justice Waite in State v. Gaillard,U.S. Supreme Court Docket
Books, Oct. Term 1879, quoted in C. PETER MAGRATH, MORRISON R. WAITE 213-14 (1963).

187. Id. at 214.
188. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80-81 (1873).
189. 85 U.S. 129 (1874).
190. Id. at 132-33.
191. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
192. When the Court announced the Munn decision, italso decided two companion cases,
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1877) and Peik v. Chicago &
North-western Railway Co., 94 U.S. 164 (1877), both of which involved efforts by states to regulate
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legislation directed at railroads, which the Court eventually came to treat as
comparable, was probably strategic. Illinois sought to regulate grain elevators
located within its borders, and although some of the product stored in them was
eventually shipped across state lines, their connection to interstate commerce was
less obvious than that of the railroads. Further, the grain warehousing industry,
unlike the railroad industry, did not feature exclusive or limited state corporate
franchises, which had formed the setting of many antebellum Contracts Clause
cases.
Munn thus seemed designed to bring the issue of the constitutionality of police
power regulations affecting private businesses to the surface. That issue, after the
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, was novel because the Court had not
squarely faced the question of whether the vested rights principle, with its expanded
anti-class implications, was now part of the doctrinal overlay of the Due Process
Clause. Three possible responses suggested themselves, each having ramifications
for the departmental discretion principle.
One response, which Justices Field and Swayne offered in the Slaughter-House
Cases and Justice Field developed somewhat further in his dissenting opinion in
Munn, treated private liberties and property rights after the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment against the backdrop of republican theory and the vested
rights principle, so that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
became a kind of Magna Charta directed at state governments. 9 3 Under this theory,
private property was presumptively immune from state regulation, although the state
could justify taking property for public uses as long as it provided adequate
compensation. Over time, Justice Field's version of this response emphasized the
judicial formulation of bright-line divisions between the private and public sectors,
so as to prevent corruption in the public sphere and overreaching by private special
interests. 94
Justice Bradley intimated another response in a concurrence inBartemeyer. He
argued-an argument that Thomas Cooley had also made in his Constitutional
Limitations treatise 95 and Justice John Marshall Harlan would advance in his
majority opinion in the 1887 case Mugler v. Kansas,where he concluded that a state
could outlaw the manufacture of beer for the maker's own use' 9 6-that all private
property was held subject to the police power, and so the terms "liberty" and
"property" in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause needed to be
197
understood as being qualified by the scope of the police powers of the states.
Although Cooley had suggested that "due process" obviously included the
requirement that "vested rights must not be disturbed,"'98 any legislative measure
legitimately within the scope of the police power did not, by definition, violate
constitutionally protected rights.

railroad rates, treating that legislation as governed by its analysis in Munn.
193. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 95-96 (Field, J.,
dissenting); id. at
124-25 (Swayne, J.,
dissenting); Munn, 94 U.S. at 136-54 (Field, J., dissenting).
194. See McCurdy, supra note 183, for a detailed explanation of Field's approach.
195. COOLEY, supra note 172, at 356-58, 572-73.
196. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 664, 668-69 (1887).
197. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. 129, 136-37 (1874).
198. COOLEY, supra note 172, at 357-58.
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It is not clear to what extent this response assumed that the scope of state police
powers would be self-evident is not clear. Justice Field's response anticipated
considerable judicial activity in marking the boundary between the private and
public sectors. Chief Justice Waite, in contrast, appeared to believe that a
legislature's mere recital of a police powers rationale for legislation could suffice
to justify the legislation as legitimate; at least he suggested as much in passages of
his opinion for the Court in Munn. In one passage he said that "[e]very statute is
presumed to be constitutional," and "[t]he courts ought not to declare one to be
unconstitutional, unless it is clearly so.' 99 In another passage he said that "we must
assume that, if a state of facts could exist that would justify such legislation, it
actually did exist when the statute now under consideration was passed."2" In yet
another passage he stated that "[o]f the propriety of legislative interference within
the scope of legislative power, the legislature is the exclusive judge."' ' Chief
Justice Waite concluded his opinion by noting that the power to determine the
reasonableness of rates charged by regulated businesses was a legislative power,
and although that power might be abused, "[flor protection against abuses by
legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts.""
Taken at face value, these passages of Chief Justice Waite's Munn opinion
suggest that the departmental discretion principle remained robust even after the
passage of the Reconstruction Amendments. He stated a presumption in favor ofthe
legislation's constitutionality, suggested that the legislature, not the courts, was the
appropriate department to determine the scope of its own powers, formulated a very
deferential standard-ifa court could subsequently supply some hypothetical basis,
the court thus would be assuming it existed at the time of the legislation-for
determining whether a statute was grounded on any factual basis, and declared that
if legislative judgments about the reasonableness of regulation were subject to
abuse, the remedy for disappointed persons lay in the voting booths rather than in
the courts. But a closer look at the Munn opinion indicates that it can also be seen
as representing a third response to the question of how the Due Process Clause
should be harmonized with state police powers legislation.
Chief Justice Waite began his analysis in Munn by declaring that "statutes
regulating the use, or even the price of the use, of private property necessarily
deprived an owner of his property without due process of law" under some but not
all circumstances.2" 3 Accordingly, when a legislature sought to regulate the rates
charged by a private corporation, courts needed to "inquire as to the principles upon
which [the regulation] rests, in order that we may determine what is within and what
without its operative effect." 2" He then suggested that what was "within" and
"without" the permissible scope of a legislative regulation affecting private
property, for the purposes of the Due Process Clause, turned on the way in which
the property was used.2"' He invoked a maxim he identified with a treatise written
by Lord Chief Justice Hale, stating that when property became "affected with a

199. Munn, 94 U.S. at 123.

200. Id. at 132.
201. Id. at 132-33.
202. Id. at 134.
203. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1877).

204. Id. at 125.
205. Id.
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public interest" it ceased to be private and could be "controlled by the public for the
common good." 2" This maxim, he argued, had become part of the common law and
was embodied in the principle that private property "became clothed with a public
interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the
community at large." °7 The "affected with a public interest" doctrine helped define
what a property right meant for purposes of the Due Process Clauses.
Having identified the "affected with a public interest" doctrine, Chief Justice
Waite then listed examples of private property that had been "used in a manner to
make it of public consequence" under English and American common law.20 8
Among the examples he cited were ferries, wharves, warehouses, inns, turnpikes,
bridges, mills, and common carriers.2 Each of these businesses were "devoted to
a public use" and thus clothed with a public interest and subject to regulation.210
Having established that the principle for determining whether a legislative
regulation affecting private property violated the Due Process Clauses was whether
the property in question had become affected with a public interest, Chief Justice
Waite then devoted much of the rest of his Munn opinion to demonstrating that
grain elevators were clothed in a public interest.2 Because of the grain elevators'
great significance to the shipment of grain from the midwestern states that produced
it to the markets on the east and west coasts, because nearly all the nation's
midwestern grain passed through the port and railroad hub of Chicago and was
stored in elevator warehouses while awaiting shipment, and because the Chicago
grain elevator franchises charged uniform, comparatively high storage rates, Chief
Justice Waite found the grain elevators were clothed in a public interest.2"
For Chief Justice Waite, this ended the analysis. Either a business was "private"
or "public" in the sense of being affected with a public interest. If it were private,
legislatures could not regulate its prices without running afoul of due process; if it
were public, any legislative regulation of its rates passed constitutional muster
because the judiciary could not inquire into the reasonableness of rates set by
legislatures. A regulation was either "within" or "without" the police power. If it
were within the police power, it satisfied due process standards. In some respects,
Chief Justice Waite's approach was reminiscent of earlier departmental discretion
cases; it was as if he were treating the legislative regulation of property affected
with a public interest as a question that had been "submitted to the legislature" and
was thus not cognizable in court.
But this was only true if the category of businesses "affected with a public
interest" was as easily discernible as the categories of questions "submitted to the
executive" or "in their nature political" had once seemed to be. Those categories
proved to be difficult in operation, and Chief Justice Waite's category would prove
to be difficult as well. Chief Justice Waite himself wrote to a friend shortly after
Munn was handed down that "[t]he great difficulty in the future" would be "to
establish the boundary between that which is private, and that in which the public

206. Id. at 126 (citation omitted).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 126.

209. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126-30 (1877).
210. Id. at 130.
211. Id. at 130-32.
212. Id.
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has an interest."'2t 3 He intimated that Munn had been the lead opinion in the rate
regulation cases decided in 1877 because "[t]he Elevators furnished an extreme case
and there was no difficulty in determining on which side of the line they properly
belonged."" 4 But other cases might prove more difficult if the "affected with a
public interest" principle were to do any analytical work in due process challenges
to state legislation. Justice Field, dissenting in Munn, claimed that the principle was
virtually useless since it could be made to apply to every business "engaging the
attention and labor of any considerable portion of the community."" - If Chief
Justice Waite understood the line between private and public property to be a
meaningful boundary, the judiciary would have to trace it out over a series of cases.
Thus, by declaring that the scope of legislative power to regulate private property
was a legislativequestion, Chief Justice Waite laid the groundwork for its becoming
a judicialquestion.
4. The Emergence of JudicialBoundary Tracing
Although Chief Justice Waite surely did not think of his opinion in Munn as
representing a turning point in departmental discretion jurisprudence, his opinion
arguably was. After Munn it was clear that the Court would invoke a common law
formula to resolve the question of which police power regulations conformed to due
process standards and which did not. Unless Chief Justice Waite's "affected with
a public interest" category was limitless, it invited further judicial tracing of the
boundary between the police power and private rights. This meant that the
discretion of legislatures to regulate property in the public interest was subject to
judicial oversight any time a regulation arguably trespassed on private prerogatives.
Thus, less than two decades after Munn, it had become clear that the Court was
preoccupied with due process challenges to state legislation and that only two
approaches to the intersection of police powers legislation and the Due Process
Clause remained salient in constitutional jurisprudence. One approach, employed
by Justice Field, was an effort to develop bright-line boundaries between public
power and private rights with an emphasis on the presumption-something of an
echo of the vested rights principle-that persons could engage in lawful callings
free from state interference. The other approach was illustrated by two cases in the
late 1880s sustaining police power regulations against due process challenges. In
both of those cases, Mugler v. Kansas2 t6 and Powell v. Pennsylvania,2t7 the Court
treated legislation prohibiting the manufacture of beer for private use and banning
the sale of oleomargarine altogether as being well within the police powers of the
state. The Court said in Mugler:
[I]f, in the judgment of the legislature, the manufacture of
intoxicating liquors for the maker's own use ...would tend to
cripple... the effort to guard the community against the evils

213. Letter from Waite to James Sheldon (March 30, 1877), quoted in MAGRATH, supra note
186, at 187.
214. Id.
215. Munn, 94 U.S. at 141 (Field, J., dissenting).
216. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
217. 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
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attending the excessive use of such liquors, it is not for the
courts . . . to disregard the legislative determination of that
question." 8
In Powell, the Court said that whether the danger from even healthful oleomargarine
on the market required "the entire suppression of the business" was a "[q]uestion
of fact and of public policy which belong[ed] to the legislative department to
determine."21 9
The approaches, rhetoricaliy, were ij, all that far apart. In Mugler, the Court
concluded that due process challenges to police power legislation might succeed if
"a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public
morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects."22
In Powell, the Court conceded that "the privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling"
was part of the "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.2 2' However, in Mugler, the Court did not seem troubled by the fact that
some breweries shut down by the statute had been in existence before its passage.222
Similarly, in Powell, the Court ignored evidence from an oleomargarine
manufacturer that its product was as nutritious as butter, and the legislation was
therefore not a public health measure but was in effect a subsidy to the dairy
industry. 23 Justice Field expressed concern about both of those points, 224 which
seemed to signal the majority's disinclination to consider whether the legislatures'
police power rationales might have been pretextual.
By the death of Chief Justice Waite in 1888, it became clear that although the
Court continued to use the language of departmental discretion jurisprudence in
cases in which it considered the constitutional validity of state legislation, the
boundaries of its role vis-a-vis legislative departments had subtly shifted. Little by
little, the inquiries raised by provisions of the Reconstruction Amendments did their
work. Instead of questions involving the exercise of core legislative powers, such
as those protecting public health or safety, being seen primarily as legislative in
their nature, some-when they arguably had the effect of taking property from A
and giving it to B or had the effect of interfering with the lawful exercise of one's
calling-had come to be seen as potentially judicial. Even when courts and
commentators instinctively retained the conception, left over from departmental
discretion jurisprudence, that the scope of legislative police powers defined the
scope of the Due Process Clauses, the intersection of police powers with the
Fourteenth Amendment invited, as Chief Justice Waite recognized, judicial
boundary tracing.
The more the late-nineteenth-century Court became engaged in boundary
tracing in police power-due process cases, the more an altered role for the judiciary
became entrenched. Justice Brewer described that role in an 1893 address, although

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Mugler, 123 U.S. at 662.
Powell, 127 U.S. at 684.
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661.
Powell, 127 U.S. at 684.
See Mugler, 123 U.S. 657.
See Powell, 127 U.S. at 689.
See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 677-78; Powell, 127 U.S. at 694, 698-99.
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his purpose was to reassure his audience about the limited range of the judicial
department. Justice Brewer said:
The courts hold neither purse nor sword; they cannot corrupt nor
arbitrarily control. They make no laws, they establish no policy,
they never enter into the domain of popular action. They do not
govern. Their functions ...are limited to seeing that popular
action does not trespass upon right and justice as it exists in
written constitutions and natural law.225
Although Justice Brewer's comments were designed to buttress conventional
definitions of the judiciary's functions in orthodox departmental discretion
jurisprudence, they revealed that the Reconstruction Amendments were perceived
as having altered those functions. His language describing the courts as "never
enter[ing] into the domain of popular action," as "mak[ing] no laws," and
"establish[ing] no policy" sought to reassert the existence of clear boundaries
between the judiciary and other departments.226 But his statements were
accompanied by language sketching an image of the courts as overseers of potential
trespasses by the elected departments into a domain of private "right and justice"
as established by foundational principles of constitutional and natural law.227 The
conceptual map pictured in Justice Brewer's comments retained a sphere of
"popular action" in which laws and policies were fashioned and into which the
judiciary did not enter. Nevertheless, his comments also pictured the courts as
standing on a boundary line between that sphere and the sphere of private rights,
vigilantly safeguarding those private rights from trespasses by public actors.
5. James Bradley Thayer and the "ClearMistake" Rule: The Departmental
Discretion Principleand DeferentialJudicialScrutiny
By the time Justice Brewer made his comments, others recognized the potential
of the Reconstruction Amendments-when interpreted in the altered social and
economic context of late-nineteenth-century America-to greatly increase the scope
of judicial interpretive power and thereby dissolve the lines between judicial
questions and those confined to the discretion of the other departments. In two
essays written in 1893228 and 1901,29 James Bradley Thayer contrasted the contexts
in which Congress passed the Legal Tender Act in 1863, and that of the earlytwentieth century.
Although the Legal Tender Act "intimately and more seriously touch[ed] the
interests of every member of [the] population" when passed, Thayer noted that "it
225. David P. Brewer, Justice of the United States Supreme Court, The Nation's Safeguard (Jan.
17, 1893), in 13 PROC.N. Y. ST. B. A. 37, 46 (1893).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrineof ConstitutionalLaw,
7 HARV. L. REv. 129 (1893) [hereinafter Thayer, Origin and Scope].
229. James Bradley Thayer, Weld Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Address on the One
Hundredth Anniversary of Marshall's Elevation as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court
(Feb. 4, 1901), in JOHN MARSHALL: THE TRIBUTE OF MASSACHUSETTS 25 (photo. reprint 1988)
(Marquis F. Dickinson ed., 1901) [hereinafter Thayer, Address].
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was the legislature that determined [the] question [of the constitutionality of making
paper money legal tender],.. .not merely primarily, but once for all."23 The power
"not merely of enacting laws, but of putting an interpretation on the constitution
which shall deeply affect the whole country," was given to the Legislature not only
with respect to that legislation but generally.23' Thus, if "some individual, among
the innumerable chances of his private affairs, found it for his interest to raise a
judicial question about [an act of Congress]," Thayer argued, the departmental
discretion principle suggested that courts should only invalidate the Act "when
those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have
' He noted that the Supreme Court had ultimately upheld
made a very clear one."232
the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act but initially invalidated it, which was
an exercise of judicial overreaching.233
By 1901, Thayer believed "a vast and growing increase ofjudicial interference
with legislation" had developed.234 He thought this was a response not only to "the
portentous and ever increasing flood of litigation to which the fourteenth
amendment has given rise," but to "new problems in business, government, and
police which have come in with steam and electricity" including "the growth of
corporations and of wealth" and "the changes of opinion on social questions, such
as the relations of capital and labor. '235 John Marshall and his contemporaries,
Thayer suggested, "[s]eldom... imagined [that the] great, novel, tremendous power
of the courts be exerted" to invalidate the decisions of the other branches. 3 They
understood that "[aill the departments, and not merely the courts, are sworn to
support the Constitution" and "are bound to decide for themselves, in the first
'
instance, what this instrument requires of them."237
He noted the longstanding
principle that "[a] question, passed upon by [the other] departments," was typically
"refused any discussion in the judicial forum, on the ground ... that 'the respect
due to co-equal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act
upon this assurance.'"23S
At the opening of the twentieth century, Thayer feared that a spate of novel
legal and social issues were tempting the courts to lose sight of the departmental
discretion principle. When the judiciary exercised its "power . . . to disregard
unconstitutional legislation," it fostered "a serious evil, namely, that the correction
of legislative mistakes comes from the outside, and the people lose the political
experience and the moral education. . . that come from ... correcting their own
' He proposed that courts "adhere to first principles, and consider how
errors."239
narrow is the function which the constitutions have conferred on them" and "[h]ow
large... is the duty entrusted to others, and above all to the Legislature."240 By
adopting a rule of not overruling legislation unless the legislators had made a clear

230. Thayer, Origin and Scope, supra note 228, at 136.

231. Id.
232. Id. at 136, 144.

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

See id. at 136-37.
Thayer, Address, supra note 229, at 65.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 63 (quoting Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672 (1892)).
Id. at 66-67.
Thayer, Address, supra note 229, at 68.
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"constitutional mistake," the judiciary would be "keeping its hands off [legislative
acts] wherever it is possible to do it." '' Underscoring that approach to judicial
review, Thayer asserted that the "remarkable jurisdiction" of American courts to
oversee the actions of other governmental branches "has had some of its chief
illustrations
and its greatest triumphs... while the courts were refusing to exert
242
it."
Thus, as late as 1901, an influential constitutional commentator continued to
maintain that so long as the courts adhered firmly to the departmental discretion
principle they could avoid "a vast . . . increase of judicial interference with
legislation. 24 3 Clearly, Thayer understood departmental discretion as something
different from the idea that certain questions were "in their nature political" or of
the class "submitted to the executive." He did not describe a category of
departmental activity that gave rise to nonjusticiable issues when he urged the
courts to recognize that the legislative or executive branches were "charged,
primarily with the duty of judging of the constitutionality of its work" and thus
"entitled, as among all rationally permissible opinions as to what the Constitution
allows, to its own choice." 24" Instead, he described a hands off standard for judicial
review of the other branches' acts that were challenged on legal or constitutional
grounds. In short, he sought to enlist the departmental discretion principle in
arguments for deferential judicial scrutiny of the other branches' activity.
Modem commentators tend to see Thayer's "clear mistake" rule of
administration as an early recognition of the countermajoritarian constraints on
American judges in a democratic theory guided society. 245 However, his call for a
hands offjudicial approach to the decisions of the other branches was not connected
to democratic theory2 " and bore only an indirect relationship to the central
constitutional issues in the years between Munn and the close of the nineteenth
century. Thayer designed his "clear mistake" rule only for courts reviewing a coordinate branch of government-federal courts reviewing acts of Congress or the
Executive, or state courts reviewing state officials.247 In the major constitutional
cases of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court limited its
review to state police power legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus,
Thayer's rule of administration did not apply in any of the cases in which the Court
struggled, in the years after Munn, to determine the proper boundary between the
state police power and private rights.
Nonetheless, Thayer's effort to convert the departmental discretion principle
into a standard of deferential review bore an indirect relationship to the guardian
role for the federal judiciary that emerged with the Reconstruction Amendments.
Among the "[v]ery serious things" Thayer had noticed happening in late-nineteenth-

241. Id. at 69.

242. Id.
243. Id. at 65.
244. Id. at 68.
245. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 40 (1962) (discussing
the "clear mistake" rule as an accommodative principle in a representative democracy).
246. For more detail on the comparison between Thayer's "clear mistake" rule and theories of
democratic constitutionalism, see White, ConstitutionalJourney, supranote 11, at 1529-31.
247. The judiciary's "duty ... of keeping its hands off," Thayer noted, was confined to cases in
which it was "dealing with the acts of co-ordinate legislatures." Thayer, Address, supra note 229, at
69.
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century constitutional jurisprudence were "more and more prohibitions and
restraints" imposed on state legislatures by new constitutions in the states.248 These
new constitutions provided a "harvest" for state courts that "promptly and easily
' This encouraged legislators
proceed[ed] to set aside acts of the legislatures."249
to
"shed all consideration of constitutional restraints," thereby "turning that subject
over to the courts." 5 0 All of this made "[t]he people... careless as to whom they
send to the legislature," resulting in "unfit persons [who] pass foolish and bad laws"
and a tendency among citizens to look to the Judicary"to protect them against their
more immediate representatives." 25' Thayer deplored all of those trends. Because
he identified their origin with "the portentous and ever increasing flood of litigation
to which the fourteenth amendment has given rise," his readers might well have
concluded that if the Supreme Court set an example by adopting a hands offposture
toward state as well as federal legislation the Court reviewed on constitutional
grounds, it might help curtail the "vast and growing increase ofjudicial interference
with legislation."252
Thayer's "clear mistake" rule of judicial administration can be seen as
straddling the two quite different universes of constitutional jurisprudence that
briefly co-existed at the close of the nineteenth century. The pre-Civil War
departmental discretion cases reflected the traditional universe and its salient
categories centered on justiciability and the lines between judicial, legislative, and
executive questions. Thayer invoked that universe when he referred to the courts'
respect for "co-equal and independent departments" and their "triumphs" in
"refusing to exert" their review powers.2"3 The other universe was the emerging
late-nineteenth-century world of due process challenges to police power legislation,
in which courts stood poised to police the boundary between public power and
private rights. In this universe, Thayer's "clear mistake" rule served as a surrogate
for deferential judicial scrutiny.
For Thayer, the universes overlapped because he assumed that every legislative
act that raised legal or constitutional issues represented an implicit judgment on
those issues. If the Court viewed an act under the traditional universe, its passage
signified a legislative judgment about its legal and constitutional validity. Under
established principles of departmental discretion, such as those followed by Chief
Justice Waite in his opinion for the Court in Munn, s4 that ended the matter, even
after the Fourteenth Amendment. Legislatures were the appropriate judges of the
scope of their police powers. In the terms of the modern universe of constitutional
jurisprudence, Thayer recognized, the Fourteenth Amendment and comparable state
provisions might establish limits on legislative activity. If those limits anticipated
some judicial oversight of legislatures, then the courts should use their oversight
sparingly. For the most part, courts should keep their hands off in respect for the
competence of legislatures as constitutional interpreters.

248. Id. at 64.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 64-65.
251. Id. at 65.

252. Id. at 64-65.
253. Thayer, Address, supra note 229, at 63, 69.
254. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 123 (1877).
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Thus, Thayer designed his rule to retain the departmental discretion principle,
whether in its original form or as a surrogate for limited judicial scrutiny. However,
in the first two decades of the twentieth century, the Court did not direct its energy
at reviving traditional departmental discretion jurisprudence or at implementing
Thayer's "clear mistake" rule. Instead, the Court directed its energy at fashioning
doctrinal formulas that served as guides for boundary tracing, which seemed
inevitable when considered in light of the new post-Reconstruction role for the
judiciary as the tracer of the boundary between public power and private rights.
When one examines those formulas against the background of departmental
discretionjurisprudence, the formulas can be seen as efforts to transfer the emphasis
from issues of justiciability to issues of constitutional doctrine in cases involving
judicial oversight of the actions of the other branches. When one looks at the
functions of doctrine in a scattering of early-twentieth-century boundary tracing
cases, it turns out that one function was to serve as a surrogate for judicial scrutiny
of federal or state legislation.
C. The End of the TraditionalRegime
As the United States entered World War I in 1917, a survey of the landscape
of American constitutional law would have noted some striking changes since the
Court began to engage in boundary tracing in the police power-due process cases
of the 1870s. That boundary tracing process had continued and became more
refined. Chief Justice Taft described the process in 1923 as a "laborious[]" judicial
effort to mark "[t]he boundary of the police power beyond which its exercise
becomes an invasion of the guaranty of liberty under the Fifth and Fourteenth
' Although
Amendments" featuring the "pricking out a line in successive cases."255
the police power-due process cases were a staple of the early-twentieth-century
Court's docket, they were not the only exercises in judicial boundary tracing.
Boundary tracing had become the Court's dominant methodology in cases involving
the actions of federal administrative agencies and cases testing the scope of the
federal government's commerce powers.
The massive growth of industrial corporate power in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century ultimately prompted Congress to intervene on behalf of the
principle of competitive freedom in the marketplace. Congress chose two forms of
intervention: the passage of statutes seeking to prevent "combinations of capital"
that tended to lessen competition and the creation of federal administrative agencies,
to which Congress delegated its regulatory powers to oversee corporations engaging
in interstate commerce. The federal government's commerce power, treated as the
equivalent of state police powers, formed the constitutional basis for both forms.
The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890
constituted the first examples of congressional intervention in the economy.256 The
former statute created a federal agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC), charged with regulating carriers in interstate commerce. 7 The latter statute

255. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923) (Taft, C.J., dissenting).

256. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887); Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26
Stat. 209 (1890).
257. Interstate Commerce Act, § 11.
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declared "every contract, combination,.. . or conspiracy in, restraint of trade," and
any attempt, combination, or conspiracy to monopolize a market in interstate
commerce, to be illegal.2 58 Both statutes provided for what appeared to be limited
judicial review.259 Congress gave the ICC power to set aside carrier rates that were
not "reasonable and just" and required the courts to treat findings of fact as
conclusive and binding.260 However, the Sherman Act's categorical language gave
courts little room to exempt interstate combinations of capital from its provisions.26 '
Nonetheless, the idea that the federal government's power to regulate interstate
commerce might be employed to permit governmental incursions on private rights
that would be impermissible under a police power-due process analysis soon found
its way into judicial decisions involving the Interstate Commerce Act and the
Sherman Act. In 1895, the Court concluded that the Sherman Act did not apply to
the activities of the American Sugar Refining Company, a corporation that after
1892 controlled 98% of the market for domestic sugar manufacturing.262 The Court
held that the company was primarily engaged in producing sugar rather than selling
it, and thus its business affected interstate commerce "only incidentally and
indirectly. ' 26 a Then in 1897, the Court ruled that although the ICC had the power
to set aside unreasonable carrier rates, Congress did not explicitly give the power
to make rates, and thus the ICC's findings could be reviewed de novo and reversed
by courts.2 Eventually the Court concluded that comparable judicial oversight was
part of the Sherman Act as well. In cases decided in the first two decades of the
twentieth century, the Court concluded that the phrase "every combination in
restraint of trade" in the Act could be limited by the common law doctrine of
"unreasonable" restraints, and it fashioned a "rule of reason" that exempted some
monopolistic practices from the Act's coverage.265
These cases evidence the Court's solicitude for large-scale industrial enterprise
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, if one considers them
as examples of boundary tracing, analogous to the police power-due process cases,
they appear to be efforts to use judicially fashioned common law and constitutional
doctrines-in these instances doctrines associated with the Commerce Clause-to
achieve the same separation of impermissible invasions on private rights from
permissible uses of public power that the Court sought in state police power cases.
Once Congress signaled its readiness to use its powers to regulate interstate
commerce as a justification for limiting the freedom of individuals to pursue their
callings, the Court confronted options similar to those it faced when state police
258. Sherman Antitrust Act, §§ 1, 2.
259. Interstate Commerce Act, § 16; Sherman Antitrust Act, § 4.
260. Interstate Commerce Act, § 11.
261. Sherman Antitrust Act, § 1.
262. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 9,12 (1895).
263. Id. at 12.
264. See ICC v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex, Pac. Ry. Co., 167 U.S. 479, 506-11 (1897);
ICC v. Ala. Midland Ry. Co., 168 U.S. 144, 161-64, 175 (1897).
265. For the evolution of the Court's rule of reason approach to Sherman Act cases, compare
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), which held that every
combination restraining trade was illegal under the Sherman Act regardless of whether it would be
reasonable under common law, with StandardOil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), which held
that courts must use the standard ofreason applied at common law to determine whether a combination
in restraint of trade is illegal under the Sherman Act, and United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221
U.S. 106 (1911), which affirmed the holding in Standard Oil.
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power legislation was first challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. In the late-nineteenth-century police power cases, the Court
recognized that it could do one of two things: it could treat a legislature's effort to
exercise police powers as a definitive judgment on the constitutionality of that
exercise and let the legislature's professed definitions of the scope of their police
powers define the content of due process, or the Court could get into the business
of tracing boundaries. In the Interstate Commerce Act and Sherman Act cases, the
Court faced a comparable choice. Either it could treat the existence of the federal
government's power over interstate commerce as a sufficient justification for
regulating the rates of every carier and the practices of every "combination of
capital" that effected that commerce, or it could decide where federal control over
interstate commerce ended and other regimes-most notably that in which
individuals could pursue their economic affairs free from governmental
regulation-began.
After the same initial hesitation that marked its approach to the police powerdue process cases between the 1890s and World War I, the Court made a similar
decision to scrutinize rather than merely accept federal assertions of regulatory
power under the Commerce Clause. The Court concluded that "commerce" had a
limited definition; thus, the federal government's commerce power had a limited
scope. The Court eventually decided the Sherman Act's seemingly categorical
language needed to be understood in light of preexisting common law doctrines
confining that language. As a result, the Court got itself into the business of
reviewing the findings of fact, as well as the policies, of federal administrative
agencies.
In the process, the Court created a web of doctrine, based on its interpretations
of the Sherman Act and Interstate Commerce Act cases, which paralleled its
interpretations of the scope of state police powers. When the Court began reviewing
the findings of fact and the policies of administrative agencies, the traditional
universe of nineteenth centuryjurisprudence, with its comparatively robust principle
of departmental discretion, still existed. In this context, it is possible to see the
aggregated interpretations ofthe Commerce Clause and Due Process Clauses which
the Court made in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as the functional
equivalent of scrutiny levels decisions. The Court's activity suggested that it no
longer regarded the scope of the government's authority to make laws that arguably
invaded the legal or constitutional rights of individuals as capable of being defined
by the departmental discretion principle and its concept ofjusticiability. Instead, the
scope needed to be traced out in successive cases by the Court itself.
As justiciability receded as an analytical device in cases challenging the actions
of the other branches on legal or constitutional grounds, what remained was simply
the Court's tracing of the boundary between permissible and impermissible
governmental action in due process cases and Commerce Clause cases. As the
Court traced the boundary in successive cases, it relied upon doctrinal distinctions
and recognized that those distinctions--"direct" versus "indirect" effects of an
activity on interstate commerce, "reasonable" versus "unreasonable" restraints of
trade or carrier rates, "private" or "affected with a public interest"
businesses--served as signals for when the Court aggressively scrutinized the
actions of the other branches and when it presumed them to be constitutional.
Once American constitutional jurisprudence reached this point in its history, the
Court's own doctrinal exegesis controlled the exercise ofjudicial review rather than
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol57/iss1/3
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the principle that "co-equal" departments decided constitutional questions within
their own spheres. A new regime, in which the doctrinal techniques accompanying
judicial review determined the other branches' scope of discretion, replaced the
traditional regime in which judicial review coexisted with the departmental
discretion principle. As the new regime took shape, questions arose with regard to
the judicary's jurisprudential authority to make that determination. That authority
rested on the foundational assumptions of republican political theory, but those
assumptions themselves came under scrutiny by the early-twentieth century.
Ill. MODERN DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND THE COLLAPSE OF
DOCTRINAL FORMULAS IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

This Section argues that, in the early decades of the twentieth century, the
doctrinal formulas that aided the Court in tracing the boundary between permissible
and impermissible exercises of legislative power were undermined by new
conceptions of the role ofjudges as constitutional interpreters. Instead of judicial
glosses on constitutional provisions being thought of as efforts to adapt the
foundational principles embodied in the Constitution to new controversies, those
glosses came to be thought of as willful efforts to change the meaning of the
Constitution in response to the altered social and economic conditions ofmodernity.
As this view of constitutional interpretation gained momentum, the Court's
boundary tracing decisions were seen as exercises in public policy with ideological
implications. Meanwhile, the Court found it increasingly difficult to apply the
doctrinal formulas it employed in boundary tracing across a range of cases.
Eventually the Court abandoned judicial glossing of constitutional provisions as a
technique for marking the spheres of influence of the judiciary and other
departments. In this setting, judicial scrutiny levels first made their appearance.
A.

The Emergence ofDemocratic ConstitutionalTheory

We have seen that the robust conception of departmental discretion that existed
in traditional American constitutional jurisprudence was based on two axioms of
republican constitutionalism: that the Constitution existed to secure private rights
against their usurpation by government and that the judicial branch of government
declared, rather than made, law. Republicans assumed the judiciary was well suited
to protect individual rights against governmental interference because, as Justice
Brewer had stated in his 1893 address, it had "neither purse nor sword."266 Having
no access to the spoils of legislative office, judges were less tempted to equate the
public interest with their private interests and were thus less susceptible to
corruption. Having no power to make laws or to enforce them, judges were not
capable of assuming the role of arbitrary tyrant. Therefore, judges served as a check
on the partisanship, licentiousness, corruption, or tyranny of the other branches.
In a speech in which Justice Brewer reminded his audience that judges never
entered the domain of policy and did not make laws, his invocation of republican
axioms demonstrated that republican constitutional theory still influenced

266. Brewer, supra note 225, at 46.
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conceptions of the judiciary a hundred years after the framing of the Constitution. 267
But less than two decades after Justice Brewer's remarks, an altered attitude toward
the foundational assumptions of republican theory began to gain influence among
some members of American academia.2 6' Republicanism, in their view, was not
fully compatible with modernity. Those academics defined modernity as the conflux
of advanced industrial capitalism, broadened political participation, fluid rather than
fixed gradations of social status, and secularized theories of human knowledge that
rested on the contributions of science rather than the dogmas of religion. Humans,
armed with scientific knowledge and advanced technological capacity, were capable
of transforming their environment. To be a "modem," at the bottom, was to be one
who recognized the causal power of human agency in the universe. 6 9
1.

Modernity,Republican ConstitutionalTheory, and CausalAgency

Republicanism, from this perspective, was not a "modem" political theory. It
described humans as endemically partisan and self-interested, inevitably prone to
abuse power and fall susceptible to corruption or tyranny. Republicanism attributed
causal agency to a host of factors-nature, religion, the cycles of history, and
relatively fixed status gradations--over which humans had little control. It was
suspicious of democratic forms of government, believing that they encouraged mob
passions and demagoguery, and of government itself. In contrast, modernist
American political theorists were enthusiastic about the potential of humans to
better themselves and the potential of government to help in that process. In the
place of a cyclical theory of history, modernists advanced historicist, progressive
theories. History was the progression of human-induced qualitative change; the
future was not simply part of a cycle, but an improvement on the past.27 °
2.

Toward Democratic ConstitutionalTheory

The result was that American political culture, by the early decades of the
twentieth century, was far more receptive to the idea that government programs and
policies could better the condition ofAmerican citizens. Alongside Justice Brewer's
conception of government activity as potentially trespassing on private rights 27'
emerged a conception of government activity as enhancing the rights of members
of the public in a democratic society. Democratic constitutionalism, as it evolved
during the first three decades of the twentieth century, emphasized governmental
promotion of two sets of rights in particular. One set included rights associated with
the opportunity for all citizens, whatever their backgrounds or beliefs, to fully
participate in public affairs-rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion,

267. Id.
268. On the early-twentieth-century emergence of disciplines rooted in modernist assumptions

about causal agency in the American academy, see DOROTHY Ross, THEORIGINS OFAMERICAN SOCIAL
SCIENCE 303-89 (1991).
269. For more detail on the emergence of modernist conceptions of causal agency among legal
commentators in the early-twentieth century, see G. EDWARD WHITE, THECONSTITUTION ANDTHENEW
DEAL 167-97 (2000) [hereinafter WHITE, NEW DEAL].
270. For evidence of this altered conception of history among historians in the early-twentieth
century, see Ross, supra note 268, at 312-19.
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and unrestricted access to the public deliberations of elected officials as they made
laws and formulated policy. The other set included rights associated with improving
the condition of workers in the labor force, a right to a minimum level of wages and
a maximum number of working hours. By 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt was
to encapsulate those sets of rights and add another based on the conception of a
constitutional democracy as the antithesis of totalitarian states on the right or the
left.272 In a message to Congress announcing the "Lend-Lease" program, under
which armaments would be provided to Britain and her allies in their war against
the Axis Powers, President Roosevelt said that Americans were entitled to freedom
of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear.273
As the United States was drawn into a world war and experienced an economic
depression in the first three decades of the twentieth century, policy-makers
increasingly responded to the dislocations caused by those events by expanding the
presence of government in American life. States passed legislation regulating
economic activity and redistributing economic benefits. Likewise, Congress passed
legislation creating jobs in the public sector and delegating power to federal
regulatory agencies. Banking, securities, and electronic communications were
among the industries subjected to federal regulation. Eventually, after the
Democratic Party under Franklin Roosevelt captured the Presidency in 1932,
Congress introduced a code of regulatory practices for most American industries.
Those developments suggested that a sea change had taken place in the attitudes of
Americans toward government, especially the federal government. Whereas
traditional republican theory saw the Union as a minimalist entity, primarily
designed to guard the United States against its enemies and to prevent the parochial
interests of states from fostering anarchy or chaos, democratic theory anticipated a
positive role for the federal government as a promoter of the freedoms to which
citizens in a democracy were entitled.
3. Democratic Theory and ConstitutionalAdaptivity
As a symbiotic relationship between modernity and democratic theory
developed in early-twentieth-century America, the Supreme Court struggled to
adapt to the expanded role of government and the enhanced status of new sets of
democratic constitutional rights. The central element in that struggle was a tension
between the Court's dominant early-twentieth-century approach to constitutional
interpretation and new conceptions that emerged in the wake of altered theories of
causal agency. The Court predicated its orthodox approach on an assumption, which
the Justices shared since the founding period, about the way the Constitution was
to be interpreted over time. As Marshall said in McCulloch v. Maryland, the
Constitution was designed "to be adapted to the various crisesof human affairs."274
Marshall and his contemporaries understood the term "adapted" in that statement
to have a particular meaning. As new controversies surfaced that called for the
application of existing constitutional provisions, those provisions were "adapted"
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to the controversies-they were applied so as to simultaneously expand and
preserve their meaning. Applying provisions to resolve new disputes demonstrated
that the Constitution was capable of enduring over time; its provisions were
capacious enough to encompass controversies that even their original drafters had
not anticipated. But when the Court used a constitutional provision to resolve a
novel controversy, it did not change its fundamental meaning but reaffirmed it. The
Court's philosophy was that each of the Constitution's provisions embodied
foundational principles of republican theory, so that by finding a provision capable
of resolving
a new dispute, the Court affined the provision's continuing
275
authority.
Thus, for Marshall and his contemporaries, adapting the Constitution to new
crises was not the equivalent of changing its meaning. When Justice Brewer spoke
ofjudges preventing "popular action" from "trespass[ing] upon right and justice as
it exists in written constitutions and natural law," he anticipated that judges could
discern what "right and justice" meant, and that those principles would not
fundamentally change 2. 76 That theory ofconstitutional adaptivity went hand-in-hand
with the theory that judging is the discerning and applying of pre-existing legal
principles rather than the fashioning of new ones. Fashioning new ones and
changing the meaning of the Constitution would be making law, something judges,
Marshall and Brewer believed, did not do. A republican constitution was designed
to prevent judges from making law by establishing written principles designed to
be adapted to new crises over time.
Thus, republican constitutionalism's assumption about causal agency reinforced
assumptions about the capacity of legal principles to be adapted to new
controversies over time. Since law, as embodied in the foundational principles of
a written constitution, was itself a causal agent in the universe-a body of timeless
universal principles that served to restrain the passions of humans and provide
cement for social organization-its ability to endure over time was important to the
preservation of republican government in America. The same assumptions helped
shape the role ofjudges as constitutional interpreters. Because judges were human,
and thus self-interested and partisan, they could not be entrusted with the power to
make law in the fashion of legislatures because they were not directly accountable
to the popular will. But their ability to discern and apply the law lent them authority
as constitutional interpreters. By declaring the meaning of the Constitution, judges
reinforced the causal primacy of legal principles. By adapting the Constitution to
the evolving crises of human affairs, judges demonstrated the capacity of
foundational principles of republican theory to endure over time.
If one rejects the assumption that law is a timeless, universal causal agent and
sees it as the product of the will of humans holding power, a different view of
constitutional adaptivity and of the role of judges as constitutional interpreters
follows. When judges adapted a constitutional provision to resolve a controversy
the drafters had not foreseen, the judges not only found the provision apposite to the
controversy but found it consistent with one resolution of the controversy and not
another. A group of early-twentieth-century constitutional scholars argued that this

275. See WHITE, NEW DEAL, supra note 269, at 205-06.
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adaptation gave a new meaning to the constitutional provision.277 This argument
demonstrated that the Constitution was a living document whose meaning changed
in accordance with the changing social and economic conditions from which new
constitutional controversies emerged. It also revealed that when judges helped
change the meaning of the Constitution, they were making law.
Those who endorsed a "living Constitution" approach to constitutional
interpretation conceded that judges acted as lawmakers when they helped change
the meaning of the Constitution.2 s Those commentators' primary concern was with
the implications of that conclusion for the role of the judiciary in a democratic
society. If judges were lawmakers and the meaning of the Constitution changed
over time, the doctrinal formulas judges supplied in interpreting constitutional
provisions were akin to the policy directives of legislatures rather than efforts to
discern the meaning of timeless legal principles.
In the early twentieth century, the emergence of "living Constitution"
approaches to constitutional interpretation ultimately produced a jurisprudential
crisis, in which the nature of constitutional adaptivity and the role of judges as
constitutional interpreters became the subject of academic and professional
debates. 279 The most significant aspect of that crisis, for present purposes, was its
effect on the accumulated doctrinal formulas that characterized the Court's police
power-due process cases. Two lines of those cases were particularly prominent and
controversial because of their close connections to the defining elements of
democratic constitutional theory. One line of cases featured the judicially created
"liberty of contract" doctrine, which courts used to analyze police power legislation
regulating economic activity. The other line involved cases in which the Court used
the police powers as a basis for regulating the "liberty" of free speech.
4. Democratic Theory andDoctrinalFormulasI: "LibertyofContract"
The Court's endorsement of the liberty of contract doctrine, a judicial gloss on
the term "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, signified the
Court's acceptance of the proposition that due process included the principle against
class legislation. Beginning in 1897, the Court required that police power legislation
not offend the anti-class principle in three sets of cases involving contract
formation. The earliest set of cases involved statutes flatly prohibiting individuals
or companies from entering into certain types of contractual relations, such as

contracts with out-of-state insurance companies insuring property within a state.2"'
These cases did not represent much of a doctrinal variation from the Court's
existing police powers jurisprudence because it was hard to see how those statutes

277. For examples of early-twentieth-century scholars holding this "living Constitution" theory

of constitutional adaptivity, see WHITE, NEW DEAL, supra note 269, at 208-11.
278. As Howard Lee McBain put it in his 1927 book, The Living Constitution, "judges are

men .... made of human stuff... and sharing with us the common limitations and frailties of human
nature," and "[I]aws are man-made, man-executed, man-interpreted." HOWARD LEE MCBAIN, THE
LIVING CONSTITUTION 2 (1927).
279. For more detail, see WHITE, NEW DEAL, supra note 269, at 215-18.

280. The Court first announced the liberty of contract doctrine in Allegeyar v. Louisiana, 165

U.S. 578, 592 (1897).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2005

57

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57: 1

promoted public health, safety, or morals. Their significance was the Court's
conceptualization of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty to enter into contracts.
The next set of cases brought the anti-class principle more clearly into focus,
representing the Court's effort between 1898 and the 1920s to separate
constitutionally permissible from impermissible wages and hours legislation. The
judiciary achieved that separation by recognizing that legislation redistributing
benefits from one class of persons to another violated the Due Process Clause
unless it benefitted the public at large. Under certain circumstances, the state's
police power could overcome freedom of contract, but only where the legislation
promoted the public interest rather than the interest of a particular class. Thus, a
limit on the hours worked by underground miners'" or women" 2 could be justified

under the state's police power as public health measures, given the susceptibility of
the workers and the risk that they might become wards of the public if they
developed health problems. In contrast, efforts to limit the working hours of
bakers,283 the resale prices of theatre tickets, 4 or the fees set by employment
agencies2 5 lacked an appropriate health, safety, or morals justification. The
impermissible legislation simply benefitted one class of market actors at the expense
of another. Even susceptible classes of workers sometimes needed freedom to
bargain and sell their services on the terms they chose.2" 6
The final line of liberty of contract cases involved state efforts to outlaw
"yellow dog" contracts, agreements between industrial laborers and their employers
in which the employees agreed as a condition of their employment not to join labor
unions or submit labor disputes to compulsory arbitration. In those cases, the Court
concluded that promoting harmony in labor relations fell outside the traditional
rationales justifying a state's exercise of police powers.2" 7
From one perspective, the liberty of contract cases were orthodox exercises in
the Court's doctrinalist approach to police power cases that began in the 18 80s. The
Court's function in those cases was boundary tracing, and its use of doctrinal
formulas to place cases on one side or another of the boundary was as
unexceptionable as its distinction between "direct" and "indirect" effects on
interstate commerce in Commerce Clause cases or between "private" property and
property "affected by a public interest" in rate regulation cases. From another
perspective, the Court's decisions defining the term "liberty" in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause as encompassing the right of industrial workers
to bargain for their services on their own terms constituted an unwarranted
interference with legislative discretion. One commentator argued that legislation
imposing wages and hours requirements on the industrial labor force was a
quintessential exercise of the state's police power, and any doubts about its

281. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898).
282. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1908).
283. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
284. See Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418,445 (1927).
285. See Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 357 (1928).
286. See. e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525,560-62 (1923) (holding that the District
of Columbia could not require minimum wage levels for female workers in its hospitals).
287. Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 540 (1923); Coppage
v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 18 (1915). For a detailed discussion of "yellow dog" cases, see BARRY
ASHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 107-38 (1998).
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constitutionality "must be resolved in favor of the Legislature.""2 ' In the same year,
another commentator suggested that the courts were "seiz[ing] upon vague clauses
in the constitution to perpetuate the economic views of the past" about wages and
hours legislation, and "the time seem[ed] to have arrived to call a halt upon the
encroachments of the judiciary" so as to "maintain[] ...the independence of the

three departments of government."'289
By the end of the nineteenth century, some critics of liberty of contract
decisions began to see the doctrine as embodying an ideological bias in the
judiciary. C.B. Labatt wrote in 1893 that the decisions reflected "economic
prepossessions" and "class prejudices" and would "scarcely fail to strengthen the
impression which is already widely prevalent among working men, that the courts
are a mere stronghold of capital."29 ° That line of criticism revealed that at least
some commentators treated the judicial glossing of constitutional provisions as the
equivalent of policy-making. Within a decade, this reaction to liberty of contract
cases surfaced on the Court itself. Labatt claimed that some of the Court's liberty
of contract decisions "breath[ed] the very spirit of Mr. Herbert Spencer."29' 1
Similarly, in 1905, Justice Holmes, dissenting in a liberty of contract case, said that
"[t]he Fourteenth
Amendment [did] not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
2 92
Statics."

The significance of this reaction to the judicary's use of doctrines such as
liberty of contract to trace out the boundary between public power and private rights
was that the reaction threatened to undermine the legitimacy of judicial use of
doctrinal formulas as a surrogate for the departmental discretion principle. Doctrinal
formulas in police power-due process cases, Contracts Clause cases, or Commerce
Clause cases had served to legitimize the judicary's hands-off posture toward some
acts of the other branches and its scrutiny of others. The formulas had made the
alternative postures a set of constitutional requirements reinforcing the departmental
discretion principle. If doctrinal formulas had ideological dimensions, however,
their use suggested that courts were inclined to scrutinize the activities of other
branches when they disliked the policies embodied in those activities. That
amounted to judicial encroachment and offended the departmental discretion
principle. In short, the more commentators emphasized the ideological dimensions
of doctrinal formulas, the less those formulas were seen as doing any work to
preserve the independence of the branches of government.

288. Herbert Henry Darling, Legislative Control Over ContractsofEmployment: The Weaver's
Fines Bill, 6 HARV. L. REv. 85, 96 (1892).
289. Conrad Reno, Arbitration and the Wage Contract,26 AM. L. REv. 837, 849 (1892).
290. C. B. Labatt, State Regulation ofthe Contractof Employment, 27 AM. L. REv. 857,874-75

(1893).
291. Id. at 864. Herbert Spencer was the author of SocialStatics (1851), one of the earliest-and
best known--"Social Darwinist" texts. SocialStatics predated Darwin's On The Origin ofSpecies by
six years and coined the phrase "survival of the fittest." Morton J. Horwitz, Foreward: The
Constitutionof Change: Legal FundamentalityWithout Fundamentalism, 107 HARv. L. REv. 32, 46
n.70 (1993).
292. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Democratic Theory and Doctrinal Formulas II: "Liberties of the
Mind"

As the Court began to use the liberty of contract gloss to aid its boundary
tracing in police power-due process cases, it also began to gloss the term "liberty"
in cases where statutes restricted freedom of expression. Over the forty-odd years
in which the Court created and developed the liberty of contract doctrine, it
experimented with three distinct doctrinal approaches to speech issues. One
approach, which had dominated American free speech jurisprudence for most of the
nineteenth century, treated the passage of the First Amendment as having no effect
on common law principles affecting free speech." 3 The Court regarded the First
Amendment as designed only to provide protection against prior restraints on
expression-government preclearance or censorship ofideas prior to their utterance
or publication.294 Since the First Amendment only applied against Congress, this
approach assumed that the federal government could punish seditious, libelous,
blasphemous, obscene, or indecent speech with impunity so long as it did not censor
the speech in advance. The approach further assumed that the states had significant
power to restrict expression.
Over the course of the nineteenth century, few federal statutes restricted
speech295 and comparatively few speech-based challenges to state police power
legislation were posed.296 This meant that the constitutional status of freedom of
expression was largely undeveloped by the opening of the twentieth century.297 But
in the years after the Civil War, legal treatise writers began to suggest that even if
the First Amendment only prevented prior restraints, liberty in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause very likely encompassed liberties of the mind.
Under this approach, the same judicial glossing of liberty that produced the liberty
of contract doctrine had the potential to result in some recognition of the right of
citizens to receive and communicate ideas and information. 29 ' By the early decades
of the twentieth century, other commentators had concluded that Blackstone's prior

293. The Supreme Court endorsed this approach in Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
294. The idea that the liberty of the press consisted only of protection from "laying no previous
restraints upon publications" was advanced in William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of
England. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *152.
295. One example was the Comstock Act of 1873, which prohibited the trade in and circulation
of obscene literature and articles of immoral use in the United States mail. Comstock Act, ch. 258,
§ 148, 17 Stat. 599 (1873). On the passage of the Comstock Act, and the history of free speech
jurisprudence in the nineteenth century, see DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTrEN YEARS

24 (1997).
296. For a discussion of free speech challenges of state police power legislation in the latenineteenth century, see RABBAN, supra note 295, at 131-49. Rabban concluded that "the overwheming
majority of decisions in all jurisdictions rejected free speech claims," but "a minority of state... courts
upheld [them]." Id. at 131-32.
297. "The overwhelming weight of judicial opinion in all jurisdictions before World War I
offered little recognition and even less protection of free speech interests." Id. at 175.
298. The most prominent nineteenth century commentator making this argument was Thomas
Cooley, whose ConstitutionalLimitationstreatise gave some attention to liberties of the mind when he
discussed the scope of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See COOLEY,
supra note 172, at 355. For discussion of Cooley's approach, see RABBAN, supra note 295, at 181-82.
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restraint doctrine was inconsistent with the First Amendment and free speech
clauses in state constitutions."'
Prior to World War I, however, the Supreme Court showed no inclination to
read the First Amendment broadOctober 27, 20051y or to uphold free speech
challenges to state police powers legislation. In two state cases, Justice Holmes,
writing for the Court, allowed a Colorado court to hold a newspaper editor in
contempt for criticizing the motives of state judges °° and allowed the state of
Washington to suppress articles about nudity."' In Schenck v. United States,30 2 the
first case testing the constitutionality of the Espionage Act of 1917, which
criminalized expression tending to undermine the United States' participation in
World War I, the court unanimously upheld a conviction for distributing leaflets
critical of the war effort to men who were conscripted for military service.3"3 Justice
Holmes's opinion nonetheless backed away from the proposition that the First
Amendment only supplied protection against prior restraints.3" It implied that the
mere recital of a government interest in maintaining solidarity in wartime was
insufficient to restrict speech criticizing the government unless the speech in
question posed a "clear and present danger" to national security."a 5 Despite the
tentativeness of Justice Holmes's language in Schenck,"°o it was clear that the Court
was inclined to make, in cases testing Congress's power to restrict speech, the same
sort of categorical distinctions between permissible and impermissible legislation
it had made in state police power cases.30 7 Thus by the 1920s the Court had
seemingly abandoned the doctrine that freedom of expression was limited to
protection from prior restraints, and had concluded that Fourteenth Amendment
liberty included liberties of the mind, although the tenor of its free speech decisions
remained far from libertarian.
Then in a 1925 case, Gitlow v. New York,3 °8 the Court announced, with virtually
no discussion, that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated the First Amendment's free speech clause. 3" The casual analysis of
299. Rabban cites the fifth edition of Cooley's treatise (1883) as evidence that he had rejected
Blackstone's position by that date. RABBAN, supra note 295, at 177. Theodore Schroeder, Henry
Schofield, Ernst Freund, and Roscoe Pound were other commentators who rejected the proposition that
free speech was limited to protection form prior restraints. See id. at 189-93.
300. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 465 (1907).
301. Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277-78 (1915).
302. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
303. Id. at 48-53.

304. Id. at 51.
305. Id. at 52.
306. Justice Holmes indicated in Schenck that "in many places and in ordinary times" the
defendant's language critical of the government would be protected by the First Amendment. Schenck,
249 U.S. at 52. Holmes's statement may have been in response to a concession by the United States in
its brief in Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), a companion case to Schenck, that the First
Amendment went beyond prior restraints. See RABBAN, supra note 295, at 277 (quoting the brief for
the United States in Debs).
307. As the Court decided more free speech cases inthe years after World War I, it used the "bad
tendency" test to distinguish protected speech from unprotected speech. Thebad tendency test examined
whether or not an expression had a tendency to encourage acts that the state had a right to prevent.
Holmes alluded to the bad tendency formula in Schenck and used it in two companion cases decided
at the same time--Debs andFrohwerkv. UnitedStates, 249 U.S. 204,209 (1919). See RABBAN, supra
note 295, at 282-85.
308. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
309. Id. at 666.
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the incorporation issue in Gitlow might seem puzzling given that the Court had
declined to entertain the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated free
speech rights in two earlier decisions,31 0 and had stated in a 1922 case that "neither
the Fourteenth Amendment nor any provision of the Constitution of the United
States imposes upon the States any restrictions about 'freedom of speech."' 31 In
two decisions in 1923 and 1925, however, the Court invalidated state statutes as
infringing liberties of the mind-the right of students to learn foreign languages and
the right of parents to send their children to private schools.1 2 In addition, the Court
had recognized in a 1920 case that a state statute preventing interference with
enlistment in the armed services could be challenged as infringing on the right to
express pacifist opinions.3" 3 Justice Brandeis dissented in that case, saying that he
had "difficulty in believing" that because the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause "has been held to protect against state denial the right ... to contract," it did
not also extend to "liberty ... to teach.

. .

the doctrine of pacifism."3 4 In short,

liberties related to expression did not appear conceptually different from liberty of
contract by the 1920s. Both were judicial glosses on a constitutional provision, and
both were part of a boundary tracing methodology in police power cases.
Thus, one can assume that, in the years immediately following Gitlow,judges
did not draw a conceptual distinction beween First Amendment rights that were
incorporated against states and Fourteenth Amendment liberties of the mind. Both
sets of rights were given comparable solicitude; both were subject to restriction by
legislation based on the state's police power. Between 1907 and 1931, the Court
only invalidated legislation challenged on liberty of the mind grounds in three
instances 5 and did not invalidate any federal or state legislation challenged on First
Amendment or incorporated First Amendment grounds.
The growth of free speech cases in the 1920s thus initially seemed to be another
example of judicial glossing of constitutional provisions in order to facilitate
boundary tracing. Incorporation of the provisions of the Bill of Rights into the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause was yet another example of glossing.
However, as the number of speech cases increased after World War I and criticism
surfaced that sought to expose the Court's liberty of contract decisions as
ideologically motivated, an interesting dissonance between the Court's two

310. In Pattersonv. Colorado,Justice Holmes's opinion assumed that the First Amendment was
relevant to a state statute providing criminal contempt penalties for criticism of state judges, but his
prior restraints interpretation of the scope ofFirst Amendment protection rendered that issue moot. 205
U.S. 454,462 (1907). Justice John Marshall Harlan, dissenting in Patterson,stated that he believed that
freedom ofexpression was a constitutional privilege without specifying where that privilege originated.
Id. at 465 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Fox v. Washington, counsel for the defendant argued that
Pattersonhad not decided whether the Fourteenth Amendment made the First Amendment applicable
to state action but that, in any event, freedom of speech was a liberty protected against the states under
the Due Process Clause. 236 U.S. 273, 275 (1915). Holmes's opinion construed the statute in Fox as
prohibiting only expression that actually encouraged a breach of state law. Id. at 277. He did not
address First Amendment arguments and thus technically did not pass on the incorporation claim. See
id. The issue thus remained undecided after Pattersonand Fox.
311. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922).
312. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
313. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
314. Id. at 343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
315. In addition to Meyer andPierce,see Farringtonv. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 248 (1927), which
also involved decisions by parents about their children's educational choices.
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principal lines of police power cases emerged. The juxtaposition of two cases
decided by the Court in 1931 reflected that dissonance. One case involved a
situation where Minnesota sought to apply a statute forbidding the publication of
a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper" in order to enjoin a
Minneapolis paper from distributing future issues." A five-Justice majority
comprised of Justices Hughes, Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, and Roberts invalidated
the statute on the ground that it constituted a prior restraint on speech. 31" Justices
Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler dissented. 318 The other case
involved a New Jersey statute regulating fees paid to local agents by insurance
companies, which was challenged as a violation of liberty of contract. 319 The same
majority of Justices sustained the New Jersey legislation as an appropriate exercise
of the police power,320 and the same four dissenters registered their opposition.321
The majority in the Minnesota case declared that prior restraints on speech were
presumptively invalid, whereas the majority in the New Jersey case suggested that
police power regulations affecting economic activity were presumptively
constitutional. It was as if the Court had come to regard the exercise of judicial
glossing in liberty of contract cases and liberty of mind cases as qualitatively
different.
B. Democratic Theory and the Collapse ofDoctrinalFormulas
1. Commentary
By the 1930s, the stage was set for a wholesale reexamination of the role of
doctrinal formulas as surrogates for the departmental discretion principle. Ifjudicial
glossing was an exercise in policy-making, formulas such as liberty of contract
simply provided judges with an opportunity to strike down legislation they disliked.
In his testimony before Congress supporting the Roosevelt Administration's 1937
plan to reorganize the Court by appointing additional justices should existing
members fail to retire at the age of 70, Edward Corwin emphasized that the
ideological nature ofjudging, coupled with the increased participation ofjudges as
constitutional interpreters since Reconstruction, undermined the departmental
discretion principle. 322 The current Court, Corwin charged, had "been endeavoring
to elevate into constitutional law a particular economic bias," which was a "theory
of political economy that government must keep its hands off of business" and
"must not interfere with the relations of employer and employee. 323 Its bias was
especially troublesome because in the "last forty or fifty years" the Court had "in
the exercise of judicial review dissolved every limitation upon the exercise of its

316. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 701 (1931).
317. Id. at 722-23.
318. Id. at 738 (Butler, J., dissenting).
319. O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931).
320. Id. at 257-58.
321. Id. at 270 (Van Devanter, J., McReynolds, J., Sutherland, J., Butler, J., dissenting).
322. Reorganizationof the FederalJudiciary: Hearingon S. 1392 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 75th Cong. (1937) (statement of Edwin S. Corwin), reprinted in 2 CORwIN ON THE
CONSTITUTION 218 (Richard Loss ed., 1987).
323. Id. at 219.
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' This created "aserious unbalance in the Constitution resulting
power."324
from the
undue extension of judicial review. 32 5 The Court "projected itself into [the]
political field" and was "sinn[ing] against the fundamental maxim of judicial
'
review; namely, all doubts will be resolved in favor of the legislature."326
By the early 1940s, one commentator argued that for the departmental
discretion principle to be preserved and judicial review to be squared with
democratic theory, the Court needed to adopt a deferential stance toward all
legislation.327 Henry Steele Commager maintained that when courts reviewed
legislation they were passing on acts that a majority not only ratified but also
implicitly subjected "to scrutiny in regard to [their] conformity with the
Constitution."32 The passage of legislation, Commager argued, represented "a
' Judicial invalidation of legislation thus
majority vote for its constitutionality."329
amounted to "one non-elective and non-removable element in the government
[rejecting] the conclusions on constitutionality arrived at by the two elective and the
two removable branches."33 Not only was judicial review a usurpation of the
discretion of another department of government, it was undemocratic because of the
judicary's limited accountability.
Commager's argument demonstrated the incompatibility of republican and
democratic constitutional theory with respect to their assumptions about the
judiciary. He attacked both of the republican arguments that served to legitimate the
principle of judicial supremacy when contested departmental interpretations of the
Constitution existed. Republicans dealt with the issue ofjudicial bias by treating the
judiciary as a class of savants, trained to discover the law, and by sharply
distinguishing between the will of the judge and the will of the law. Commager
asserted that the argument that judges were "peculiarly fitted"33' to interpret
constitutional provisions failed because most exercises of constitutional

interpretation involved "vague and ambiguous clauses" whose meaning was

determined not "by legal research but by 'considerations of policy." 332 Judges were
no better versed on policy considerations than members of other departments.
Republicans also believed that the judiciary was incapable of making corrupt
or arbitrary decisions. Commager claimed that the argument that courts "alone are
' also failed because any close student of the Court's
independent and unbiased"333
nineteenth century decisions could see that the Court "intervened again and again
to defeat congressional efforts to free slaves, guarantee civil rights to Negroes, to
protect workingmen, outlaw child labor, assist hard-pressed farmers, and to
'
democratize the tax system."334
The features of the judiciary that republican
constitutional thought deemed safeguards against tyranny or corruption were treated

324. Id. at 221.

325. Id. at 220.
326. Id. at 256.
327. See HENRY STEELE

COMMAGER, MAJORITY

328. Id. at 40.
329. Id.

RuLE AND MINORITY RIGHTS 40-55 (1943).

330. Id.

331. Id. at 42.
332. Id. at 43.

333. COMMAGER, supra note 327, at 42.
334. Id. at 55.
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by Commager and other democratic theorists as illusory and potentially inconsistent
with democratic principles.
2. The Abandonment ofDoctrinalFormulas
As this commentary surfaced, the Court had difficulty maintaining the integrity
of the doctrinal approach it developed in connection with boundary tracing. In
several areas, such as police power cases involving economic activity, police power
cases involving restraints on expression, and Commerce Clause cases, the
increasingly refined doctrinal distinctions that the Court fashioned in the first three
decades of the twentieth century appeared on the brink of collapse. 35 The inability
of doctrinal formulas to sustain themselves provided additional evidence of their
ideological character to the Court's critics.
Despite the difficulties in which the Court found itself in the late 1930s and
early 1940s, the Court did not adopt a wholly deferential stance toward the action
of the other branches challenged on constitutional grounds. Instead, the Court
infused into its approach to constitutional interpretation a new technique designed
to shore up the principles of judicial review and departmental discretion. That
technique focused on the degree ofjudicial scrutiny afforded various actions of the
other branches of government. Levels of scrutiny became devices by which the
Court implicitly designated an action as within the discretion of another branch or
subject to a check by the courts. As the Court's scrutiny levels decision became a
habitual step in its methodology in constitutional cases, tiers of scrutiny became
associated with particular sets of cases. These cases signaled that the Court was
likely to defer to the actions of the other branches in some instances but not in
others. Eventually it became clear that the Court's scrutiny levels jurisprudence was
closely connected to democratic constitutional theory. Three lines of cases, all of
which produced major decisions in the late 1930s and early 1940s, serve to illustrate
the Court's new scrutiny levels jurisprudence.
IV. THE ORIGINS OF SCRUTINY LEVELS JURISPRUDENCE

A. IncorporatedRights Cases
The idea that provisions of the Bill of Rights were incorporated into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not seem to be particularly novel
or controversial in the areas in which it was first adopted. In an 1897 eminent
335. After more than forty years of"pricking out the boundary" between public power and private

rights in due process cases, the Court, in two decisions in the 1930s, abandoned the affected with a
public interest and liberty of contract doctrines that it employed so regularly in boundary tracing. See
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
Then, in a 1941 decision, the Court signaled that the distinction between direct and indirect effects of
an activity on interstate commerce might no longer control the disposition of Commerce Clause cases,
and in 1942 the Court abandoned the distinction altogether. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Meanwhile, the Court struggled to find a
doctrinal formula for deciding speech cases, abandoning the bad tendency test in a series of cases in
the late 1930s for the clear and present danger test and then experimenting with the idea that some
forms of expression were of higher value than others. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
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domain case, Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroadv. Chicago,33 6 the Court
concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause required that the
state provide just compensation when it took private property for a public use.337
But the Court did not thereby incorporate the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause;
it merely followed a line of railroad rate regulation decisions holding that states
could not use their regulatory powers to "do that which in law amounts to a taking
of private property for public use without just compensation. 3 38 In that setting, a
guarantee that the state could not take private property for public use without just
compensation was another way of saying that the judiciary had an obligation in
police power cases to determine whether the legislature set reasonable rates.339
Similarly, the Court's decision in Gitlow to incorporate the First Amendment's
prohibition against the abridgement of free speech seemed unexceptional in light
of its Meyer and Piercedecisions, holding that liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment
includes protection for liberties of the mind.34
Once the Court began incorporating rights, parties in a line of cases between
1925 and 1938 asked the Court to incorporate additional provisions. In some of
those cases, involving the freedom of the press,34 l free exercise of religion,342 and
peaceable assembly 343 provisions of the First Amendment, the Court explicitly
spoke of a provision's being incorporated. Inothers, notably ones involving Sixth
Amendment provisions identifying the rights of persons accused of crimes to have
the assistance of counsel 3"4and to be informed of the nature of charges against
them,3 45 the Court's language was more general, referring to "the conception of due
process of law."'3' Although none of those decisions seemed to extend the concept
336. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
337. Id. at 236.
338. Stone v. Farmers Loan & Trust, Co., 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886). See also Covington &
Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 598 (1896) (holding that tolls on public highways
must be just both to the corporation operating the highway and to the public); Dow v. Beidelman, 125
U.S. 680,690-91 (1888) (holding that a rate of three cents per mile did not amount to a taking without
due process); Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Smith, 128 U.S. 174, 179 (1888) (construing the grant
to a railroad corporation of the state's eminent domain rights); Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler,
110 U.S. 347, 354 (1884) (holding that regulation of water prices does not violate due process).
Scholars often cite Chicago,Burlington & Quincy as the first example of a case incorporating a
provision of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See, e.g.,
WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 99 (1986) (citing cases
where the court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates provisions
of the Bill of Rights). The case, however, actually represents another approach to the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-that the clause itself does not incorporate any Bill of Rights
provisions, but the concept of due process embodies restrictions on the state governments that are
comparable to some Bill of Rights restrictions on the federal government. For a modem example of this
approach, see Justice John Marshall Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541
(196 1) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
339. Dow, 125 U.S. at 691; Stone, 116 U.S. at 331.
340. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
341. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931).
342. Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 261-62 (1934).
343. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
344. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
345. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
346. Powell, 287 U.S. at 68. In his opinion for the Court in Powell,Justice Sutherland said that
"'it is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against
National action may also be safeguarded against state action,"' but this was "'not because those rights
are enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but because they are of such a nature that they are
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of due process beyond conventional limits, they took place in a jurisprudential
climate in which some judicial glosses on the Due Process Clause were criticized
as ideologically based. A potential inconsistency surfaced between the Court's
analytical techniques in liberty of contract cases and its techniques in incorporation
cases. If liberty of contract was a judge-made doctrine that served to invest the Due
Process Clause with substantive content, what was incorporation? After all, judges
decided which provisions of the Bill of Rights were part of due process.
Aware of this difficulty, Justice Cardozo attempted to identify criteria for
guiding the Court's analysis in incorporation cases in Palko v. Connecticut.347 Palko
involved a man who was tried in state court for first-degree murder but convicted
of second-degree murder.34 A Connecticut statute provided that prosecutors could
appeal rulings of law made at criminal trials and retry defendants who had been
acquitted under erroneous rulings.349 On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court
ordered a new trial on the ground that the trial judge had mistakenly excluded
testimony and erroneously instructed the jury."' Palko was retried, convicted of
first-degree murder, and sentenced to death.' He claimed that he was entitled to
the Fifth Amendment's guarantee that "[n]o person shall be 'subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." 352
Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court, identified a "line of division" between
Bill of Rights provisions that were "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty" and those that were not "'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental."" 53 He concluded that subjecting a criminal
defendant to being tried "until there shall be a trial free from the corrosion of
substantial legal error" was not subjecting that defendant to "a hardship so acute
and shocking that our polity will not endure it."3 4 In contrast, Justice Cardozo felt
that "freedom of thought[] and speech" was "the matrix, the indispensable
condition, of nearly every other form of freedom," making Bill of Rights provisions
protecting it "fundamental" to the Anglo-American system of ordered liberty.355
Equally fundamental were provisions ensuring that "ignorant defendants in a capital
case" should have the benefit of counsel.3" 6 The "essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty" criterion distinguished those incorporated provisions from ones that the
Court had declined to incorporate against the states, such as the Fifth Amendment's
guarantee that no person should be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness
against himself or the Sixth and Seventh Amendments' provisions for jury trials in
criminal and some civil cases.357

included in the conception of due process of law."' Id. at 67-68 (quoting Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78, 79 (1908)).
347. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
348. Id. at 320-21.
349. Id. at 321.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 321-22.
352. Id. at 322 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
353. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1933)).
354. Id. at 328.
355. Id. at 326-27.
356. Id. at 327.
357. Id. at 325.
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After Palko, the Court's approach to incorporated rights cases was selective,
resembling boundary tracing in police power cases. The Court applied some Bill of
Rights provisions against the states, meaning that due process required states to
afford persons the same guarantees afforded to individuals by the federal
government. The Court did not apply other provisions, meaning that a state could
deviate from federal procedures, typically in criminal trials. The result of selective
judicial incorporation was to preserve the discretion of state legislatures to fashion
some of their own rules in civil and criminal cases. Selective judicial incorporation
ensured that parties could challenge other rules as violations of due process and the
judiciary would oversee those challenges. Palko, from that perspective, was a
departmental discretion case.
B. PolicePower Cases
Meanwhile, by the late 1930s, the Court showed signs of departing from its
methodology of pricking out boundary lines in police power-due process cases. In
a 1938 case, United States v. CaroleneProducts Co., 3 18 the Court considered the
constitutionality of the Filled Milk Act of 1923, in which Congress prohibited the
shipment in interstate commerce of skimmed milk that contained fat or oils made
from products other than milk. 3 " The Carolene Products Company manufactured
a version of skimmed milk, Milnut, which replaced butterfat with coconut milk.360
A federal grand jury in Illinois indicted the Carolene Products Company for
violating the Filled Milk Act. 36' The Company claimed the statute exceeded
Congress's commerce powers and deprived it of property without due process
because there had been no finding that its product lacked nutritional value.362
In an opinion by Justice Stone, the Court made short shrift of the commerce
power claim-Congress could exclude articles from interstate commerce that it
concluded were deleterious to the public health 363-and concentrated its focus on
the due process claim. The Court left no question that legislatures could prohibit the
sale of even nutritious products if they concluded that their distribution amounted
to a fraud on the public. 36 Justice Stone stressed evidence that Milnut was
"indistinguishable" from skimmed milk made with butterfat, "thus making
fraudulent distribution easy and protection of the consumer difficult. '365 The only
serious issue appeared to be whether Congress needed to base its decision to ban
Milnut on some actual findings that the product was unhealthful or deceptive. That
358. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
359. Id. at 145-46.

360. Id. at 146.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 146-47.
363. Id. at 147. Justice Stone cited Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903),
and HipoliteEgg Co. v. UnitedStates, 220 U.S. 45 (1911), for the proposition that Congress could use
the commerce power to protect public health, welfare, and morals. CaroleneProds., 304 U.S. at 147.
364. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 148 (1938). Justice Stone cited Hebe
Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297 (1919), in which the Court upheld a state statute almost identical to the
Filled Milk Act. CaroleneProds., 304 U.S. at 148. The statute prohibited the manufacture and sale of
skimmed milk made with coconut oil on the ground that the product was likely to deceive the public,
even though there had been no finding that the product lacked nutritional value. Hebe, 248 U.S. at
302-03.
365. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 149-50.
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issue was not troublesome in CaroleneProducts itself because Congress based its
declarations that filled milk was "injurious to health and... a fraud on the public"
on Senate and House committee reports. 3 But Justice Stone decided to use the case
to make some more general comments about the Court's stance toward
constitutionally challenged legislation.
He began by stating that "no pronouncement of a legislature can forestall attack
upon the constitutionality of the prohibition which it enacts by" the use of
"opprobrious epithets" characterizing the evils at which the prohibition was
directed.367 Nor could a statute "preclude[] the disproof in judicial proceedings of
all facts which would show" that the statute lacked a "rational basis" for its
passage.36 But it was not necessary to base "regulatory legislation affecting
ordinary commercial transactions" on factual findings.369 "[T]he existence of facts
supporting the legislative judgment [was] to be presumed" by courts.37 Only when
other facts existed that "preclude[d] the assumption that [the legislation] rest[ed]
upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators"
was the Court to depart from this presumption of constitutionality.37' In short, the
Court presumed that legislation regulating "ordinary commercial transactions" was
grounded on a rational basis.372 The legislature did not have to supply any basis for
such legislation; the burden was on challengers to introduce evidence suggesting
that it was not rationally grounded.373
This was the first statement in a Supreme Court opinion generalizing the
proposition that the Court presumed a whole category of legislation to be
constitutional. In operation, that proposition did the same work as the departmental
discretion principle in the Court's nineteenth century cases-it served to confer
power to regulate a group of activities on another department of government. But
Justice Stone's presumption of constitutionality for legislation regulating ordinary
commercial transactions came in the wake of a half-century in which the Court
routinely scrutinized that sort of legislation under the Due Process Clauses. For
every instance in which the Court sustained legislation regulating economic activity
or redistributing economic benefits as an appropriate exercise of the police powers,
there were instances in which the Court had invalidated that sort of legislation as an
impermissible invasion of private rights. Indeed, the methodology of police power
cases, as well as Commerce Clause cases, assumed that the Court would decide
whether a piece of legislation was constitutional or not. Now Justice Stone was
suggesting that the Court would typically not review the constitutionality of
legislation regulating ordinary commercial transactions.
Although converting the presumption of constitutionality for a whole category
of legislation into a general proposition was a notable feature of Justice Stone's
CaroleneProducts opinion, the idea of treating such legislation as constitutional,

366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.

See id. at 148-49.
Id. at 152.
Id.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 153.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2005

69

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57: 1

if rational rather than arbitrary, had already surfaced in two earlier decisions. 74
Those decisions indicated that the Court might well abandon boundary tracing in
many cases challenging the constitutionality of social and economic legislation. The
truly novel feature of CaroleneProductswas Justice Stone's intimation in footnote
four that
the presumption of constitutionality might not extend to another line of
375
cases.

Justice Stone initially had some difficulty characterizing that line. An early draft
of his footnote gathered together a series of cases that he described as challenges
to laws "aim[ed] at restricting the corrective political processes which can ordinarily
be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation" and suggested that
"one attacking the constitutionality of a statute may be thought to bear a lighter
burden" when making such challenges. 37 6' But most of the cases he cited did not
raise concerns about "political processes" in legislatures.3 77 They involved two sorts
of free speech claims: those based on incorporated First Amendment provisions and
those based on the liberty of mind gloss. 78 Reacting to Justice Stone's draft, Chief
Justice Hughes asked whether the difference between those cases and cases
involving the regulation of ordinary commercial transactions lay "in the nature of
the right invoked. 3 79 In "dealing with freedom of speech and of the press," Chief
Justice Hughes maintained, "the legislative action putting the press broadly under
license and censorship is directly opposed to the constitutional guaranty and for that
reason has no presumption to support it." 380 Incorporated rights challenges, unlike
other constitutional challenges requiring judges to gloss words such as liberty or
commerce, squarely confronted legislation with an allegedly incompatible
constitutional provision. In that situation, a presumption of constitutionality seemed
inappropriate; if anything, the challenge demonstrated that the legislation should be
presumptively unconstitutional.
Justice Stone picked up on Chief Justice Hughes's suggestion and revised his
footnote, inserting a lead paragraph that ran: "There may be narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first
ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced
within the Fourteenth. 31 ' That paragraph, taken together with Justice Cardozo's

374. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397-98 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291

U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
375. CaroleneProds., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
376. MURPHY ET AL., supra note 338, at 486-87.
377. Id.

378. Of the cases Justice Stone cited in his CaroleneProducts footnote four, two cases, South

CarolinaState Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) and McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), alluded to the inability of voters in one state to influence the actions
of other states, and two others, Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) and Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S.
73 (1932), dealt with efforts by the state of Texas to bar black voters from eligibility to vote in
primaries. CaroleneProds., 304 U.S. at 152. Those cases could have been said to involve legislation
"restricting... political processes." MURPHY ET AL., supra note 338, at 486. The other twelve cases
Justice Stone cited were either liberty of mind cases or cases incorporating First Amendment provisions
against states.
379. Letter from Chief Justice Hughes to Justice Stone (Apr. 18, 1938), quoted in MURPHY ET
AL., supra note 338, at 487.
380. Id.
-381. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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suggestion in Palko that "freedom of thought[] and speech" was a fundamental
constitutional right,382 intimated that a hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights
might exist. Some Justices subsequently explored the idea that First Amendment
rights occupied a "preferred position" in constitutional jurisprudence. 38 3 But
ultimately the main effect of Justice Stone's footnote was to create different levels
of judicial scrutiny for different types of legislation.
The Court's scrutiny levels jurisprudence got under way with some scattered
comments in cases in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The 1939 case of Schneider
v. State8 4 involved an anti-littering ordinance directed at Jehovah's Witnesses who
were distributing religious literature in public.385 Justice Roberts, writing for the
Court, treated the case as an ordinary police power case, but he noted that the Court
"characterized the freedom of speech and that of the press as fundamental personal
rights and liberties. 38 6 He then suggested that "legislative preferences or beliefs
respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at
other personal activities," but they were "insufficient to justify such as diminishes
the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions."387
Justice Roberts's formulation in Schneider linked three related but distinct
propositions. One proposition was that legislation restricting fundamental rights
would be treated differently from other legislation. 38' A legislative judgment that
regulatory legislation would serve public convenience might be sufficient to justify
the legislation when the activity being regulated did not involve the exercise of
fundamental rights.3 8 9 But where the activity did involve the exercise of
fundamental rights, the Court required a greater justification. 39 That proposition
recalled Justice Stone's first draft of the CaroleneProductsfootnote four, where he
had suggested that "[d]ifferent considerations may apply, and one attacking the
constitutionality of a statute may be thought to bear a lighter burden," when free
speech rights were affected.391 Ultimately, this proposition was about the level of
judicial scrutiny to be applied to classes of legislation.
Another proposition contained in Justice Roberts's opinion in Schneider was
that freedom of speech and freedom of the press were fundamental constitutional
rights. 392 This proposition suggested that other rights might be less fundamental, and
the Court's response to legislation might vary, as Chief Justice Hughes had put it
in his CaroleneProductsmemorandum to Justice Stone, depending on "the nature
of the right invoked. 39 3 Chief Justice Hughes may only have meant that where a
provision of the Constitution explicitly protected a right, and legislation was

382. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937).
383. For a discussion of the Court's "preferred position" experiment, which took place between
the late 1930s and the early 1950s, see G. Edward White, The FirstAmendment Comes ofAge: The
Emergence ofFree Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REv. 299, 330-42 (1996).
384. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).

385. Id. at 157-59.
386. Id. at 161.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 161.

389. Id.

390. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
391. MURPHY ET AL., supra note 338, at 486.
392. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 161.

393. Letter from Chief Justice Hughes to Justice Stone (Apr. 18, 1938), quoted in MURPHY ET
AL, supra note 338, at 487.
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"directly opposed" to that right, a presumption that the legislation was constitutional
was inappropriate. However, he might also have meant that rights explicitly
guaranteed in the Constitution's text, as opposed to rights that were the product of
judicial glosses, were more fundamental. It also was not clear whether Chief Justice
Hughes anticipated that the level ofjudicial scrutiny of legislation would vary with
"the nature of the right invoked" in constitutional challenges. Chief Justice Hughes
suggested that the "different considerations" Justice Stone had alluded to where free
speech rights were involved did not involve "the test" employed by the Court to
evaluate the statute, which Chief Justice Hughes later described as "whether there
[was] a rational basis" for the legislation.394
The third proposition in Justice Roberts's Schneideropinion was that freedom
of speech and freedom of the press were fundamental rights because they were
"vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. '395 When Commager
considered the implications of judicial review for democratic theory in his 1943
book, he eventually concluded that the legislature should resolve tensions between
majority rule and minority rights because it was the more democratic forum.396 By
the publication of Commager's book, it was clear that the Court regarded protection
for the speech rights of minorities as a foundational principle of democratic
constitutionalism, too important to be left to the legislature. In West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette,397 the Court, reversing a decision handed down
three years earlier,39 concluded that the state could not compel the children of
Jehovah's Witnesses to salute the flag in public schools.399 Justice Jackson, writing

for the Court, defined "free speech" and "freedom of worship" as "fundamental
rights" that had been "withdrawn" by the Bill of Rights "from the vicissitudes of
political controversy."
Justice Jackson tied together the three propositions announced by Justice
Roberts in Schneiderin the form of a new standard ofjudicial review for cases that
challenged legislation as interfering with fundamental constitutional rights. He
made it clear that the Court's newly relaxed posture toward police power legislation
in due process cases would not be followed in incorporated First Amendment cases.
"[I]t is important to distinguish," he wrote in Barnette,
between the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as
an instrument for transmitting the principles of the First
Amendment and those cases in which it is applied for its own
sake. .

.

. Much of the vagueness of the due process clause

disappears when the specific prohibitions of the First become its
standard. 40'
As an illustration, he noted:

394. Id.
395. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 161.
396. COMMAGER, supra note 327, at 72.
397. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

398.
399.
400.
401.

Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
Id. at 638.
Id. at 639.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol57/iss1/3

72

White: Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny

2005]

HISTORICIZING JUDICIAL SCRUTINY

The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may
well include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to
impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a
"rational basis" for adopting. But freedoms of speech and press,
of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender
grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave
and immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully
protect.402
Thus, by the early 1940s, the Court had made a set of associations between the
idea of incorporated rights, democratic theory, and the appropriate standard of
review for legislation challenged on constitutional grounds. The Court first gave
greater constitutional cachet to specific rights enumerated in the text than to a vague
set of rights that were the product of judicial glosses. But not all of the rights
specifically listed in Bill of Rights provisions were included in due process, only
fundamental rights. The Court defined those rights as "essential to a scheme of
ordered liberty," and they were the rights that, by the Barnette decision, came to be
associated with the foundational principles of a democratic society.41'
When legislation infringed upon fundamental incorporated rights, the Court
required the legislature to show more than a rational basis for the infringement. The
legislature needed to show, Justice Jackson's Barnette opinion suggested, "grave
and immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect."' Thus,
by 1943 Chief Justice Hughes's intimation that "the nature of the right involved"
was different when legislation infringed on incorporated rights evolved into a
different test for the constitutionality of that legislation. The burden to justify
legislation affecting incorporated rights was greater than that required to justify
legislation affecting other rights. The Court had begun to develop a jurisprudence
of scrutiny levels.
From Palko through Barnette, the Court's scrutiny levels cases had all been
police power-due process cases. But two cases in the 1940s suggested that the
Court's technique of subjecting different types of legislation to different
justificatory burdens would not be confined to police power or due process. In
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 5 a man who had been convicted once for stealing chickens

402. Id.
403. By 1943, the Court incorporated the free speech, free press, free exercise of religion, and
freedom of assembly provisions of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. In addition, the Court subsumed the right ofpersons accused of capital crimes to the assistance
of counsel for their defense and the right to be informed of the nature of the charges against them into
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937);
Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). Each of
these decisions arguably rested on foundational propositions of democratic theory that majorities had

no power to coerce the consent of minorities or to arbitrarily put citizens in peril without affording them
procedural safeguards.
404. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639. This language was reminiscent of the approach then being
adopted by the Court in subversive advocacy cases, when the Court required that a legislature
demonstrate that speech constituted a "clear and present danger" to the security of the state as a
justification for suppressing it. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 261 (1941); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
405. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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and twice for robberies with firearms challenged a state statute that provided for the
sterilization of habitual criminals."' The statute limited sterilization to felonies
involving "moral turpitude" with exceptions for several types of felonies, such as
4 7
embezzlement, violations of prohibition laws, revenue acts, or political offenses. 0
Although defendants subject to the statute were given notice, a hearing, and
afforded jury trials, the only triable issue was whether a defendant's health might
be adversely affected by the sterilization procedure." °8
Skinner posed some difficulties for the Court's police power-due process
jurisprudence after Carolene Products. Although the Justices-who eventually
voted unanimously to invalidate the statute-may have had an intuition that the
right to be free from compulsory sterilization by the state was some form of
constitutionally protected liberty, they surely could not define it as an incorporated
right. Under Carolene Products, the Court found no reason to depart from the
presumption that the statute was constitutional. The public health and public morals
rationales for the legislation in Skinner seemed evident, even though the statute's
numerous exceptions could have been said to undermine them. Moreover, the
procedure for sterilization afforded defendants an opportunity to challenge it. A
majority of the Court eventually elected to join an opinion by Justice Douglas that
conceptualized Skinner not as a police power-due process case but as an equal
protection case.
Justice Douglas centered his equal protection argument on the fact that the
statute exempted those who committed embezzlement but applied to those who
committed "larceny by trespass or trick or fraud."'" By doing so, he asserted, the
legislature was claiming that those committing larceny had "biologically inheritable
traits" that those who committed embezzlement lacked."0 That distinction was
"clear, pointed, unmistakable discrimination" of an "invidious" nature, Justice
Douglas claimed, because "the law lays an unequal hand on those who have
committed intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes one and not the
other.""' I
Legislatures, Justice Douglas conceded, could "mark and set apart... classes
and types of problems" without violating the Equal Protection Clause."
Legislatures could, for example, classify different types of crimes and provide for
different penalties. The legislation challenged in Skinner, however, involved "one
of the basic civil rights of man.""' 3 Marriage and procreation were "fundamental to
the very existence and survival of the race.""4 The power to sterilize had "subtle,
far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or
types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear."" A
sterilized person was "forever deprived of a basic liberty."" 6 Thus, "strict scrutiny

406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.

Id. at 536-37.
Id.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 541.
Id.

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
Id. at 540.
Id. at 541.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law [was] essential,"
Justice Douglas concluded, "lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious
discriminations are made against groups or types of individuals in violation of the
constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws.""41
Skinner suggested that the critical step in determining whether the Court would
reverse the presumption of constitutionality was not whether the right infringed
upon by a statute was incorporated, but whether the right was fundamental. Justice
Douglas said that he did not intend to "reexamine the scope of the police power of
the States."41 He implied that prior equal protection cases indicated that state
legislatures should be given "large deference" in classifying substantive crimes and
their penalties. 1 9 The difference in Skinner was that the case involved sterilization,
and sterilization was an "irreparable injury" with "no redemption for the individual
whom the law touches.""42 Strict scrutiny of the Oklahoma statute was essential
because it affected a fundamental right.42'
The Skinner decision was all the more interesting because the Court likely
could have reached the same result by treating the case as an ordinary police powerdue process challenge in which the legislature failed to show even a rational basis
for the legislation. The difficulty with the Oklahoma statute invalidated in Skinner
was not simply that it made nonsensical distinctions between the eligibility of
chicken thieves and embezzlers for sterilization. The difficulty was that the statute
assumed that "habitual criminals" had genetic defects they could pass on to
offspring and provided no procedure by which affected persons could challenge this
assumption. A legislature could decide that larceny, but not embezzlement, was a
crime of"moral turpitude." However, a legislature could not conclude that "habitual
criminals" convicted of crimes of "moral turpitude" would pass those tendencies on
to their children without any evidence that this, in fact, occurred. Oklahoma had no
basis for concluding that a chicken thief was likely to father another chicken thief,
and the statute gave the affected chicken thief no opportunity to expose that
misguided conclusion.
The strict scrutiny language in Skinner, and the suggestion that legislative
infringements on fundamental rights triggered strict scrutiny, may simply have been
a product of Chief Justice Stone's assignment of the case to Justice Douglas, who
was more prepared to resort to an equal protection argument than Chief Justice
Stone would have been.422 But once a doctrinal association is planted in one case,
it can recur in another, and in 1944, a legislative classification again was seen as
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421. Id.
422. Chief Justice Stone wrote a concurring opinion in Skinner in which he conceptualized the

case as a due process case rather than an equal protection case. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
544 (1942) (Stone, C.J., concurring). He believed that if the presumption of constitutionality was
applied to the case, the Oklahoma legislature could decide which criminals to sterilize and even decide
"that the criminal tendencies of any class of habitual offenders are transmissable regardless of the
varying mental characteristics of its individuals," although "science has been unable to ascertain" that
fact. Id. Chief Justice Stone thought, however, that if the Skinner case was conceptualized as a due
process case, it illustrated that "[t]here are limits to the extent to which the presumption of
constitutionality can be pressed, especially where the liberty of the person is concerned." Id.
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triggering strict scrutiny. The case was Korematsu v. UnitedStates,423 in which an
American citizen of Japanese descent challenged a military order requiring him to
report to an "Assembly Center" on the West Coast. 42 " The military used those
centers to detain persons of Japanese ancestry until they were shipped to
"Relocation Centers" or allowed to return to their homes if outside of a designated
military zone.425 The plaintiff was anAmerican citizen of unchallenged loyalty.426
After being tried and convicted for remaining in his home in defiance of the order,
the plaintiff claimed that the order was an unconstitutional violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. 427 The plaintiff argued that the military based the order on race
and not national security because the order singled out persons of Japanese ancestry
for detention and relocation rather than persons of German and Italian descent, even
though the United States was also at war with Germany and Italy.
Justice Black, writing for the Court, upheld the order, but not before stating that
"all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect," and the "courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny. ' 4 28 Although Justice Black eventually concluded that the plaintiff was
excluded from the military zone "because the country [was] at war with the
Japanese Empire" rather than because of his race, his language provided another
basis for strict scrutiny: "suspect" legislative classifications.429
Justice Black did not clarify, however, what sort ofjustification the government
needed to provide once a classification was deemed "suspect." Justice Black's
opinion conceded that the military order singled out Japanese for detention and
relocation, but his opinion indicated that the government had evidence that some
Japanese refused to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States and others
requested repatriation to Japan. 3" This suggested that the order was based on
military necessity. But Justice Black did not provide evidence that persons of
German or Italian descent living in the United States refused to swear allegiance or
requested repatriation once the United States declared war against Germany and
Italy. Thus, the Court did not ask the government to demonstrate why persons of
Japanese ancestry in the United States were more dangerous to national security
than persons of German or Italian ancestry. Despite Justice Black's statement that
the Court subjected the order to the "most rigid scrutiny," the government was able
to defend the order largely on the basis of conjectures about the motives of Japanese
residents after the United States declared war against Japan.
C. Cases Involving Executive Discretionin ForeignRelations
By the close of World War II, it became apparent that the Court had decided to
experiment with the idea of scrutiny levels as a substitute for boundary tracing. The
Court's efforts to identify fundamental rights and suspect classifications, its
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language about presumptions of constitutionality and departures from them, and its
allusions to the requirement that in most instances legislatures need only
demonstrate that statutes allegedly infringing on constitutional rights had a rational
basis, seemed directed toward changing its approach to judicial review. Instead of
actively involving itself in the classification of every statute challenged on
constitutional grounds, the Court employed the CaroleneProductstechniques of
avoiding serious engagement with most statutes and departing from the presumption
of constitutionality only in a limited set of cases.
The common explanation for the Court's altered stance in reviewing legislation
in the 1940s is that it had gotten itself into political difficulties by blocking some
New Deal and state welfare legislation in the 1930s, and realized that a more
deferential stance could be self-preservationist. 43' It is possible, however, that a
majority of the Court's Justices 432 came to recognize that its boundary tracing
methodology, with an emphasis on doctrinal formulas, had become problematic as
the formulas were increasingly criticized as being ideologically driven. By shifting
the Court's emphasis from boundary tracing to presumptions-and departures from
presumptions-of constitutionality, the Court potentially avoided active engagement
with a good deal of legislation. Moreover, the Court could refurbish the
departmental discretion principle by delegating to Congress or the states the power
to regulate large areas of society and the economy, such as the area dealing with
ordinary commercial transactions, while retaining for itself the power to scrutinize
the other branches and states when they infringed upon a particular subset of
fundamental constitutional rights, mainly rights of expression, that were associated
with democratic theory.433
If one thinks of the Court's emerging scrutiny levels jurisprudence as a
technique for refurbishing departmental discretion at a time when boundary tracing
threatened to obliterate the principle, another set of decisions the Court initiated in
the late 1930s can be seen in a different light. Those decisions involved challenges
to actions by the Executive in the area of foreign relations.
The 1930s featured an increased number of instances in which Congress chose
to explicitly or implicitly delegate its powers to the executive branch or to agencies
staffed by the Executive. In the early years of the New Deal, Congress created
several new federal agencies by delegation, and in two cases in the mid 1930s the
Court struck down provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act on the ground
431. See the discussion in WHITE, NEW DEAL, supra note 269, at 160-61 (outlining "stock

explanation").

432. Changes in the Court's personnel doubtless affected its changed posture in the early 1940s.

Of the justices who had been committed to boundary tracing, which in 1937, included Justices Van
Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, Butler, Hughes, and Roberts, only Justice Roberts remained on the
Court by 1942, and he retired in 1944.
433. The Court's efforts in the 1940s to distinguish cases involving challenges to legislation

regulating speech from challenges to legislation regulating economic activity illustrates the Court's
experimentalist character. The preferred position line of cases provides one illustration. Another can
be found inpolice power-due process cases involving economic activity, in which ChiefJustice Hughes
and Justice Roberts suggested that the Court should presume that legislation which satisfied a
reasonableness test was constitutional, but the Court should not submit that legislation to the supine
standard of review for challenges to economic legislation that the Court subsequently adopted. For a

comparison of the Court's 1940s experiments in formulating a standard of review for economic
legislation with its later supine approach, see Bar-y Cushman, Lost Fidelities,41 WM. &MARY L.REV.
95, 99-145 (1999).
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that Congress's delegation of its powers to the Executive did not provide adequate
standards for making decisions. Meanwhile, Congress delegated powers in the
foreign relations arena as well. A joint resolution Congress passed in 1934 gave
power to the President to prohibit American arms manufacturers from shipping
weapons to foreign nations if he found that the prohibition would "contribute to the
reestablishment of peace. 435 President Roosevelt prohibited one arms manufacturer,
the Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, from shipping aircraft machine guns to
Bolivia. Curtiss-Wright challenged the order as an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power to the Executive branch.436
As we have seen, the Court had long regarded foreign affairs decisions as
having been "submitted to the Executive" by the Constitution. But Roosevelt's
prohibition of overseas arms sales, which the President could trigger simply by his
personal judgments about the effects of those sales, seemed to resemble the
standardless delegations that the Court found in the National Industrial Recovery
Act cases. Moreover, the 1934 executive order ending arms shipments to Bolivia
was not the only example of congressional delegation of power to the Executive in
the foreign relations sphere. A year earlier, the United States recognized the Soviet
Union after fifteen years of nonrecognition, but the form of recognition was not the
traditional form of a treaty with Senate ratification. The recognition took the format
of an executive agreement resulting from diplomatic correspondence between
Roosevelt and the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Maxim Litvinoff.437 An
important feature of the Litvinoff Agreement, as it was known, was the assignment
to the United States of all amounts owed by American nationals to the Soviets.438
The basis for most of the assigned obligations was the Soviet Government's
confiscation of assets owned by Americans in Russia at the time the Soviets seized
power. The Litvinoff Agreement had the effect of legitimating that confiscation and
making the United States Government the creditor of a variety of persons that
owned property in pre-Soviet Russia.
Between 1937 and 1945, the Court decided three cases related to the exercise
of executive power in connection with the 1934 presidential arms embargo and the
Litvinoff Agreement. In each case, the Court held that the exercise of power was
within the discretion of the President, passed constitutional muster, and represented
a policy decision of the United States Government that superceded contrary law and
was binding on the courts. The cumulative effect of the decisions was to expand
significantly the category of cases "submitted to the executive" under the
Constitution.
In the first case, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,43 Justice
Sutherland, writing for the Court, propounded the novel theory that the federal
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437. Exchange of Communication Between the President of the United States and Maxim M.
Litvinoff, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in 28
Supp. AM. J.INT'L L. 2, 2-11 (1934).
438. Letter from Maxim Litvinoff to President Roosevelt (Nov. 16, 1933), in 28 SUPP. AM. J.
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government's powers in the area of foreign relations were inherent, deriving from
national sovereignty rather than from the Constitution, and thus were not subject to
constitutional restraints such as the non-delegation doctrine."' In addition, Justice
Sutherland's Curtiss-Wright opinion canvassed reasons for what he called the
"plenary and exclusive power of the President.. . in the field of international
relations.""' He cited the longstanding congressional practice of delegating power
to the President to negotiate international treaties as an argument for "the
constitutionality of the practice.""'2 Both Justice Sutherland's inherent powers
theory and his argument from practice were subject to the objection that they
confused the United States' status as an international entity with the status of the
federal government under the Constitution. The power of the federal Executive to
negotiate international agreements presupposes that those agreements, when they
affect the states or American citizens, are subject to constitutional limitations.
Few commentators criticized the Court's conclusion in Curtiss-Wright that the
President had discretion to suspend the foreign arms sales of American corporations
at his pleasure." 3 The Court then relied on Curtiss-Wright in two subsequent
decisions: the 1937 case of United States v. Belmont4 and the 1942 case of United
States v. Pink."s In those two cases, the Court held that the Litvinoff Agreement's
assignment provisions represented policies of the United States Government that
superceded state law and were not reviewable by the courts. Both cases involved the
disposition in New York state of assets confiscated by the Soviet Government and
assigned to the United States under the Litvinoff Agreement. In both opinions, the
Court concluded that the claims of the United States to the assets originally owned
by a Russian metal works corporation and a Russian insurance company prevailed
over those of Russian nationals or creditors, even though that dis osition was
contrary to the rules of New York state for distributing those assets.' As Justice
Douglas wrote for the Court in the Pink case, "[T]he policies of the States become
wholly irrelevant to judicial inquiry when the United States, acting within its
constitutional sphere, seeks enforcement of its foreign policy in the courts.""' 7
Although the Litvinoff Agreement was not a treaty, it prevailed over competing
state law.
The effect of the trilogy of decisions was that the President could negotiate an
agreement with a foreign government that affected the assets of American citizens
without falling foul of the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause or any
other constitutional provision. In both Belmont andPink,New York procedure for
distributing assets located within the state consisted of identifying domestic and
foreign claimants to those assets and paying out claims according to their priority.
The United States, in both cases, intervened under the Litvinoff Agreement to claim
the assets." 8 Because the Just Compensation Clause applied to aliens as well as
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citizens, the United States Government's claim appeared to be a taking of property
for public use under the clause. But Justice Douglas maintained that there was "no
Constitutional reason why this Government need act as the collection agent for
nationals of other countries when it takes steps to protect itself."" 9 He likened the
Litvinoff Agreement to a federal treaty, concluding that it superseded state law.45
One commentator, Edwin Borchard, called the Pink decision the culmination
of an effort "to substitute for the Constitutional treaty the executive agreement,
without Congressional approval if possible," in order to "bring about a change in
the Constitution.""45 Borchard believed the effort had originated with executive
policy-makers in Washington and had "moral support from the Supreme Court."4 52
Borchard was correct as a matter of constitutional analysis, but he was swimming
against the tide. The proposition that the Executive branch could use international
agreements to bypass the Constitution was analytically dubious, but it seemed to
make practical sense in a wartime atmosphere that valued speed and flexibility in
foreign relations. Moreover, this proposition strongly revived the principle of
executive discretion in foreign affairs and thereby took the courts out of the
business of supervising the foreign policies of the federal government. The CurtissWright/Belmont/Pinktrilogy was another illustration of the Court's efforts to step
back from the role of constitutional scrutinizer of the activities of other branches in
the early 1940s.
V.

CONCLUSION: THE EMERGENCE OF SCRUTINY LEVELS JURISPRUDENCE

By the close of the Second World War, it appeared as if the Court had
minimized some of the pressure it placed upon itself by its cumulative boundary
tracing efforts of the past fifty-odd years. The Court signaled that in two major
areas, state and federal legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions and
foreign relations, it was prepared to defer to the decisions of the other branches.
Only in free speech cases did the Court assume a more hands-on posture, and it took
pains to justify that posture by invoking the fundamental status of speech rights in
a democratic society. The Court may well have contemplated a more modest role
for itself-and a more robust status for the departmental discretion principle-as
it entered the the second half of the twentieth century.
If so, the Court failed to anticipate that its effort to replace boundary tracing
with a posture based on scrutiny levels would result in scrutiny levels jurisprudence
taking on a life of its own, indeed becoming a vital element of the Court's later
twentieth century constitutional jurisprudence. The 1940s Court might not have
foreseen two lines of cases that proved important in the development of scrutiny
levels jurisprudence. Equal protection arguments, described as late as 1927 as the
"last resort of constitutional" discourse,4 3 became increasingly important as the
Court involved itself with racial segregation cases. The casual language of Skinner,
to the effect that invidious discriminations justified more searching judicial review
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under the Equal Protection Clause, came to be picked up in cases where states
sought to prevent children of different races from attending the same public
school" 54 or persons of different races from marrying.4 " And once the Court
established strict scrutiny in one set of equal protection cases, it felt pressure to
decide whether strict scrutiny should apply to legislative discriminations based on
gender, alienage, or sexual preference. By the 1970s another tier of scrutiny,
intermediate review, had emerged in gender discrimination cases. 56 Scrutiny levels
decisions had become embedded in the Court's equal protection jurisprudence.
Similarly, the idea of fundamental rights triggering heightened scrutiny, first
employed as an analytical technique in incorporated rights cases, revived itself in
a new line of due process cases beginning in the 1960s. In those cases, the Court
required that statutes preventing the dissemination of birth control information to
married couples45 7 or single persons,458 or preventing women from electing to
terminate pregnancies, 4" rest on more than a rational basis because the Court
deemed the right to make intimate personal choices to be fundamental. This use of
heightened scrutiny meant that a version of boundary tracing had returned to the
Court's due process decisions, because it continued, during the same time period,
to require that police power legislation affecting economic activity be grounded
only on a rational basis. ' But instead of boundary tracing being accomplished
through doctrinal formulas, the Court instead employed scrutiny levels, with
heightened scrutiny being triggered by the Court's positing a set of due process
liberties as fundamental.
By the end of the twentieth century, scrutiny levels decisions had so infiltrated
the Court's constitutional jurisprudence that some commentators concluded that it
was about to collapse of its own weight." Although the Court had designed the
technique of submitting challenged actions of the other branches to different levels
of scrutiny to prevent it from making the sort of refined doctrinal distinctions that
were susceptible to being attacked as ideologically motivated, the scrutiny levels
decision itselfbecame susceptible to criticism as being outcome-determinative. The
late-twentieth-century history of the Court's scrutiny levels jurisprudence ultimately
raises two questions. Why did the Court think that it could solve the interpretive
difficulties it confronted in the 1930s by abandoning boundary tracing-along with
its accompanying doctrinal formulas-and by adopting an interpretive posture
emphasizing scrutiny levels? And why has a constitutional jurisprudence based on
scrutiny levels failed to solve the Court's predicament?
The first question answers itself if one briefly recapitulates the shift from
republican to democratic constitutional theory that took place during the first three
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decades of the twentieth century. Although the Court took on an expanded role as
a constitutional interpreter after the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments, the
judiciary's increased presence as guardian of the boundary between public power
and private rights was not inconsistent with republican theory. So long as judges
were seen as declaring-rather than making-law, and as not entering into the
domain ofpolicy, their development of doctrinal formulas to aid in boundary tracing
was not problematic.
The difficulties with a constitutional jurisprudence of boundary tracing began
when human agency became elevated to a position of causal primacy, when judges
began to be regarded as a species of lawmakers, and when the formulas of boundary
tracing came to be criticized as ideologically driven. As arguments pointing out the
inconsistencies between lawmaking by unelected judges and democratic theory
became part of constitutional commentary, courts were asked to justify
interpretations that substituted judicial glosses on constitutional provisions for the
policies of the elective branches. The vulnerability of the judiciary to arguments
premised on democratic theory was heightened by the fact that the expanded role
of the courts as constitutional interpreters after Reconstruction reduced the scope
of the departmental discretion principle.
From this perspective, the abandonment of boundary tracing for the posture
outlined in Carolene Products seemed to compliment democratic constitutional
theory. The technique of presuming legislation to be constitutional removed the
courts from having to oversee many of the policies of the popularly elected
branches. It promised to revive the departmental discretion principle by allowing the
legislatures or the Executive to resolve most contested issues ofsocial policy. Those
instances in which the Court departed from the presumption of constitutionality and
continued to play the role of overseers did not seem numerous at the time the Court
decided CaroleneProducts.To be sure, there were some rights that could not be
infringed by majorities, even in a society premised on majority rule, but those were
rights self-evidently associated with democratic theory, such as speech rights. For
the most part, the Court applied those rights against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Judicial departures from the
presumption of constitutionality to protect those rights was consistent with
democratic constitutionalism. It was not anticipated, when the Court handed down
CaroleneProducts,that there would be many other occasions where judges would
depart from the presumption.
In short, the Carolene Products regime did not anticipate an elaborate
jurisprudence of scrutiny levels. The tentative blueprint for judicial review Justice
Stone sketched in Carolene Products came before racial discrimination cases
expanded the importance of the Equal Protection Clause, before the Cold War and
anti-Communism ushered in additional efforts to restrict speech, and before altered
attitudes toward sexuality rendered the enforcement of public morality a more
treacherous enterprise. As legislative efforts to classify persons on the basis of race
or other endemic characteristics, to repress unpopular speech, or to enforce sexual
taboos came to be seen as inconsistent with one or another tenet of democratic
theory, the Court departed from its ordinary posture of deference. As the categories
of CaroleneProductsdepartures increased, the technique appointed to justify those
departures was the Court's choice of scrutiny levels.
More scrutiny levels choices begat still more, resulting in scrutiny levels
decisions becoming a routine feature of the Court's constitutional decisions. As that
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occurred, justifications for scrutiny levels choices began to occupy a role
comparable to the doctrinal formulas that accompanied the Court's earlier efforts
at boundary tracing. The justifications for scrutiny levels decisions became
vulnerable to the same line of criticism that was directed at boundary tracing
formulas-they were simply rationalizations for ideologically determined outcomes.
The history of judicial scrutiny suggests that no definitive solution to the
problem of reconciling judicial review with a political theory premised on popular
sovereignty is capable of being achieved. All previous "solutions," whether
premised on republican or democratic constitutional theory, whether emphasizing
the departmental discretion principle, boundary tracing, or constitutional
presumptions and scrutiny level choices, earned their temporary success from tacit
understandings that made the lines they mark between the province of the judiciary
and that of the other departments seem natural and inevitable instead of artificial
and dubious.
At one point in its history, American constitutional jurisprudence presumed that
the distinction between judicial and political questions was intelligible. At another
point, it presumed that the boundary between public power and private rights could
coherently be traced. At another point, it presumed that there was a clear difference
between the sort of legislation that required heightened scrutiny and the sort that
only required minimal scrutiny. Those presumptions did not come from the
Constitution or any other legal source. They came from a set of shared social and
political attitudes that shaped conceptions of the role of the judiciary in American
constitutionalism. As those attitudes changed, the presumptions changed with them.
A robust constitutional principle of departmental discretion gave way to judicial
boundary tracing, which gave way to judicially-fashioned levels of scrutiny. None
of those regimes of constitutional interpretation should be regarded as cast in stone.
None should be regarded as intrinsically superior to the others. The scrutiny regime
has been with us for approximately seventy years, and it may have exhausted itself
as a helpful technique of constitutional interpretation. Ifwe understand its historical
origins, perhaps we can understand its contingent status.
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